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COMPETITION, CONTRACT, AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION
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VERTICAL integration, the coordination of successive stages of production
or distribution,' has received considerable attention in recent years. This at-
tention, however, has been confined largely to integration by stock or asset
acquisition--ownership integration. Contract integration-vertical contractual
arrangements such as requirement, output, exclusive dealing, franchise, con-
signment, and agency agreements 2 --has just begun to be treated as a form of
vertical integration 3 although it is widely used to achieve industrial coordina-
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1. Cole defines "vertical integration" as "that type of organization that comes into
existence when two or more successive stages of production and/or distribution are com-
bined under the same control." Cole, General Discussion of Vertical Integration, in
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN IRLUUETING 9, 99 (Bureau Econ. & Bus. Research, U. Ill.,
No. 74, 1952). According to Adelman, "a firm is called vertically integrated when it
transmits from one of its departments to another a good or service which could, without
major adaptation, be sold in the market." Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63
HARv. L. REv. 27 (1949); Bork adopts this definition in Vertical Integration and the
Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. Cni. L. REv. 157
n.1 (1954). For Frank, "[Vlertical Integration may be described as the functional
co-ordination of one or more units in each of the several successive stages of production,
so that they are all operated as a single, unified industrial process." Frank, The Signili-
ance of Industrial Integration, 33 J. PoL. EcoN. 179 (1925). See also Buans, TnE DE-
CLINE OF CoETrmoI 421 (1936) (salability of intermediate products).
2. The vertical joint-venture agreement might be added to this list of contractual
coordination devices. Joint venture is a hybrid integration device which combines owner-
ship and contract. Typically, a supplier and his customer set up a jointly owned subsidiary
in order to transact their business. See note 14 infra.
3. See McLaren, Related Problems of "Requiremnent I' Contracts and Acquisitions in
Vertical Integratim Under the Anfi-Trust Laws, 45 Iu. L REv. 141 (1950); Adelman,
Corporate Integration, in How To CO=PLY WrrE TEE ANTITRUST LAws 290, 303-04
(Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954); Rostow, Over All Size, in id. 311, 323; Hia & HA.E,
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tion and even control. Nor have informal understandings which are ancillary
to formal contracts and which aim at coordination 4 been included in an overall
concept of integration.
As a result, the functional similarities or differences between these alter-
native methods of integration have been underemphasized or ignored. Con-
tractual arrangements aimed at coordinating the supply of materials or dis-
posal of output frequently affect the contracting firms, as well as the rest of
the industry, in much the same way as ownership of suppliers or outlets
does. But important differences may attend the two devices-differences in
business effectiveness and in legal consequences. With an eye toward possible
differences between ownership and contract, part I of this Article will deal
with the industrial and economic aspects of vertical integration. The remain-
ing parts are devoted to legal problems: part II examines the effect of the
antitrust laws on integration systems and part III considers the impact of
pricing regulations.
I. VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN ITS BUSINESS SETTING
THE IMPACT ON THE FIRM
Cost reduction is the principal technological justification for vertical in-
tegration.5 "Cost reduction," however, is a broad term which requires further
MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN AcT 204 (1958) ("vertical
control"). Compare id. n.12 (§ 3 of the Clayton Act not applicable) ; Levi, The DuPont
Case and § 7, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 10 (1958). However, the courts have been aware
that contractual arrangements may serve as alternatives to ownership integration. See
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319 (1949) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.) ; cf. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 (I.S.
219, 243-44 (1948); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Fox, 297 U.S. 381 (1936).
Contractual arrangements aiming at vertical integration extend over a wide range,
verging at one extreme on the permanence and control of ownership integration, and at
the other approaching the impermanence and lack of control of the spot-market transaction.
4. For example, manufacturers frequently have an understanding of exclusive dealing
with their dealers, although exclusive dealing is not required by the formal sales contract.
This is particularly common when the manufacturer leases the premises to the dealer.
Loans or extension of credit may assure an outlet or secure a source of supply, and
thus serve as devices of vertical industrial coordination. See International Shoe Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) U 26611 (1957), consent order entered, id. Ui
27074; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Coln-
inittee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 3, pt. 6, at 2598-99 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as 1955 Sen. Hearings] ; id. pt. 7, at 2665-66, 2668; Bus. Week, May 19, 1951, p. 26
(General Motors lends to steel companies to secure their output) ; United Stateg v.
National City Lines, 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951).
5. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. Rxv. 27, 48 (1949) ("Ste-
cessful integration . . . consists in the saving of overhead, and results in doing a given
job more cheaply.").
Of course, vertical integration may occur without any rational justification. Historical
accident and mere chance may cause a vertical integration pattern in an industry where
there are no economies or diseconomies of scale. Adelman, Concept and Statstiual
[Vol, 69:1
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analysis, for it encompasses a multitude of reasons for adopting integration."
Perhaps the most important of these is the increased stability of operations
that coordination affords. Consumer outlets, sources of supply, and uniform-
ity of quality are made more secure, thus increasing the feasibility of long-
range planning.7 Facilities can be fully utilized, overtime production or idle
plant minimized, s and inventory reduced.9 foreover, vertical integration
eliminates many costs incurred in the transfer of goods from one control to
another. The most obvious of these are marketing expenses.10 Also, when
goods are manufactured for general salability rather than for a specific known
function, many all-purpose features unnecessary to each individual buyer are
incorporated, thereby raising the cost of production in order to increase
market appeal." Such "functional cross-hauling" costs can be eliminated by
integration.
Measurem et of Vertical Integration, in BusINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY
281, 320 (1955). For a discussion of underwriters' profits as a motivation for ownership
integration, see Thorp, The Persistence of the Merger Movement, 21 Am. EcoN. REV.
77, 85-86 (Supp. 1931). And psychological factors such as power and prestige should not
be ignored. See 2 DEvING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CoRroRATioNs 812 (5th ed. 1053):
Adelman, supra note 5, at 34; JmVIES, ORDA. BY PLANNING 29, 30 (1948).
6. For example, to the extent that vertical integration lessens human wear and tear
attendant to the constant making of sales contracts, it is a cost reduction factor. See
Llewellyn's excellent discussion of this point in Book Review, 52 HAnv. L. REv. 700, 701
(1939), referring to the human economies of standardized contracts.
7. See DEAN, MANAGERIAL EcoNoMics 117 (1951) ; Girdner, Inlegrated Marketing
Institutions, 209 ANNALS 55 (1940). In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232.
287 (1936), respondent defended itself against a charge of violation of § 2 of the Clayton
Act by asserting that the large assured volume obtained from its requirements contract
integration with Sears, Roebuck served to "remove hazards and insure stability by
avoiding the fluctuation of profit inevitable in respondent's other business... :' See note
526 infra.
See also KImDALL & KIMBALL, PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIO.N 61 (6th ed.
1947) ("danger of having production slowed up because of lack of supplies greatly
reduced") ; FoLTs, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 169-70 (1938).
8. This factor is most significant when overhead costs are large. See DAVIS, VFsRT-
CAL INTEGRATION IN THE TEXTnE INDUSTRIES 3 (1938).
9. KIMALL & KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 61; Frank, The Significance of
Industrlal Integration, 33 J. POL. ECON. 179, 190-91 (1925); see NEvi.s, Foro: Tnn
TimEs, THE MAN, THE COM PANY 336 (1954). But see DE CuAzEAv & KAs, I.TEG;rATh'.
IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 454 (1959).
10. CON-VERSE & HUEGY, ELEMENTS OF MARKETING 199 (3d ed. 1947) (savings on
"salesmen, advertising, sales promotion, sales managers, buyers"). See also Girdner.
supra note 7; Frank, supra note 9, at 179, 190-91. These expenses also include handling.
transportation (geographical cross-hauling), and credit losses.
11. A familiar example of this is the "Swiss Army" knife, wfith saw, file, curkscrew,
awl, bottle opener, screwdriver, can opener, and scissors, in one package. While this tool
may be practical for the person who needs all of these items, the person needing only a
few of them who had to buy it because nothing else was available would find himself
paying for tools he did not need. Cf. DAvis, VERTICAL IlTEGRATION IN THE TEXTILE
INDUSTRIES 2 (1938) ("Production policies of individual businesses are often attuned
to speculative factors in intermediate markets and not related to the demand for finished
1959]
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Stability advantages exist irrespective of the method of vertical integration
chosen, i.e., contract or ownership. But the degree of realization of these and
other benefits is dependent upon the particular form adopted. The two
methods differ, for example, in the degree of control and flexibility offered;
other relevant factors are labor costs and tax consequences.
Control
The chief distinction between ownership and contract as devices for vertical
integration is the means of control available for coordination of the organiza-
tions involved. Ownership integration maximizes control-exerted by cor-
porate directives and enforced by status sanctions.12 Control is necessarily
more indirect when contract integration is employed. The traditional contract
remedies--damages, rescission, perhaps specific performance-are the overt
sanctions available. The threat of nonrenewal is, however, often equally
potent. For many purposes, these indirect sanctions control the integrated
firm as effectively as the status sanctions of ownership.18 But whenever con-
textiles. . . . The fundamental importance of integration is that it offers a possibility of
co-ordinating the different processes to avoid misdirected production at the intermediate
stages.").
12. Under asset ownership, this method of control and enforcement is direct. Under
stock ownership, control is exerted in two stages. The integrating firm votes the stock,
and the directors thus elected issue the directives and apply the status sanctions, as well
as being subject to them.
13. See note 481 infra and accompanying text.
The manufacturer does not have to possess resources to be able to command them;
and, whatever the facts of ownership, the operations by which material and parts
converge into cars represent a single technical process. It is control of design and
sales which gives the manufacturer his strategic position; the importance of com-
plete corporation integration is easily and frequently overemphasized.
Adams, The Autontobile-A Luxury Becomes a Necessity, in HAMILTON & Assocs.,
PRICE AND PRICE PoLicy 27, 58-59 (1938).
Contract integration can be made more effective by establishing close relationships
between integrating firms.
Successful subcontracting . . . regards the operations of the supplier as part
of a continuous process, leading up to and including the operations in the buyer's
own plant. In this concept, the supplier's material control, production efficiency,
scheduling, and service, are definitely the concern of the buyer and his company,
to be handled with the maximum of cooperation and mutual assistance. So far as
the subcontracts are concerned, the supplier's operations are a part of his customer's
operation, even though they are carried on under a different roof and a different
management
HEiN'RiTz, PURCHASING 314 (1947); see FOLTs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 172,
General Electric has been particularly diligent in coordinating the activities of its
subcontractors. It provides them with technical assistance, helps them tool up, and main-
tains a department which specializes in finding, helping, and keeping subcontractors.
Tolley, How We Work With Subcontractors, General Electric Rev., Sept. 1957, p. 38;
Fouch, How To Coordinate Subcontracting To Meet Production Schcdules, Am. Ma-
chinist, Feb. 15, 1954, p. 137; Aircraft Subcontractors Still Fly High, Steel, March 31,
1952, pp. 56, 57.
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trol is crucial to secure supply or adequate quality, business has found it
advisable to supplement, and even to replace, contract by ownership integra-
tion.1 4 For example, backward vertical integration by ownership increased
greatly in the period immediately following World War II, because many
producers were never sure when and whether they would get another ship-
ment of raw materials as a result of widespread material shortages and con-
sequent private rationing.15
Flexibility
The correlatives of control are responsibility and commitment. Because of
its fixed investment, the enterprise vertically integrated through ownership
14. According to DAvis, V-RTIcAL INTmGRATiox IN THE TEXTmE INDUSTMIEs 10-11
(1938), backward integration by contract in textile manufacture has been very successful,
but forward integration by contract has not, and has ended up in full merger to assure
adequate coordination and quality control. See also Frank, supra note 1, at 179, 185-86
(ownership integration is by far the best assurance of stability of operations).
Examples of supplementing contract integration with ownership may be found in the
cases. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Hodgman, 13 F2d 781, 782 (3d ir. 1926) ; Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232, 271-72 (1936).
A compromise approach to this problem is the vertical joint-venture, in which corpora-
tions at successive stages of production or distribution of a product set up a jointly owned
subsidiary to handle intermediate stages of production. See 1955 Sen. Hearings pt. 2, at
500-02; National Lead Co. Ann. Rep., 1953, p. 21; MOODY, INDUSTRIALS 2078 (1957)
(National Lead, Goodyear, and Bird & Son formed Rubarite, Inc. to produce rubberized
barytes for addition to highway asphalt mixtures; each company deals in one of the
ingredients); Chemical & Engineering News, Feb. 4, 1957, p. 18 (Monsanto and Emery
build plant to convert paper pulp by-products into rosin for Monsanto and fatty acids
for Emery; the by-product plant is integrated by contract with St. Regis Paper Co. for
the supply of the pulp by-product) ; Kahn, The Chenticals Induisry, in ThE Smucrun,
OF AEmucA IxDusTRY- 199, 215 (Adams rev. ed. 1954).
15. Another common risk-reducing purpose is protection against shortages of supply.
During the early postwar years this motivation dominated, because supply shortages
were absolute; many producers were never sure when and whether they would get
another shipment. This danger of complete cut-off in raw material supply does
not fit into economic doctrine, because theoretically it is always possible to get
supplies by bidding up prices a little more. But theory overlooks the phenomenon
of private rationing, where suppliers keep prices rigid for wide ranges of demand
and dole out their product according to past purchases or some other non-price
scheme. I
DAx, CArrrAL BUnrNGr 142-43 (1951).
In 1940 Safeway reported that meat purchasing involved "no procurement problems
worth mentioning." Fortune, Oct. 1940, p. 132. But by 1945 Safeway was being forced,
it claimed, to integrate because the big meat packers weren't allocating it its share of
meat. The Interstate Merchant, May 6, 1945, p. 1. Before World War II, the fixed policy
of Republic Steel Corporation was to be not committed for more than half of its ore
requirements so that the company could take advantage of cheaper "distress" ore. But
after the war, the company had to go "over to ... ownership or long-term contractfs]
... [to] become covered or integrated," because of the necessity of having a secure supply.
Hearings Before the Subcdninittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, pt. 4a, at 240 (1950) (testimony of
C. M. White, President, Republic Steel).
1959]
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may show considerable inertia and inflexibility. 0 Contract integration, on the
other hand, offers the parties a high degree of flexibility, facilitating adapta-
tion to changing circumstances, and the prompt reallocation of productive
facilities.' 7 This is of particular importance in industries which must respond
quickly to design or style changes, or those characterized by rapid tech-
nological obsolescence, or changes in the business cycle.' 8
Flexibility may conflict, however, with stability. In a very real sense, the
two are antithetical. To the extent that an organization makes commitments
16. KIMBALL & KImBALL, PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 62 (6th ed.
1947). ("Once [a highly integrated] . . . organization is 'tuned up' to produce a given
product, it is difficult, and expensive to change over to new models or different pro-
ducts."). Such inflexibility may particularly be present when the enterprise is very
large. For a discussion of size as a factor leading to inflexibility, see text at note 26
infra.
17. Much of the inertia of the vertical concern arises from fixed investments that
are not easily put to new uses or readily liquidated. . . . [T]he best way to attain
the maximum degree of flexibility would be to restrict all investment to materials
and to have all manufacturing operations carried on by contract operators. This
in effect is th(policy which nearly all retailers and wholesalers have followed in
venturing into the textile business. . . . It should be emphasized that integration
through ownership of goods rather than through facilities depends on the avail-
ability of reliable and competent contract operations.
DAVIS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THEI TEXTILE IN DusTIEs 117-18 (1938) ; see id. at 8;
Bus. Week, July 7, 1951, pp. 116, 118; id., June 30, 1951, p. 72; Baker, Peacetine
Customers: Toolbuilding Sudbs, Steel, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 70. But see Aviation Week,
Sept. 24, 1951, p. 155 (assertion that the translation of aircraft design changes into
production is slower when production is subcontracted out).
18. If frequent changes in design are demanded, why not, as in days of old, shift
some of the risk and expense to the manufacturer of parts? . .. Instead of invest-
ing in a plant to make radiators, when today's style may be outmoded tomorrow,
it may be advisable from year to year selectively to buy from the radiator specialist
the product which fits best with current designs . . . . The invention of a better
brake may render an ancillary brake plant obsolete; it may be better policy for the
manufacturer to buy from an independent concern licensed to make it. Since the ap-
peal of style is strong in respect to some parts and weak as regards others, a partial
rather than a complete integration may be the answer to a serious problem.
Adams, supra note 13, at 58; McLean & Haigh, How Business Corporations Grow, Harv.
Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1954, pp. 81, 87.
However, risk can be so severe that it is impossible to integrate by contract and
ownership integration is "thrust upon" a manufacturer. See 1955 Sen. Hearings pt. 8, at
4298-99 (GM claimed it purchased Euclid to demonstrate the utility of "hydramatic" to
the construction equipment industry after the latter refused to believe it would work);
DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 17, at 71-72; Klaw, Lever's Artful Dodging, Fortune, June 1959,
p. 125, at 158 (when Monsanto developed a new, low-sudsing detergent, it was unable to
interest the soap industry in the product, and was forced to integrate vertically into distri-
bution; when "all" caught on, it was able to sell out to Lever, see note 354 itifra and
accompanying text). See also HALE & HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZz AND SHAPE UNDER
THE SHERMAN ACT 237 n.13, 463-64 (1958). This may account for the use of vertical
joint-venture agreements in the development of new product lines. See id. at 144 & n.20
(horizontal combinations).
[Vol. 69:1I
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to insure stability of operations, it must surrender a degree of flexibility.
Ownership is generally the ultimate commitment, and by the same token it
minimizes flexibility. Contract offers the parties their choice of the full range
from complete commitment and no flexibility to complete flexibility and al-
most no commitment. Thus, contract ideally makes it possible for the parties
to select whatever mixture of flexibility and stability they deem optimal. Of
course, what is the optimum for one contracting party may not be optimum
for the other. Hence, the extent to which each party approximates his
optimum will depend on his bargaining position.
Bargaining power is a crucial consideration in contract integration." Nor-
mally, when risk is shifted, its assumption must be paid for.2 0 For example,
when parts are subcontracted out and a risk is shifted, the prime contractor
may have to pay a premium over the immediate cost he would incur if he
chose to manufacture the parts himself.2 1 Thus, he still would carry the "cost"
of the shifted risk. But the prime contractor may succeed in transferring to
the weaker party the potential adverse effects of a change in the business
cycle or some other such business variable. Thus, often a manufacturer has
utilized contract integration to shift losses stemming from fluctuations in raw
material 2 2 and inventory values 2 "to other corporate units who can levy no
19. Bargaining power, it should be realized, need not be the result of monopoly
power. It may result from the normal "stickiness" of a "workably" competitive market.
See Adelman, supra note 1, at 48.
20. For a discussion of contract as a risk-distribution device, see Patterson, The
Apportlidnnet of Business Risks Through Legal De-ices, 24 COLUm. L Ruv. 335, 347-59
(1924).
21. Some production men have expressed dislike for dealing with subcontractors
because of the high profit subs exact. See Casting Off the Subconlractor, Bus. Week,
Aug. 15, 1953, p. 43. However, this same source discusses the slump which hit sub-
contractors after the Korean truce. Parts subcontractors suffer great fluctuations in their
business activity between boom and recession, because their customers buy at peak demand
periods, rather than expand, but use their own plant facilities when business slackens.
See also Make It or Buy It: Which Pays Off?, Bus. Week, July 3, 1954, p. 106; Squeeze
on Subcontractors, Am. Machinist, Aug. 26, 1957, p. 144; Coughlin, Job Shops Hard Hit
by Puilbacks, Aviation Week, 'Oct. 11, 1954, p. 21; Coughlin, Small Business Fights for
Survival, id. Oct. 4, 1954, p. 16. It would appear then that the allegedly high prices subs
charge reflect risks they face.
22. See Stryker, New Spark at Autolite, Fortune, Aug. 1955, p. 102, 140 (effect of
Chrysler poor sales on supplier).
In the automobile industry, manufacturers appear usually to control the terms of con-
tracts with suppliers. See 1955 Sen. Hearings pt. 7, 2982, 2999, 3001-02 (use of GM
form contracts); id. pt. 6, at 2269 ("economic colonialism" alleged); id. at 2323
(allegation GM coerces its suppliers). Chrysler is said to have a policy of obtaining sup-
pliers to whom it is the most important customer. United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 634 (1957) (dissenting opinion). The size of automobile
industry suppliers may give some clue to their bargaining power. Three-quarters of
Chrysler and General Motors suppliers have less than 100 employees. OrnA-NzATIO. Fon
EuorEAN EcoNoMIc CooPERATiox, SoME AspEars oF THE MoToR VEHIcin I.nusTrnv
IN THE U.S.A. 26 (1953). In the aviation industry, half of the subcontractors on a typical
Air Force contract have less than 25 employees, while about 70% have less than 50
1959]
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demand upon his treasury . .. [and] who go under quietly .... ,24 And the
structure of the industry may be such that the unfavorable position of the
weaker party will persist indefinitely.25
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
The choice between production of or contracting for any component of the
firm's product also depends in part on the optimum size of the production
unit of the total product, including the component in question. When the size
of the plant producing the component "is comparatively small, combined own-
ership might increase efficiency and thus result in greater economies of scale.
In such a situation, ownership integration would be practical. But when the
production unit required for the component to be added is disproportionately
large, consolidated ownership could decrease overall efficiency, and thus be
economically unfeasible.
Large size may prove disadvantageous to an enterprise. A recent study
suggests that increases in internal lines of communication in an organization
decrease its rate of response to stimuli and render it less flexible with respect
to change.26 This would seem to confirm the skeptical views some writers
employees. Aviation Week, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 169. An employment breakdown on a
typical Air Force engine contract indicated that about 30% of the subcontractors employed
10 men or fewer, while 80% hire fewer than 100. According to the Radio Corporation
of America, half its subs have fewer than 100 employees. Karpeck, Expanded Electronics
Program Brings Surge in Subcontracting Opportunities, Steel, Nov. 26, 1951, p. 82.
See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. Ann. Rep., 1956, p. 27-28 (prefer small manufacturers
who look to Sears "for a substantial part of their distribution") ; Mackey v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), petition for cert. dismissed per stspulation, 355
U.S. 865 (1957); FTC, RMoar ON CoRoPATrz MERGERs AND AcQuiSITIoNS 166 (1955)
(exaggeration?); Hearings Before the Subco nmittee ont Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, pt. 4a, at 187-95,
211-13, 283-301 (1950).
23. "Flanders [general manager of Ford in 1906] brought in an expert stockkeeper,
who established a continuous inventory of materials and parts, whittling them down to
not more than a ten-day margin; thus the parts makers carried most of the inventory
costs." NEvixs, FoRD: THE TIMEs, THE MAN, THE COMPANY 336 (1954). See also
Adams, supra note 13, at 60-61.
24. Id. at 68-69.
25. Ownership integration may prove a means of escaping from a contract-of-adhesion
situation. Thus, where suppliers have monopoly power and exact monopoly prices, the
buyer may choose to manufacture his own supplies and by-pass the monopoly toll gate. See
CULLITION, MAKE OR BUY 75 (Bureau Bus. Research, Harv. Univ. No. 27, 1942); Rou-
INSON, THE STRucruRE OF CoMPETrrIV INDUSTRY 127-28 (1932) ; Adelman, supra note
1, at 47. See also DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 75-83.
26. Caplow, Organizational Size, 1 AD. SCIENC Q. 484, 502-05 (1957); accord,
PARKINSON, PARINSON's LAw 33-44 (1957); KimBALL & KIMBALL, PluRclPLus oF
INDUSTIUAL ORGANIZATION 62 (6th ed. 1947) ("great difficulty of effectively coordinating
and controlling a large enterprise. . . . cost of coordination will more than offset the
gain due to integration") ; jEVKES, ORDEAL BY PLANNING 12-14, 157 (1948). This had
been suggested earlier in SLCHTar, MODERN ECONOMIC SOcIETY 136-38 (1931). See also
BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 431-32 (1936).
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have expressed regarding the relative efficiency of the large organization.
Nor are inertia and stolidity the only diseconomies of scale. Decreased effi-
ciency may result from spreading management "too thin" or spreading it
among "hired hands" who lack entrepreneurial drive.28 And bigness can prove
a curse to its possessor as well as to its alleged victims. Public and govern-
mental hostility 29 to the large concern is always a relevant consideration.
Anti-chain-store legislation is an example of this hostility,30 as is resistance
by some consumers against dealing with large corporations. Factors such as
these favor integration by contract.
On the other hand, large size brings an organization greater bargaining
power, greater access to financing, and sometimes greater political influence.3 '
Size may make feasible the hiring of more expensive personnel or the estab-
lishment of a management training program.32  And a large enterprise is
more able to diversify, thus lessening the risk of loss due to changes in the
business environment.33
To secure the technological benefits of large-scale production, firms often
27. See Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positize Instrument of Progress, 14 U. Cnt.
L. REv. 567, 568 (1947) ; HALE & HALP, MARK~r PowER: SIZE AND SHAPE' UNDER THE:
SEHE m Acr 142 & n.13 (1958). But see Adelman, Effective Competition and the Anti-
trust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1291-92 & n.2 (1948).
28. Ridgeway, Administration of Manufacturer-Dealer Systems, I AD. ScsENcE Q.
464, 470 (1957); Cross, Vertical Integration in the Oil Industry, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-
Aug. 1953, p. 69, at 77-78; Cole, supra note 1, at 27,30-31. According to Slichter, maintaining
administrative control over a large organization is often prevented by employees and de-
partment heads who "doctor" the records because they are "more interested in how
efficient they appear to be than in how efficient they are; they often use more ingenuity
in covering up their shortcomings than in improving their efficiency." SmcnERr, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 137-38.
29. In recognition of political and public sentiment against big business, some oil
companies decided not to use ownership vertical integration but to use contract vertical
integration instead. McLEAx & HAIGH, THE GRoW'vTr OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPAN-sIS
510 (1954); 1 WrIrEY, ANTITR uST PoLicaEs 125 (1958). See also Cole, supra note 1,
at 36-37. Perhaps a similar motive was involved in GM's decision to buy refrigerator
parts for Frigidaire from American Motors "which it could as well make for itself." It
has been alleged that this was done to "silence" American as a "protestant." 1955 Sets.
Hearings pt. 6, at 2323.
30. See, e.g., IowA CODE AxN. §§ 424.1-.16 (1949) (chainstore tax); TEx. PFN. Coim
ArN. art. 1ll1d (1948) (same); PALAuOUNTAIN, TE PoLIrrcs OF DisTmxuTon 159-
87 (1955). This hostility was also a reason for the passage of the Robinson-Patman
Act. See id. at 189-91.
31. Cole, supra note 1, at 9, 26-27; Adelman, supra note 1, at 33; United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32. Cole, supra note 1, at 26.
33. Like conglomerate integration, although perhaps less effectively, vertical integra-
tion by ownership makes it possible for an enterprise to put its "eggs" in different
baskets. See Boatwright, Vertical Integration in. the Petroleum Industry, in VERTIcAL
INTEGRATION IN MAARKETING 136, 138-39 (Bureau Econ. & Bus. Research, U. Ill., No. 74,
1952); McLEAx & HAIGH, op. cit. supra note 29, at 83; Cross, supra note 2 0, at 77.
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integrate by contract with a "specialist" who enjoys economies of scale in
manufacture, purchasing, and research not attainable by the integrating firm.3 4
Even highly integrated industries, such as automobile manufacturing, have
found it to their advantage not to manufacture all of their own parts.36 Cer-
tainly few industries care to make their own nuts and bolts or paper clips.
Moreover, reliance on the specialist releases capital for the firm to employ
elsewhere in its operations or makes it possible for the firm to operate with
a smaller capital investment. In effect, the firm is able to tap the capital re-
sources of other firms in other industries. For infant industries, this may be
of great importance,3 6 and the availability of such specialists decreases the
capital barrier to entry.31
34. Where the technical unit requires to be large, not because all the processes re-
quire to be on a large scale, but because one process requires to be on a large scale,
that process tends to be separated off and performed for the main industry by
another subsidiary industry. Thus most motor firms buy.., parts .... By such
outside purchase the small firm can obtain almost all the economies available to
the large firm. It is at a disadvantage only in so far as its smaller demands
enable it to drive a less hard bargain with the specialist firm.
RoBINsoN, THE STRuCTaa OF COMPETIVE INDUSTRY 109-10 (1932).
Moreover, in distribution, for example, forward integration by the manufacturer may
be unsuccessful because the retail store requires many items, a "full line," to operate suc-
cessfully; but the manufacturer cannot efficiently produce a full line. Thus the outlet must
purchase from more than one manufacturer. Craig & Gabler, The Competitive Struggle
for Market Control, 209 ANNALS 84, 91-92 (1940); McLean & Haigh, How Business
Corporations Grow, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1954, pp. 81, 87.
For an example of specialization in distribution to achieve sufficient output to make
production economical, see Bus. Week, Oct. 9, 1954, p. 108 (Whirlpool Corp. got
"on top of the home laundry market .. . [through] the Kenmore line of washers, dryers,
and ironers" which it sells Sears Roebuck, building volume to reduce the effect of over-
head costs); cf. FTC, MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF FARM IMPI2MEN'rS 103
(1948) (specialty farm equipment manufacturers cannot afford ownership integration of
distribution).
35. Thus, Arvin Industries supplied parts (e.g. mufflers, defroster parts, structural
supports, interior trim) for 17 of the 19 passenger car makes in 1957. ARViN INDUSTRIES,
INC. ANN. REP., 1957, p. 7, 17.
The dominant characteristic of the independent parts fabricators as well as the
allied parts divisions of the vehicle manufacturer is that they tend to specialize in
relatively short lines of parts which have common manufacturing requirements
and require a high degree of skill and efficiency. In fact the basic competitive
strength of the parts fabricator as against the integrated vehicle manufacture is
the cost advantage which the 'specialist' has in spreading the heavy yet inescapable
outlay for research, tools and dies, over several contracts.
DAvissoN, THE MARKETING OF AUTOIOTIVE PARTS 133 (1954).
Occasionally, small ownership-integrated enterprises have shifted to contract integra-
tion because they could not keep up with technological progress requiring a higher and
higher degree of specialization. See Against Make or Buy Tide, Bus. Week, March 19,
1955, p. 194.
36. See note 77 infra.
37. Capital barriers to entry are discussed in text at notes 74-76 infra.
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Federal Taxation
In some limited circumstances, tax considerations are of importance in
determining the form of integration to be adopted. Since a comprehensive
treatment of the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code is beyond
the scope of this Article, some provisions which may bear most directly on
the problem will be pointed out. Ownership integration may have tax advan-
tages. The shareholders of the acquired firm might avoid realizing income
when the stock of the acquiring firm, rather than cash, is exchanged for the
stock of the acquired firm.38 Or, in the case of a sale of a closely held cor-
poration, they might be able to convert, on favorable terms, nonmarketable
securities into marketable ones, in preparation for anticipated estate taxes2 9
And when the stock is exchanged for money, the shareholders may be able
to close out their investment at capital gains rates rather than continue in an
enterprise yielding income taxable at ordinary rates and subject to continuing
business risk.40 Further, it is possible at times to convert a loss carryover
into money rather than to lose it through bankruptcy or expiration of the
five-year period for carrying losses forward.4' For the acquiring corporation,
the possibility of a forward carryover of past losses of the acquired firm may
be significant. For example, when Willys and Kaiser merged, Kaiser had a
sixty million dollar loss carryover which Willys could use to offset future
taxable earnings.4 It should be realized that such factors are relevant only
in rather special circumstances and generally play no role in a decision
whether to integrate by contract or ownership.
Turning to the question of tax economies with the vertically integrated
system already in operation, tax advantages of ownership are slight. One
difference is the possibility of filing a consolidated return.43 This substantially
decreases the likelihood that losses or loss carryovers at some level of production
will not be dissipated by nonuse. However, the tax rate on consolidated returns
is two per cent higher." And it is most doubtful that contract integrated
production can continue in the face of losses at some levels and gains at others
long enough for loss carryovers to accumulate and be lost.4 Renegotiation
of the contract or failure of the losing firm are more probable. 40 Finally, owner-
38. INT. Rxv. CoDS oF 1954, § 354.
39. See Butters, Recent Trends in lndustrial Concentralion and Taxation, in TAX-
ATION AND BusiNzss CoxcNTRAZiox 3, 13-16 (Tax Inst. Symposium 1950).
40. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201(b), 1221-23.
41. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 172, 381-82, 1212; see Western Pac. R.R. v. Western
Pac. R.R, 345 U.S. 247, 276-77 (1953) (dissent) (tax loss is asset of corporation just like
.any other asset, and its seller is entitled to reasonable compensation).
42. FTC, RPoRT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQuisiTioNs 138 (1955).
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1501.
44. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1503(a).
45. With respect to recoupment under ownership vertical integration see note 61 infra.
46. Another possibility is that the firm saddled with an onerous contract will buy up
the other firm. Thus, in 1926 General Motors bought all of isher Body's stock to
terminate an unfavorable long term requirements contract. 1955 Sen. Hearings pt. 8,
p. 4299.
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ship integration offered an opportunity at various times in the past to reduce
excess profits taxes by increasing the "invested capital" or historic income
base.41 But, by and large, these tax possibilities do not significantly favor
ownership integration over contract.
Labor Relations
Reliance on contract may, in some industries, enable an already unionized
firm to add a product component without paying the higher labor costs which
could attend expansion by ownership.48 The operation of the minimum wage
and hour laws might be similarly avoided.4 0 These factors would apparently
point to contract integration. But ownership integration may strengthen the
bargaining power of the combined entity and thus perhaps result in lower
total labor costs than would obtain if both firms bargain independently5 0
Unified ownership might, on the other hand, force the integrated firm to bar-
47. See Excess Profits Tax Act, ch. 1199, 64 Stat. 1137 (1951), expiration date ex-
tended, Act of July 16, 1953, ch. 202, 67 Stat. 175; Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940, ch.
757, § 201, 54 Stat. 975, repealed, Revenue Act of 1945, ch. 453, § 122, 59 Stat. 568; these
comprised Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 430-59, 710-36. A list of earlier excess profits tax
acts is given in Historical Note, 26 U.S.C.A. following § 241 (1955).
48. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692-93
(1951) (dissent) ; NLRB v. Business Mach. Mechanics Union, CIO, 228 F.2d 553, 555-59
(2d Cir. 1955) ; International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir.
1950) (dissent) ; Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) ; BETHEL, ESSENTIALS OF INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 163 (1954) ; CULUTON, op. cit.
supra note 25, at 58; cf. Squeeze on Subcontractors, Am. Machinist, Aug. 26, 1957, p. 144
(prime contractor shops highly organized, subcontractor shops unorganized); Make It
or Buty It: Which Pays Off.f, Bus. Week, July 3, 1954, p. 106 (use of partial contract
integration as bargaining tool against union). Moreover, a company may prefer to buy
rather than make in order not to increase the staff entitled to the company benefit plan,
guaranteed annual wage, or pension.
49. Modley, Subcontracts Face Strangulation, Aviation Week, April 14, 1952, p. 49.
This article protests vigorously against proposed regulations, 17 Fed. Reg. 2070-71 (1952),
for administration of Walsh-Healey Act, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1952)
which would require prime contractors to make their subs conform to the act. The
author says regulation would destroy subcontracting system, make "subcontracting a
hindrance rather than a help." Another regulation objected to would make integrated
manufacturers apply provisions of act to all stages of their operations, rather than just
to the manufacturer of the "ultimate product." Accord, Meiklejohn, Dresscs-The Ipact of
Fashion on a Business, in HAMILTON & Assocs., PaIcE AND PmICE Poucizs 299, 347-48
(1938) ; see Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 171 F. Supp. 37, 39 (D. Md. 1959) ; 1 WHIITNEY,
ANTITRUST Poucms 125 (1958); Adams, supra note 13, at 27, 60-61.
50. Moreover, a contractor may suffer from the labor troubles of his suppliers. In
1953, shortly after Studebaker attained full production, a ten-week strike in the plant of
one of its important suppliers forced it to reduce production sharply. Immediately after
strike settlement and resumption of full production, the retail car market collapsed and
Studebaker found that it had no opportunity to sell its cars. Studebaker Corp. Ann. Rep.,
1953, p. 4-5; see Champion Motors Co. Ann. Rep., 1948 (sales dropped 46% partly due
to supplier strike) ; N.Y. Times, April 1, 1959, p. 51, col. 5 (Chrysler losses from glass
supplier's strike spur adoption of tapered ownership integration).
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gain as part of the integrating firm's industry, where "follow the leader"
wage trends upward may be more prevalent. If such was the case, labor would
be ultimately cheaper under contract integration.
A Mixed System of Integration
The weight to be given the foregoing factors varies with the business
cycle 5' and long range trends of each industry.52  Their significance also
changes as the firm passes through different stages in its history.5 Hence,
business organizations tend to experiment with mixed systems-using con-
tract for some factors of production or distribution and ownership for
others.54 Mloreover, for some components, enterprises blend the two devices,
adopting a "tapered" system of integration.3 This scheme is frequently em-
51. "The greater the percentage of company manufacture of the products distributed
by the company, the greater would be the effect of the swings of the business cycle [risk
of idle plant, need to lay off]!' CuLLrO , dp. cit. supra note 25, at 72.
Forward integrations are likely to be formed at moments when productive
capacity outruns consumption, for their purpose is the appropriation of certain
markets. They are likely therefore ... in... depression. They will be weakest,
because least necessary, in times of good business. On the other hand, backvard
integrations are likely to be formed in times of prosperity, since they exist to
prevent owners of temporarily limited supplies of raw material exploiting the con-
suming firms. They will be weakest, perhaps.., even break up, in ... depression.
RoBINsoN, THE Sraucrturx OF COMPRTITIVE INDUsTRY 129 (1932).
52. "Young companies, just as companies in young industries, are subject to many
more risks than better established ones. Frequently their working capital is not plentiful.
Any new company faces risks, many of which cannot be forseen... sufficient to make it
worthwhile to avoid the additional risks involved in making things which can be bought."
CULuTON, op. cit. supra note 25, at 78. See also SELrznE, A FINANCIAL HIsTORY OF THE
Am mcaN Au'rouroBE INDUsTRY 28-29, 48, 264-73 (1928).
53. CULIITON, op. cit. supra note 25, at 78; 1955 Sen. Hearings pt. 2, at 545 (owner-
ship integration desirable only for auto makers producing more than 800 cars a day).
Firms frequently shift from ownership to contract to enjoy the benefits of new develop-
ments by independent suppliers. See, e.g., id. pt. 7, at 2997 (shift from ownership to
contract for Buick torque converter, Chevrolet clutch plate). See also CLARK & CLARK,
PRINCIPLES OF MARETING 145 (3d ed. 1942).
54. "Greater size may be an advantage in purchasing or in marketing but a disad-
vantage in manufacturing; or it may be an advantage in manufacturing but a disadv-ant-
age in marketing. Every enterprise, therefore, is a compromise between the advantages
of largeness or smallness in some departments and the disadvantages in others.' SucnTEa,
MoDR EcoNOmc SocmrY 134 (1931).
The automobile industry is one of the best examples of an integrated industry using
a mixed system. See Adams, supra note 13, at 58-59; FORD MoroR Co., ForY YERs 15
(1943) ("Self-integrated as it [Ford] is, it still looks to more than 6000 firms . . . for
parts and services") ; 1955 Sen. Hearings pt. 2, at 652; id. pt. 7, at 3638. The aviation
industry is another good example, see Aviation Week, Nov. 22, 1954, p. 20 (52% of
contract dollar goes to subs), as is electronic manufacturing, see Karpeck, supra note
22, at 82 (60% to subcontractors).
55. "Tapered integration' differs from a mixed integration in that the latter involves
the use of contract for some factors of production or distribution and ownership for
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ployed where it is difficult to keep outputs at successive stages in balance with
one another.50
THE IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY
An optimum blend of ownership integration, contract integration, and spot
market purchasing probably makes the average firm most adaptable to changes
in its business environment and provides for the best allocation of its re-
sources. But the ideal allocation of resources from the firm's viewpoint may
not prove consonant with the optimum allocation of goods and services in the
economic or social system as a whole.
Vertical integration, whether by contract or ownership, necessarily fore-
closes access to a segment of the market, since competitors of the integrating
firm often can no longer deal with the integrated enterprise. Because of such
foreclosure, vertical integration has been viewed as an evil in itself.5 The wrongs
others while the former involves the use of contract for securing part of the firm's needs
for some factor and ownership for the rest of that same factor. The rationale of tapered
integration is discussed in Adams, supra note 13, at 57-59. For an example of tapered
integration, see 1955 Sen. Hearings pt. 7, at 3004-05 (Chevrolet procured 50% of its
clutch plate requirements from Borg & Beck in 1954 but manufactured the other 50%
itself).
56. See DAN, MANAGERIAL EcoNoMics 117 (1951); FOLTS, INTRODUCrION TO IN-
DUSTMAUL MANAGEMENT 172 (1938); DAVIS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE TEXTILE
INDUST FS 87 (1938) (". . . [IJntegrated companies today might profitably accept un-
balanced operations as the normal way in which they have to do business and, wherever
possible, adjust their organizations accordingly.")
The Richfield Oil Co. has had a striking history of unbalanced operations. United
Oil Co., a crude oil producer purchased the Richfield Oil Co., then primarily a refiner and
distributor, in 1923 "to secure an assured outlet for its production." The merged concern's
subsequent "expansion in marketing and refining proved to be the company's undoing, for
it could not purchase a sufficient supply of crude oil at reasonable cost." In 1931, the
company went into receivership. When Richfield was reorganized, finally, in 1938, its
integration was out of balance; refining capacity was six times its crude production and
station outlets were few and poor. Richfield then entered exploration and also made
long-term output contracts with producers in a major new oil field. This resulted in crude
production exceeding refining capacity. Hence, a new round of station and refinery build-
ing began. Brief for Richfield Oil Co., United States v. Standard Oil Co., TRAvE- Rmt.
REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) ff 69399 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 1959) (consent decree). Richfield
eventually found itself a defendant in two antitrust cases brought by the Government,
discussed in notes 166-74 infra and accompanying text.
Another reason for adopting tapered integration is that the contract procurement
system and ownership procurement system can be compared or even played off against
one another. The firm can use "its own processing costs as a standard by which to judge
the fairness of prices quoted by outside suppliers," CULLITON, op. cit. supra note 25, at
87 & n.3, or it can provide "competition in costs for [its] own departments," by using
the outsiders as the standard, BETHEL, ESSENTIALS OF INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 163
(1954) ; Make It or Buy It: Which Pays Offf, Bus. Week, July 3, 1954, p. 106 ("keel)
its own engineering and design people on their toes"). Moreover, the firm can use the
outside supplier's "low prices as a bargaining tool to explain to the union why higher
wages can't be absorbed." Ibid.
57. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 224-25, 226-27 (1947); cf.
Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). Compare the Justice Depart-
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envisioned by this point of view are injury either to competitors or to the
integrated firm. Obviously, competitors of the integrating firm may "suffer"
as a result of adoption of the contract or ownership integration system if an
important outlet or supplier is foreclosed, or if the integrating firm can reduce
costs and therefore reduce prices and expand its market share. Competitors
may be forced into integration in order to expand if not to exist. And integrated
firms "suffer" economically 58 if subordinated to the interests of the integrat-
ing firm-5 9 Finally, firms which decline integration may lose business
if a would-be integrator therefore refuses to deal with them. Should these in-
juries, in themselves, be redressed by the law, or should they be classified
as damnum absque injuria? This problem is a recurrent theme in part II of
this study.
By contrast, vertical integration might be regarded contrary to public policy
only when its result is the restriction of competition. If such a standard were
adopted, it would be necessary to consider whether integration ever restricts
competition, and if so, under what conditions. Despite its admitted adverse
effect on competitors, critics of the injury-to-competitors approach have denied
that vertical integration, as such, has detrimental effects on competition. On
the contrary, they argue, vertical integration protects the public interest to
the extent that it increases efficiency and makes possible by-passing of "toll
gates" resulting from monopoly or imperfect competition. "To prevent firms
from branching vertically... would amount to protecting existing monopolists
in their position, and to serve notice on potential monopolists that the business
risks of exploitive behavior were henceforth very much less."G0 In the language
of one writer, "it is always horizontal market power, and not integration into
other levels, which is important."'6 Such writers have exploded the charges
that vertical concentration restrains competition by making recoupment from
level to level possible, by allowing extra profits from level to level, or by
facilitating price "squeezes. '62 These studies have made an invaluable contri-
ment position (wrongful in itself) with the Court view (not wrongful in itself) in United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-74 (1948) ; United States v. Colum-
bia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 519, 523-26 (1948).
58. See notes 22-24 supra.
59. Or minority stockholders in an ownership integration system. See United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., supra note 57; Price v. Standard Oil Co., 55 N.Y.S.2d S90, 894-95
(Sup. Ct. 1945), settlement noted and judgment modified, 273 App. Div. 890, 77 N.Y.S2d
686 (1948).
60. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. Rsv. 27, 47 (1949).
61. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic
Misconception, 22 U. C. L. REv. 157, 196 (1954). For a balanced discussion, see Adelman,
supra note 60, at 41-47; DE CHRAZFAU & KAHN, INTIRATION AND Co mPzrmTio IN MfE
OIL INDUsTRY 44-50 (1959).
62. Recoupment is the notion that the integrated firm can subsidize unprofitable opera-
tions at one level by raising prices at another level. The "squeeze" is predatory price-
cutting on one level supported by recoupment. The premise behind such fallacies that inte-
gration makes it possible to extract more than one layer of profit from the industry is
that each integrated level can make its own profit. The premise, however, is false: There
1959].
HeinOnline -- 69 Yale L.J. 15 1959-1960
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
bution to our knowledge of the economics of integration. Recent studies,
particularly those of Professor Bain, have demonstrated, however, that com-
petition can be impaired when vertical integration is utilized in conjunction
with existing market imperfections to make new entry into the industry
unprofitable and thus strengthen horizontal power. In particular, such barriers
to competiton can be raised by vertical integration when horizontal power
in one market or stage of production creates "leverage" for the extension
of the power to bar entry at another level. Thus, vertical integration plus
horizontal power can impair competition to a greater extent than could the
exercise of horizontal power alone.3
In part II, the case law on vertical integration is analyzed principally in
terms of this "leverage" standard: does the integration arrangement impair
competition more seriously than would horizontal power at each level of pro-
duction if exerted independently? In the view of the authors, this is the
criterion the Supreme Court attempts to apply in the cases. The remainder
of part I is devoted to an analysis of the economic basis of this standard:
the theory of barriers to entry.
Barriers to Entry
Entry to an industry will be barred when a prospective new competitor
must anticipate lower net returns than the established firms enjoy. Given this
condition, the structure of an industry will remain undisturbed.0 4 Manipula-
tion of the industry's prices or costs is the means through which the prospec-
tive entrant's net returns can be kept down. Price manipulation is essentially
a horizontal phenomenon, but cost manipulation has both horizontal and ver-
tical aspects. The firm or firms seeking to bar entry must have sufficient
market power over total output in the market (i.e., over price) or over the
factors of production and distribution (i.e., over cost). This is to say that
entry can be more easily barred in monopolistic or oligopolistic industries
is only one maximizing point for the industry, dependent only on the product's demand curve
and its production costs. Thus, there is only one economic rent realizable in a vertical
chain of production and distribution. Addition to the enterprise of levels vertically inte-
grated by ownership will require further investment and entail additional risks-the profit
earned, over and beyond the technological economies integration offers, will be a "normal"
one, except in very special circumstances. See Bork, supra note 61, at 193-200; Adelman,
supra note 60, at 41-43.
63. See BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956) [hereinafter cited as BAIN];
Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 Am. EcoN. Ri'v. 448 (1949) ;
Modigliani, New Developments on the Oligopoly Front, 66 J. PoL EcoN. 215 (1958)
(review of BAIN and Svws LABINI, OLIGOPOLIO E PROGRzSSO TECXNCO (1957)); Adelman,
Corporate Integration, in How To Co-mILY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 290, 292-94 (Vall
Cise & Dunn ed. 1954) ("disproportionate size plus difficulty of entry . . . integration
plus monopoly") ; notes 25 supra and 72 infra. See also DE CHAZ.AU & KAHN, oP. cit. supra
note 61, at 81.
64. See BAIN 12-13. The same conclusions apply to expansion of or maintenance of
existing competition in the industry. Compare id. at 5.
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than in freely competitive industries; this proposition is almost tautological.0 5
A second condition for barring entry is that production on a very small scale
be uneconomical; conversely, that only fairly large firms will be efficient.e0
Given these two conditions, entry of new competition can be prevented
when market price and output are maintained at such a level that the addi-
tion to the total market output (the "lump") contributed by an entrant of
minimal efficient size will depress market prices below the costs of the pro-
spective entrant.67 Hence, the wise monopolist will not price his goods at a
level which exacts the full (short-run) toll of his power. Instead, he will
exercise forbearance and maximize for the long run by setting his price just
high enough over marginal costs as not to encourage entry. 8 WVhether such a
monopolist should be prosecuted for his activities is outside the scope of this
Article. 9 No vertical integration problem here exists.
The vertical integration problem arises when the monopolist attempts to
bar entry by influencing the costs of the factors of production or distribution.
For example, suppose a refiner could gain control of the world's ore deposits.
He could thus bar entry into refining (of which he has no monopoly).
Monopolization of the factors of production is not essential; control over but
a part of the ore supply can drive its short-run price level high enough to
increase the cost of production drastically.7°
But one may ask why, in a rational business world, does the hypothetical
monopolist not abandon his refining operations and concentrate his activities
on ore in which his monopoly profits ("economic rent") are apparently
earned.71 There are at least two explanations for persistence in vertical in-
tegration by our monopolist. First, there are the true economies of vertical
integration, irrespective of economic rent considerations. Second, without
the vertical relationship, the supply monopoly frequently may not yield its
full benefit because a bilateral monopoly situation might develop: someone
else might, in the terms of our hypothetical, attain a refining monopoly. If
there are monopolies at two levels in separate hands, the countervailing power
of each monopolist may force the other to share the monopoly "take." 72 To
65. Part of the definition of effective competition is freedom of entry. ATr'v Gpn-.
NAT'L Comm. ANTTruST REP. 327 (1955). Caveat, an industry may be highly competi-
tive and new entry may nevertheless be barred. Thus, if 20% of the market is the
optimum size for a plant, once there are five competing firms there is room for no more.
66. BAix 53-55.
67. In this connection the elasticity of demand with respect to price must be con-
sidered. Modigliani, supra note 63, gives a careful analysis of this point.
68. BAIN 106-07.
69. Certainly, his offense, if any, is no more than possession and maintenance of
horizontal monopoly power. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (194S;
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
70. See BAiN 153-55, denying that this occurs in practice. But see note 73 infra.
71. See authorities cited note 62 stpra, discussing recoupment and the one monopoly
profit.
72. The solution of the bilateral monopoly problem is indeterminate, given stubborn
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put it somewhat differently, horizontal power at either level may provide
leverage over the other level. The mining monopolist in this situation would
appear to need vertical integration into refining to assure profit maximiza-
tion. In this case vertical integration is a means of protecting the advantages
of horizontal power.
Barriers to entry can also be raised by forward integration which raises
the distribution costs of potential competitors. Preemption of the choice out-
lets imposes on the prospective entrant the high cost of developing his own
outlets-a fixed outlay--or else the choice of using inferior outlets which
entail higher variable costs. 73
If we move from monopoly to oligopoly, the same considerations are rele-
vant: collective, even though not collusive, integration can grant the oligo-
polists security against new entry and consequent disruption of market price
and profit stability.74
Still another way to increase costs for the prospective entrant is to raise
the risk capital outlay necessary for his successful entry: if enough of the
market can be foreclosed by vertical integration, newcomers will be forced to
make rather than buy. They will have to enter, if at all, as ownership in-
tegrated enterprises. Thus they will be forced to wager a bigger stake, and
this may discourage them from betting. Moreover, even if prospective en-
trants are not "discouraged," they may find it far more difficult to raise, say
opponents. STIGLER, THEORY OF PRiCE 240-41 (rev. ed. 1952); FELLNER, COMPETITION
AMONG THE FEw 240-52 (1949) ; Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58
J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950). However, a games theory solution is given in HOFFMAN,
LARGE-ScALE ORGANIZATION IN THE FOOD INDUSTRIES, 161-65 (TNEC Monograph No.
35). Paradoxically, all solutions show that the public is worse off under bilateral
monopoly than under a vertically integrated single monopoly. Price to the consumer is
higher and output is lower. As Bork observes, this analysis has interesting results for
countervailing power theories. Bork, supra note 61, at 196 n.128.
73. MILLER, UNFAIR CoParITON 212 (1941); Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of
Ecowinic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of
the Claytdn Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 913, 922 (1952).
In Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922), where
ownership integration of department stores by pattern manufacturers was impractical,
tying up those outlets by contract seems to have raised an absolute barricade against entry.
Compare the situation in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392
(1953), discussed in text at notes 226-58 infra, where ownership integration of theaters
in order to secure their available screen time for advertisements would have been out of
the question. Whenever ownership integration is impractical because of imbalance of the
scale of operations at the two levels, see note 56 supra, and the number of outlets at the
larger scale operation are limited, exclusive dealing contracts may successfully bar entry
to the level with smaller scale of operation.
74. For a discussion of the oil industry in this context, see Rostow & Sachs, Entry
Into the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration Re-E.amined, 61 YALE L.J. 856,
911-14 (1952); Dirlam & Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in the Pricing of Gasoline, 61
YALE L.J. 818, 842-55 (1952) ; OR CHAZEAt' & KAHN, Op. cit. spra note 61, ch. 5. But see
Adelman, supra note 60, at 61-62.
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fifty million dollars than ten million dollars. 75 Of course this latter obstacle
presupposes imperfection or discontinuity in the capital market. 0
Finally, an integration system may incidentally affect competition in other
industries, or prevent the very existence of other industries. For example,
had the machine parts industry been tied up by integration, the growth of the
automobile industry might have been dangerously threatened. The infant
industry would probably not have been able to afford the ownership-integrated
parts-manufacturing facilities it now has.77
75. But the larger firm may be willing to make a larger bet, and therefore con-
glomerate mergers may at times act to introduce new competition into areas of the
economy where capital barriers to entry do exist See BAiN 215. The tax laws may be
significant in this connection. If a loss bankrupts a corporation, there will be no loss
carry-over for future years and the owners will pay 100% of the loss from their invest-
ment. But when a going enterprise suffers a loss, there is a 52% income tax cushion.
Of course, any gains are also cushioned this -way, but the firm which takes a risk which
may bankrupt it will pay a 52% tax if it wins the bet and 100% of the loss if it does
not win. See INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 11; note 41 supra.
Essentially, the problem is that of when to buy insurance and when to be a self-
insurer and take a chance. It is not sufficient to compare "expectation" measured in cash.
with the premium, measured in cash. The "ex'pectatioa' must be corrected in terms of
the overall consequences of a loss. For this reason doubling the stakes, even keeping
the odds constant, can discourage wagerers. See Friedman & Savage, The Utility An-
alysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. PoT. EcoN. 279, 285 n.16, 295 n.32 (1948). See
also Huff, The Mathematics of Sex, Gambling, and Insurance, Harper's Magazine, Sept.
1959, pp. 69, 71-72.
The importance of this type of barrier will be decreased when the risk can be shared
among several enterprises. Although no one of five firms, each with $10 million of assets,
may be daring enough to take a $10 million "flyer," the pool of the five might be willing.
See note 18 supra. Imperfection in the risk capital market, particularly with respect to
information, probably makes for obstacles in forming such pools. Capital market imper-
fections are discussed generally in note 76 infra.
Given a perfect capital market, the opportunity to invest $10 million at an "ex-
traordinary" rate of return, tied in with an investment of another $50 million at an
"ordinary" rate, would appear about as attractive as the opportunity to invest $10 million
alone at the extraordinary rate. In either case, the total economic rent accrued is equal.
See Bork, supra note 61, at 195.
76. According to Bain, such barriers do exist in many industries. "It is suggested
that large capital requirements place the potential entrant at a disadvantage, because he
cannot secure the requisite funds at a rate as low as that available to established firms
through the capital markets or through internal financing." B.x 215. The problem
confronting small business in securing equity and loan capital are discussed in Cahn.
Capital for Small Business: Sources and Mfethods, 24 LAw & COuTE.iP. Prmi. 27
(1959) (collecting other literature). See also Comment, 47 CALr. L. Ra v. 144, 144-45
(1959) (collecting authorities); Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 Hv.
L. REv. 27,33-34 (1949) ; DE CHAZEAU & KAmx, op. cit. stpra note 61, at 273-75 (discussing
access to capital in the petroleum industry).
77. The wide distribution of the capital burdens of automobile manufacture involved
a considerable diffusion of the risks of the industry, and therefore greatly dimin-
ished their deterrent influence. Speculative as the industry appeared, potential pro-
ducers did not face the necessity of risking large sums of capital in their operations:
19591
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Thus, when component producers are "free," new enterprises can operate
on a shoestring through contract integration, and not be forced to assume the
heavy capital burden of full ownership integration before beginning. Existence
of such intermediate open markets may be necessary for innovation and tech-
nological progress to occur.78 Probably, this problem is more serious when
the factors of production or distribution are integrated by ownership rather
the immediate manufacture of the product was shared by numerous independent
enterprises which supplied the capital required for the manufacturing operations
as such, and which assumed the immediate subsidiary risks involved therein. On
the other hand, responsibility for the final product, and the essential risks of final
design, integration of the purchased components, and factory sales, did not face
those who actually, though indirectly, provided the bulk of the capital employed.
Resources that would not be directly committed to the fortunes of automobile
production proper were nevertheless attracted to and then supplied by hundreds
of enterprises engaged in providing materials, components, and sales facilities for
the new product. Mobility in the employment of capital did not in this case require
a wholesale assumption of new risks, nor, on the surface, a radical diversion of
existing capital. In other words, there was a far greater divorce between the
functions of responsibility-taking and capital contribution than is commonly thought
possible in new and speculative industries. In consequence, the diversion of capital
to the automobile industry was greatly facilitated.
SELYzE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 270-71. See also Adams, The Automobile-A Luxury
Becomes a Necessity, in HAMILTON & Assocs., PRICE AND PRICE PouiciEs 53-54 (1938).
For a description of the present structure of the industry, and the present necessity of
ownership integration, see SUBcOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPLY OF TIE SENATR COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESs., ADMINISTERED PRICEs-AuTomOBILES 14 (Comm.
Print 1958); STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE
COMI-r. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., IsT. SEss., A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 22-23
(Comm. Print 1956).
78. A new product may command capital resources not only by diverting these from
other goods, but also by effecting the utilization of hitherto idle utilities residing
in existing capital equipment. Such increases in the efficiency of capital are tanta-
mount to absolute additions to the stock of capital; and while they are rarely
reflected in pecuniary measurements, they may be of great practical importance,
particularly in a period of improving technology. Some of the capital early de-
voted to automobile production came from the idle resources of machine shops
and similar establishments, which added automobile components to their lines of
products without, at first, diminishing their output of other goods or increasing
their capital equipment.
Speaking broadly, we may say that a wide distribution of capital among industries
supplying raw materials, subproducts, and various kinds of services, and an im-
proving technology, facilitate the mobility of capital. The concentration of capital
in highly integrated industries, on the other hand, would seem to render capital
less mobile. If, twenty-five or thirty years ago, industrial practice had required
that each final product be produced by a highly integrated enterprise that directly
controlled the sources of the raw materials and all the intermediate manufacturing
stages, entrance into the automobile industry necessarily would have entailed a
considerable measure of concentrated risk. Indirect diversion of capital, with its
attendant diffusion of risks, would have been virtually impossible. In contrast
with what has actually taken place, the development of automobile manufacture
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than contract, because of the more permanent and effective market isolation
that the former causes.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS ON VERTICAL
INTEGRATION
In our legal system, the antitrust laws provide the framework within which
any conflict between the public and private interest in vertical integration is
to be resolved. The antitrust laws relevant to vertical integration are sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,7 9 sections 3 80 and 7 81 of the Clayton Act, and
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.82 Section 1 forbids the un-
reasonable restraint of trade by contract, combination, or conspiracy. Section
2 condemns monopolization of trade. Section 3 proscribes sales made on con-
dition that the buyer not deal in the goods of the seller's competitors, when-
ever the effect may be to lessen competition substantially. Section 7 forbids
acquisitions when the effect may be substantially to lessen competition. Sec-
tion 5 interdicts unfair methods of competition and unfair trade practices.
These statutes reflect different and somewhat inconsistent legislative pur-
poses, and as a result internal tensions exist within the total antitrust struc-
ture,83 and within the individual statutes.8 4 Perhaps the most serious of the
tensions is generated by the competition-competitors dichotomy. According
to the injury-to-competition standard, the antitrust laws are directed to re-
straints which affect or are intended to affect the market itself-affect it in
must have waited upon the direct commitment of large quantities of capital to
the major risks of a new industry.
SELTZER, Op. cit. supra note 52, at 272-73. See also Murchison, Vertical Integralion in
the Cotton Textile Industry, in Vzal-icA Im'EmRATioN IN MARETING 116, 125 (Wedding
ed. 1952).
79. 26 Stat. 209, (1890) as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1958). (The relevant text
of this and other pertinent cited statutes is given in APPExDix to this Article.)
80. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
81. As amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
82. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
83. "I am not unaware that the policies directed at maintaining effective competition,
as expressed in the Sherman Law, the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, are difficult to formulate and not altogether
harmonious." FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 405 (1953).
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "It is also incumbent upon us to seek to rationalize the
four statutes directed toward a common end and make of them, to the extent that what
Congress has written permits, a harmonious body of law." Id. at 406. See also United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953) (no single
pattern).
84. "The legislative solution is often to write two opposing ideas into a statute ....
A hiatus may be left in a law .... The necessity to fill in the gap is then presented
to the court. And the judges are left at large in a field that the legislature lacked
capacity to define." Address by Mr. Justice Douglas Before Section of Judicial Ad-
ministration of American Bar Association, Seattle, Sept. 8, 1948, quoted in FLE.njic.
TEN THOUSAND COmmANDmENTS: A STORY OF THE AInTRUsT LAws 2 (1951).
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the form of higher prices, poorer quality, or decreased supply.Y0 In this view,
restraints without significant market effect are not prohibited. According to
the injury-to-competitors approach, the antitrust laws exist also to prevent
injury to those trading in the market place, irrespective of other competitive
effects. Under this standard, antitrust performs a tort law function. As we
shall see, the ideals of protection of competition and protection of competitors
are often irreconcilable. And it is as yet unclear which view will prevail.
Additional tension exists between the "per se" and "rule of reason" ap-
proaches to antitrust violations. A rule-of-reason standard requires the courts
to assay the economic consequences of business behavior and to ban only
behavior which is "unreasonable" in purpose or effect. But the application
of this standard necessitates a comprehensive and costly economic analysis,
a task which may be "most ill-suited for courts."'s Therefore, a catalogue of
"per se" offenses has emerged. Within this area, the courts are relieved of
the necessity of a comprehensive economic analysis; these offenses are banned
because they belong to a forbidden category whose purpose and effect are
declared to be necessarily anticompetitive. Nevertheless, the problem facing
the court in these cases has not become one of "mere characterization." The
per se categories are still being enlarged and modified. And within the domain
of the rule of reason further tensions have developed. A power test vies with
a performance test. Should possession of power to restrain competition be
sufficient for a violation of the Sherman Act, or must that power be exercised
with anticompetitive effect s7 Moreover, "having a substantial effect" and
85. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493, 500 (1940). Such effects
include also prevention of innovation which might lower prices or improve quality.
... [T] he object of the antitrust laws is to achieve what may be called a "workably"
or "effectively" competitive organization of industry and commerce, and not "pure"
or "perfect" competition. Correspondingly, . . .the idea of workable or effective
competition is the main component of the rule of reason in defining offenses under
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The judicial norm is now close to what the economists have classified as work-
able competition.
Rostow & Sachs, Entry Into the Oil Refining Bvsiness, 61 YAtu L.J. 856, 860-61
(1952). The various definitions of workable competition, according to the authors,
"turn on the same crucial elements-the capacity of buyers to take advantage of
rivalry among sellers, the inability of sellers to exercise appreciable control over the price
at which they sell, and the absence of cost or other barriers to the entry of new firms." Id.
at 61. See also A'r'y GEN. NAT'L COmm. ANTITRUST REP. ch. 7 (1955).
For a brief but penetrating discussion of the competition-competitors dichotomy, see
Adelman, Book Review, 46 AM. EcoN. Rzv. 481 (1956).
86. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 (1949).
87. Performance testing is a method which has often been recommended by those
who think there is as much danger from too much competition as from too little.
It has become a slogan for those who fear the dangers of straight-jacketing in-
dustry by any unequivocal prohibitions or uniform general rules, and who specific-
ally dislike any concepts calling for per se or presumptively illegal market status
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HeinOnline -- 69 Yale L.J. 22 1959-1960
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
"justified by good business reasons" have competed with one another as tests
of the reasonableness of market practices.8 8 Some of these tensions appear
quiescent at the present moment. Still, we can expect new tensions to appear
in the future, for antitrust seems to be a particularly dialectical branch of the
law-the life of antitrust is strife.
All of the disharmonies of antitrust are echoed in the case law of vertical
integration, and as a result the cases show considerable vacillation. Because
different statutes apply to different forms of vertical integration, uncertainty
as to the appropriate standard to be used in each case has been further in-
creased. The early integration cases, which announce the major themes, have
received thorough treatment elsewhere"0 and need not be discussed in detail
here. For our purposes, it is sufficient to begin with Standard Oil Co. v.
United States"° [Standard Stations], in which the contours of current ver-
or behavior. Some like to call this the rule of reason approach. In an extreme
form this would call for reviewing the effects of everything-even price-fixing
agreements. Performance tests seek conclusions as to whether, for example,
profits are too high, whether innovation is rapid enough, whether production is
in the right size firms, whether there is an efficient adjustment of capacity to out-
put, whether there is a proper avoidance of waste in selling activities, whether
new firms have entered or can enter the industry readily, whether or not the
restrictive agreements themselves contain the seeds of their own destruction,
whether or not equality of bargaining power is achieved with either or both
suppliers or customers, and as many more criteria as any bright analyst can
invent. All of these sum up to a general evaluation of performance to tell whether
the public is being adequately served.
These performance criteria may raise more problems than they solve. Econo-
mists are no better than lawyers at measuring with uncalibrated rulers.
Bowman, Inwipiency Mergers and the Size Question: Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 1
ANITRruSr Bum- 533, 538 (1956). See also HALE & Hmxn MARKEr PowER: SIzE AND
SHAPE UNDER THE SnERMAN Act 176 nn.9, 10 (1958) (collecting authorities). For a
challenging presentation of the performance test, see Mason, The Current Status of the
Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. RPv. 1265, 1268 (1949). See also
Brewster, Enforceable Competition: Unruly Reason or Reasonable Rules?, 46 Ams. Eco.n.
REV. 482 (Supp. 1956).
88. At present, the former test governs, despite the presence of "good business
reasons." Thus, when the efficiencies of integration come into conflict with the dictates
of competition, the law is that the latter must prevail.
If, indeed, this [anticompetitive effect] were a result of the [integration] system,
it would seem unimportant that a short-run by-product of stability may have
been greater efficiency and lower costs, for it is the theory of the antitrust laws
that the long-run advantage of the community depends upon the removal of re-
straints upon competition. See Fashion Originatord' Guild v. Federal Trade
Conm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68; United States v. Altninuin Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 427-29 (C. A. 2d Cir.).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309 (1949). See also Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
89. See the articles by Adelman, supra note 60, and Bork, supra note 61.
90. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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tical integration law emerge, and in which the Supreme Court attempted to
harmonize the conflicting policy goals of the antitrust laws by a doctrinal
synthesis. Standard Stations, together with FTC v. Motion Picture Adver-
tising Serv. Co. 91 [MPAS] and United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co.92 [du Pont-GM], reveals the pattern of the current law of vertical
integration. Standard Stations applied a market foreclosure test to forward
vertical integration by requirements contracts, an arrangement explicitly
covered by section 3 of the Clayton Act. MPAS applied this test to backward
integration by contract, a situation not covered by section 3 but within the
scope of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Du Pont-GM, decided under section
7 of the Clayton Act, carried the same test over to a vertical integration
system based on stock ownership.
Despite the movement by the Supreme Court toward a single antitrust
standard for vertical integration arrangements, the law in the area has not
been completely synthesized. In a series of court of appeals decisions, differ-
ences in the wording of the various statutes have been emphasized and legal
distinctions established between antitrust private damages actions and public
prosecutions. 93 As a result, there has been new legislation in this area and
pressure for more.94 Part II begins with an analysis of the major govern-
mental intervention cases. A discussion of the case law on private antitrust
suits follows. Part II concludes with an examination of actual and possible
changes in the antitrust laws.
GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST INTEGRATION
The Ride of Standard Stations: Section 3 and Quantitative Substantiality
Standard Stations is the richest and the most difficult of all the vertical
integration cases. Each of the tensions that has been mentioned within the
structure of antitrust is revealed in the Standard Stations decision. As the
leading case on integration by contract, it has been the subject of extensive
commentary and controversy. 95 The decision may raise as many problems as
it settles, but the rule of Standard Stations is one which must be reckoned
with in all vertical integration cases, and comprehension of this rule is essen-
tial to evaluation of the impact of antitrust upon integration.
91. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
92. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
93. See notes 361-468 infra and accompanying text. The Court has not yet spoken
on this question, declining to grant certiorari and review the opinions.
94. See notes 469-514 infra and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition--The Impact of Stand-
ard Oil Co. of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality Under the Clayton
Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10 (1949) ; Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Fac-
tors it Determining Whether Exchsive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 65 HARv. L. Rxv. 913 (1952) ; McLaren, Related Problems of "Requirements" Con-
tracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 45 ILI. L.
Rxv. 141 (1950).
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Standard Stations involved the distribution of petroleum products and auto-
mobile accessories. The oil industry is characterized by oligopolist producers
who are integrated with their retail outlets by requirements contracts. These
contracts bound the outlets to obtain all of the products they sold from the
integrating producer. Defendant's contracts covered sixteen per cent of all
the retail gasoline outlets in the West, 6.7 per cent of the gasoline sold in the
West, and about fifty-eight million dollars in annual sales.9( Standard's sales
through company-owned outlets and to industrial users brought its total share
of the Western gasoline market up to twenty-three per cent, while its six
leading competitors, who employed similar exclusive dealing arrangements,
absorbed, according to the Court, another forty-two per cent of the market. 7
The seven majors controlled seventy-six per cent of all stations in the West. s
The Justice Department brought suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act
and section 3 of the Clayton Act to enjoin Standard from entering into or
enforcing these exclusive contracts. The district court found for the Govern-
ment on both counts.90 The Supreme Court affirmed, basing its decision solely
on section 3.100 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority was accom-
panied by dissenting opinions from Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice
Douglas.
Mr. Justice Douglas opposed condemnation of Standard's contracts because
this would, in his view, drive Standard into vertical integration by agency or
by outright ownership of the stations, a situation which, at that time, was subject
to a much more lenient antitrust standard than contract integration.10 1 The net
result would be to turn entrepreneurs into clerks, causing dilution of "local
leadership" and a "serious loss in citizenship" to the "village."' 02 Essentially,
96. 337 U.S. at 295.
97. Ibid. This 42% is an extremely conservative figure, since it excludes the industrial
sales by Standard's six leading competitors. The record is silent on the latter. United
States Brief, p. 10 n.5. Thus the percentage of total gallonage sold by the Big Seven
must have exceeded 65%.
In addition to its gasoline requirements contracts, Standard maintained a policy of
requiring many dealers to carry only TBA (tires, batteries, accessories) furnished by
Standard. 337 U.S. at 296-97. The Supreme Court opinion does not emphasize the TBA
tie-in, id. at 305 n.8, aspect of the case.
Even though the problems presented by exclusive dealing and by tying contracts are
clearly related, tying arrangements are not included in this Article. Different treatment
has been accorded by the courts to the two devices. See, e.g., Frankfurter, J., in Standard
Stations, discussing the differing policy considerations, id. at 305-03; TBA provisions as
tie-ins, id. at 305 n.8. A treatment of tie-ins would have to include patent usage problems.
See generally Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19 (1957); Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 95, at 942-54; Turner, The Validity of Tying
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HAnv. L. Rm. 50 (1953).
98. United States Brief, p. 10.
99. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Calif. 1948).
100. 337 U.S. at 314.
101. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote with reference to United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495 (1948). See 337 U.S. at 318, 320.
102. Id. at 319, 321.
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the Douglas dissent is based on prospective injury to the integrated dealers
which will have social repercussions; this is akin to an "injury to competitors"
argument.
The Jackson dissent, in which two other Justices joined, is based on con-
trary arguments. Jackson viewed the market as an already imperfect one in
which the oligopolists battle it out, using the dealers as pawns, "the instru-
mentalities through which competition . . . is waged."'0 3 Exclusive dealing,
according to his view, is an offsetting market imperfection 104 which increases
rather than decreases competition. Hence, Jackson opposed the banning of
Standard's contract integration, because the system did not result in injury
to competition.
While these opposing dissents both tend to a conclusion of legality, the
103. Id. at 323.
... [Tihe great bulk of the gasoline sold... is refined by a few large integrated
companies, who either own or control most of the service stations. Elaborate and
colorful advertising to the contrary notwithstanding, gasoline of any given grade
is a standard product, and a slight difference in price will draw trade to the
seller offering it. But because price reductions are sure to be met quickly, the
rivalry for customers is diverted into more and costlier filling stations, free
services, and so on. But this in turn makes the situation more unstable because
filling stations, and the distributive apparatus generally, have much idle capacity
and could handle much more trade at little or no extra cost. Hence there is a per-
sistent urge to cut prices, and an equally persistent one to avoid price competition.
Gasoline marketing is in fact a stock example of what the economists call "mo-
nopolistic competition with oligopoly," i.e., several sellers, each trying to persuade
the public that his wares are unique, and in the aggregate charging the public for
more capacity than is needed to do the job most economically. But to characterize
a situation as "monopolistic competition" or "oligopoly" is to begin the debate, not
to end it. There are three reasons which are usually given for considering the
situation as tolerable. Firstly, the oil industry considered as a whole has an excellent
record of constant technological innovation which has more than once "paid back"
the wastes of distribution. Secondly, many of the services provided in the attempt
to keep rivalry away from price, including the convenience of having many service
stations, are genuine and worth paying for. Thirdly, the independent refiners and
distributors are a safeguard despite their relatively small share of the market. Too
high a price on the majors' branded gasoline is hindered by the existence of the
independents' unbranded products. Too great a spread between the refinery and the
filling station price is inhibited by the independent distributor. It is at least plausible
that in this case monopolistic competition is also workable competition.
Adelman, supra note 60, at 61-62. See also Dirlam & Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in the
Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE L.J. 818, 831-34 (1952) ; DE CHAZ.AU & KAH, op. cit. supra
note 61, at 454-61.
104. But see Dirlamn & Kahn, Antitrust Law and the Big Buyer: Another Look at
the A & P Case, 60 J. POL. EcoN. 118 (1952) ("[W]here given markets are in some
respects incorrigibly imperfect, an attempt to enforce more perfect competition in other
respects may produce a poorer rather than a superior economic performance. Workable
competition in inevitably imperfect situations, may require offsetting imperfections . ...
[But] the requirements of workable competition do not offer a blanket indorsement of
all offsetting imperfections . . ").
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Frankfurter opinion for the majority ingeniously arrived at a contrary result
by synthesizing the "injury to competition" and "injury to competitors"
standards. The opinion began by examining the role of the rule of reason in
a section 3 case, questioning whether it is necessary to show actual or prob-
able anticompetitive effects of the exclusive dealing arrangements or whether
it is enough simply to show that "a substantial portion of commerce is
affected."'1 5 The court mentioned four tests which would be appropriate, were
the former standard adopted: whether "competition has flourished despite
use of the contracts," "the conformity of the length of their term to the
reasonable requirements of [business]," "the status of the defendant as a
struggling newcomer or an established competitor," and "perhaps most im-
portant . . . defendant's degree of market control."'010 These tests were re-
jected on three grounds. 0 7 First, their use would run counter to legislative
mandate. The investigation required "would ... stultify the force of Congress'
declaration that requirements contracts are to be prohibited whenever their
effect 'may be' to substantially lessen competition."' 08 Second, "serious dif-
ficulties [of economic analysis] would attend the attempt to apply these tests,"
and the task would prove one "most ill-suited for... courts." 00 Finally, the
tests are inconclusive, since lack of anticompetitive effect is no proof that, but
for the integration system, competition in the industry would not have been
even keener.110 Thus, a rule of reason approach based on elaborate economic
analysis was rejected. In place of an actual "performance" test, the majority
advanced what is essentially a "power" test. Section 3 is violated when "a
substantial portion of commerce is affected," that is, when "competition has
been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce.""' Since
"observance by a dealer of his requirements contract with Standard does
effectively foreclose whatever opportunity there might be for competing sup-
pliers to attract his patronage,... [and] in view of the widespread adoption
of such contracts by Standard's competitors . . . Standard's use of the con-
tracts creates just such a potential clog on competition as it was the purpose
of § 3 to remove.""-'
105. 337 U.S. at 299.
106. Id. at 308. Of these tests, the first and fourth are substantial effect tests, while
the second and third are "good business reasons" tests.
These criteria were greatly elaborated upon by FTC Chairman Howre" in Addresb
Before the American Marketing Ass'n, June 14, 1954, reprinted in Hcarings Beforc the
Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Ceimmittee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 3, pt. 3, at 2476, 2478. See also Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 95, at 923-29.
107. It is submitted that rejection of these tests by the Court indicates only that it
regards them as possibly sufficient although not necessary.
108. 337 U.S. at 313. But see Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 95, at 936-37.
109. 337 U.S. at 308, 310.
110. Id. at 309-10. For a discussion of the economic consequences of an alternative
system of distribution, see DE CHAZEAu & KAHn, op. cit. supra note 61, at 517-19.
111. 337 U.S. at 299, 314.
112. Id. at 314.
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The majority crossed the formidable bridge from injury to competitors to
injury to competition by analyzing the meaning of the word "may" in sec-
tion 3.
When it is remembered that all the other major suppliers have also been
using requirements contracts, and when it is noted that the relative share
of the business which fell to each has remained about the same during
the period of their use, it would not be farfetched to infer that their effect
has been to enable the established suppliers individually to maintain their
own standing and at the same time collectively, even though not collusive-
ly, to prevent a late arrival from wresting away more than an insignifi-
cant portion of the market.11 3
The rule of Standard Stations is, then: when competitors are foreclosed from
a substantial enough share of the market, it is not farfetched to infer sub-
stantial lessening of competition.1 1 4 This is the so-called rule of quantitative
substantiality.""
To Mr. Justice Jackson, the majority interpretation of "may" in section 3
was unjustifiable. "It is indispensable to the Government's case to establish
that either the actual or the probable effect of the accused arrangement is to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly."" 0 He denied
that foreclosure of a substantial share of the market can "automatically bring
the accused arrangement within the prohibitions of the statute."11 "May"
does not justify the movement from injury to competitors to injury to com-
petition.
The number of dealers and the volume of sales covered by the arrange-
ment of course was sufficient to be substantial. That is to say, this
arrangement operated on enough commerce to violate the Act, provided
its effects were substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly. But proof of their quantity does not prove that they had this
forbidden quality; and the assumption that they did, without proof, seems
to me unwarranted." 8
Thus, in Jackson's view, it is farfetched to move from injury to competitors
to injury to competition 119 upon a mere showing of foreclosure of a share,
113. Id. at 309.
114. For a discussion of the multiple meanings of the word "substantial" in antitrust
law, see text at notes 129-34 infra.
115. See 337 U.S. at 298. Citations to the sizeable literature on quantitative sub-
stantiality are collected in HANDLER, ANTITRuST IN PERSPECTIVE 136-37, 143 (1957). See,
particularly, ATr'x GEN. NAT'L Co.Ne. ANTITRUST REP. 122 & n.26, 142 n.51, 149 (1955).
See also Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee, supra note 106, at 1966 ("Now
we have the Chairman of the FTC trying to graft onto that bill a lot of econonic hocus-
pocus which does not belong there") ; id. at 2360-64, 2442-2528 (FTC chairman examined
and criticized for not following Standard Stations rule in Maico Co. as Medina, J., did
in Dictograph); id. at 2244 (Handler-Celler colloquy).
116. 337 U.S. at 321.
117. Id. at 322.
118. Ibid.
119. The Jackson interpretation does not do full justice to the majority opinion to
the extent that it criticizes it for moving from injury to competitors to injury to coni-
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no matter how substantial, of the market to competitors. ' 20 Moreover, it is
not enough for the inference of injury not to be "farfetched." The injury
must be actual or, at least, probable.
The rule of Standard Stations was also criticized in the Jackson dissent as
a per se rule because it looks only to market shares rather than to actual
market effect: "I cannot agree that the requirements contract is per se an
illegal one under the antitrust law, and that is the substance of what the
Court seems to hold."'121 Perhaps this characterization is extreme. The stand-
ard announced is not a per se rule in the sense of the rule for price fixing
under United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. ;122 it does not declare all
requirements contracts illegal. On the other hand, the majority opinion made
it clear that the Clayton Act standard does not require proof of actual anti-
competitive effect m3a
The crucial problem in applying the rule of Standard Stations is the deter-
mination of how much of the market must be affected before foreclosure is
"substantial." Critics of the case have interpreted the decision as enjoining
Standard only because its requirements contracts foreclosed 6.7 per cent of
the relevant market.- 4 Under their interpretation, any share of the market
going at all beyond de ininimis meets the test of Standard Stations. There
is some language in the decision supporting this view: among the tests the
Court rejects for determining the "restrictive effect of requirements contracts"
is "perhaps most important... the defendant's degree of market control."'"-
This passage may be read to mean that the court felt that any degree of mar-
ket control which is "not insignificant" falls under the ban of section 3.1'G
petition. The movement is only from injury to competitors to possible injury to com-
petition ("may"). "The assumption that they [the contracts] did" have actual anticom-
petitive effect is iwt the basis of the decision.
120. Perhaps, the proper reading of the Jackson dissent is that it regards the majority
decision as based on the absolute amount of commerce affected rather than on the frac-
tional share of the relevant market. Compare Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867
(7th Cir. 1954), discussed in text at note 203 infra. However, in the authors' view,
Justice Jackson's point of view is equally incompatible with either reading of the major-
ity decision. In any case, the interpretation followed here is that Justice Jackson directed
his objections to the conclusion of anticompetitive effect from the size of the fractional
share affected by the contracts, rather than from the actual and probable market effect
of the contracts.
121. 337 U.S. at 323.
122. 310 U.S. 150 (1940), discussed in text at note 437 infra.
123. See 337 U.S. at 312,313 n.16.
124. See, e.g., HANDLER, ArmusT IN PERsmcrnvn 33-37, 121-22 (1957); Carson,
Corporate Mergers, in How To COmPLy WrrH TE ANzIRaUST LAws 279, 285 (Van Cise
& Dunn ed. 1954); Austern, Dealing With Uncertainties, in id. at 343, 349-50 ("any but
the most miniscule"); cf. Timberg, Selection of Customers, in id. at 117, 121 (16%).
125. 337 U.S. at 308; see id. at 305 ("[T]he showing that Standard's requirements
contracts affected a gross business of ,58,000,000, comprising 6.7% of the total in the area
goes far toward supporting the inference that competition has been or probably will be
substantially lessened.").
126. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
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It is submitted, however, that the Court's intention was only to reject market
domination by the individual defendant as a necessary prerequisite for a sec-
tion 3 violation.127 The repeated emphasis on parallel use of exclusive con-
tracts by the major oil companies and on the aggregate sixty-five per cent of
the market foreclosed by similar distribution arrangements shows that the
Court did not rely on 6.7 per cent as the share of the market satisfying the
quantitative substantiality test. It was the "collective, even though not col-
lusive," foreclosure of the market by the majors,128 rather than the individual
foreclosure by Standard, which offended the Clayton Act.
To repeat the rule of Standard Stations: when competitors are foreclosed
by integration contracts from a substantial enough share of the market, it is
not farfetched to infer a substantial lessening of competition. 129 The use of
the word "substantial" in this formula requires careful analysis, however, for
it has two distinct meanings in antitrust. The first sense of "substantial" is
in distinction to the de minimis of de miinimis non curat le.r: insubstantial
restraints of competition are ignored by the antitrust laws,"30 but substantial
restraints are proscribed. In this sense, "substantial" is the only alternative
to "de inininis." To reduce confusion "substantial," in this Clayton
Act sense, will henceforth be termed "significant." But the second sense
of "substantial" is quite different. Whether a firm or group of firms forecloses
a "substantial" share of the market is not determined by whether the share
goes somewhat beyond de ininimis. In this context, the substantiality con-
tinuum does not have only two sectors-substantial and insubstantial (de
minimis) ; rather, there are three sectors-substantial, insubstantial (do mini-
inis), and a large gray zone between them.
When the share of the market affected by integration is de minimis, it is
farfetched to infer any significant (non-de-minimis) adverse effect on com-
petition. Therefore the integrating firm would be innocent of an antitrust
violation. When the share affected is substantial (large), it is not farfetched
to infer a significant adverse effect on competition. Hence the defendant
127. The Court declares that the prior case law "regarded domination of the market
as sufficient in itself to support the inference that competition had been or probably woul
be lessened." 337 U.S. at 301. (Emphasis added.)
Minimally, the Court extends the prior case law position, that individual "domination
of the market [is] . .. sufficient in itself to support the inference that competition" may
be substantially lessened, to the position that collective domination is also sufficient to
support that inference. However, while collective dominance may be sufficient, is it nece. -
sary in the absence of individual domination? The "incipiency" doctrine, see note 270
in!ra, and the word "may" may perhaps carry the Court far further.
128. See text at note 113 supra. See also 337 U.S. at 314 ("widespread adoption").
129. See text at note 114 supra.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (merger §
1); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500 (1940) (conspiracy § 1); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 255 F2d 214, 235 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds,
359 U.S. 207 (1959) (same); Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe Am. Corp., 201 F.2d
534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953) (§ 7). See also Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958) (per se, § 1) (dictum) ; 337 U.S. at 312 & n.15.
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would be guilty. And when the share affected is neither substantial nor de
minimis, the integrating firm is entitled to the Scottish criminal law verdict
of "not proved."
The border between the gray zone and the "black" zone of substantiality
is wavering, blurred, and ill-defined. However, it would do injustice to
Standard Stations to say that it abolishes the gray zone and assimilates it
into the black zone. Even the word "may" does not carry the Court this far.
"May" adds to the black zone of actual anticompetitive effect only a some-
what lighter black of potential anticompetitive effect. Unless integration, by
substantially affecting the market, has at least a demonstrable potentiality
(not necessarily probability) of significant anticompetitive effect, the rule of
Standard Stations should not come into play.' 3' Restating the rule with more
precision, then: when integration forecloses a substantial portion of the mar-
ket, it is legitimate to infer a significant effect on competition, and, there-
fore, a violation of section 3.
Failure to distinguish between the two meanings of "substantial" has con-
tributed to much confusion about quantitative substantiality. -3 2 Use of "sub-
stantial" in two senses, without explicit differentiation, conceals the importance
of the Court's move from quantity (degree to which the market is affected)
to quality (effect upon overall competition).' z' At the same time the justi-
fication for the move does not receive elaborate discussion. The justification
for jumping the gap from quantity to quality rests in the proposition that the
degree of vertical integration in the industry may have enabled "the estab-
lished suppliers ... to maintain their own standing and at the same time...
prevent a late arrival from wresting away more than an insignificant portion
of the market."1 34 This proposition views the potential anticompetitive effect
of vertical integration as a barrier to entry problem. Is it really not far-
fetched to infer existence of a barrier against entry into gasoline refining
from the proportion of the retail market affected by integration?
Several different entry barriers may have existed in this industry. In its
complaint, the Government alleged that Standard had tied up a substantial
portion of the choice outlets.135 If it were proved that Standard, or Standard
and the other six major refiners, had foreclosed independents or newcomers
from the bulk of choice outlets, it might go far toward suggesting that a bar-
131. Compare the "incipient incipiency" of § 5, note 276 infra.
132. See, e.g., literature cited in HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 115, at 136-37; ci. Eng-
lander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959); Anchor Serum Co.
v. FTC, 217 F2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168
F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
133. See 337 U.S. at 298, 314.
134. See text at note 113 supra. "Since Standard's major competitors also distributed
their gasoline under requirements contracts, it is possible that the cumulative foreclosure of
retail outlets by the seven leading oil companies might have denied the small producers
effective access to the consumer." HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 115, at 121 n.35.
135. Record, p. 6. See also id. at 4 ("positions of substantial impregnability against
competitive invasion of their . . . areas"); 337 U.S. at 304 n.6.
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rier to new competition had been erected. 136 If outsiders were compelled to
market through inferior outlets, they would be forced to incur higher dis-
tribution costs than the established Big Seven, thus limiting their ability to
compete.' 3 7 This barrier to new competition would prove even more severe
if the one-year requirements contracts were in reality perpetual contracts due
to the high cost to dealers of switching suppliers. 13 8
However, the Government did not prove its allegation that Standard had
preempted the choice outlets by means of its contracts. No evidence was even
offered by the Government to prove the charge. 39 Indeed, the record con-
tains some evidence pointing to the conclusion that Standard's contracts
covered, on the average, sub-standard stations. For example, in the Los An-
geles area, Standard had contracts with 3.68 per cent of the outlets and sold
only 2.43 per cent of retail gallonage through them.140 Thus, these stations
sold only two-thirds as much gasoline as the average station14 1 In the San
Francisco area, Standard bad 6.98 per cent of the stations in the area and
sold 5.52 per cent of total area gallonage through them. 42 This represents a
twenty-one per cent below average showing. 143 Los Angeles and San Fran-
136. Such a finding might also narrow the relevant market under consideration to
favorably situated stations, where defendant's market percentages would be greater. By
the same token, greater power over price in the relevant market might be apparent.
137. Unit distribution cost is inversely proportional to station gallonage. Brief for
Appellants, p. 18; Record, p. 1862A.
138. See HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 115 at 120-21; United States v. Richfield Oil
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951) aff'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952), discussed
in text accompanying notes 164-72 infra; United States v. Sun Oil Co., TADE RE(. Ruv.
(1959 Trade Cas.) ff 69398, at 75506-07 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1959) ("The changing over from
one brand of petroleum products to another by a dealer subjects him to an economic
hardship and even to the risk of a business failure.") ; Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly Problems of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 3, pt. 3, at 1930 (1955) (statement of E. V. Rostow) ("as a practical
matter dealers would find it costly to change suppliers ... in fact these arrangements
were of indefinite, and extended duration"). But see United States v. Standard Oil Co.
1958 Trade Cas. 74758, 74762 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1958) ("dealers would change from
one defendant to another").
139. See Brief for Appellants, p. 12 n.13. As a result, the district court judge said
to Government counsel, "[Y]ou have offered no testimony at all connected with geography,
as well as to good corners or bad corners or anything else." Record, p. 1082. See id, at
1023 ("nothing from which to argue that they got the choice station or did not").
140. Brief for Appellants, p. 29; Record, p. 1649.
141. The computation is 2.43% - 3.68% = 67%, and it compares the average
Standard dealer station's gallonage with the average of all stations' gallonage.
142. Brief for Appellants, p. 29; Record, p. 1652.
143. The stations owned by Standard, however, made 85% and 75% above par show-
ings in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas. The average of Standard's six leading
competitors was 2% above and 1% below par for the two areas. The independent refiners
made 8% and 16% below par showing in these areas. See Record, pp. 1649, 1652.
The superior performances of Standard's owned stations may stem in part from pre-
emption of favorable locations and the existence of municipal ordinances preventing the
building of new stations. See Brief for Appellants, p. 12; Record, pp. 1081-82. But ef.
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cisco, however, are the most competitive areas in the Western market, the
homes of frequent price wars,1 " and it may be unsafe to generalize on the
basis of statistics from those locales. In any event, we lack the information to
decide whether a barrier to new competition was erected by imposition of
higher unit distribution costs on newcomers. 48
Another possible barrier to entry might have resulted from Standard's policy
of refusing to sell any gasoline to a dealer who also buys from another
refiner.140 Had the other major refiners pursued the same policy, every dealer
would have had to choose between either buying all of his gasoline from the
independents, or else buying none from them. There could be no tapered
system.147 Since being deprived of gasoline may quickly bankrupt dealers, 4 8 it
would seem understandable that they would prefer to deal with established
majors than with newcomers who might not be able to provide them with a
Gasoline Retailer, June 3, 1959, p. 21, col. 1 (Standard's owned stations "did little better
than break even" in 1958, according to its president.)
In general, Standard's owned stations made a better showing than Standard's contract
stations. The owned stations, 3% of the stations in the area, sold 6.8% of taxable gallon-
age. The contract stations, 16% of Western stations, sold 6.7%. 337 U.S. at 295; Brief
for Appellee, p. 7.
144. See Hearings Before Subcomn,ittee No. 5 of the House Committee on Small
Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 260-307 (1955) ; Gasoline Retailer, Dec. 3, 1958, p. 1, col. 5.
"The pervasive and continuing lack of balance [despite vertical integration) between
the almost continually expanding operations of the major oil companies is the most im-
portant force that often impels them willy nilly into price competition or its equivalent."
DE CHAzE&u & KAN, INTEGRATION AND CODPETrITON IN THE OIL ImusTEay 454 (1959).
For a discussion of price wars and their causes, see Dirlam & Kahn, Leadership and Conflict
in the Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE L.J. 818, 833-34 (1952) ; Rostow & Sachs, Entry Into
the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration Re-Examined, 61 YALE L.J. 856, 866-67
(1952).
145. BAIN 279-81 suggests that entrants have higher unit sales promotion costs be-
cause of existing product differentiation barriers. But consideration of such problems is
outside the scope of this study.
On the role of the independent under a system of vertical integration, see Adelman,
supra note 103; Rostow & Sachs, supra note 144, at 865-70; DE CHAZEAU & KAHn, op. cit.
supra note 144, at 454-61, 519-52.
146. See Brief for Appellant, p. 15. Cojnpare Record, p. 1127 uith id. at 24142.
147. That the majors followed such a parallel policy was asserted in the Government's
subsequent complaint against the major Western refiners. Amended Complaint, 1956, p.
37, United States v. Standard Oil Co., TRADE REG. RE'. (1959 Trade Cas.) 69399
(S.D. Cal. June 13, 1959) (consent decree). The claim was that the majors black-
listed any dealer who violated the understanding or contract that he deal exclusively
with his supplier. Compare Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941). The alleged result is that gasoline prices are stabilized at a higher level
because dealers are prevented from having recourse to price-cutting independents.
Amended complaint, mpra at 42. But see the consent decree in the case, United States
v. Standard Oil Co., supra at 75533-34. ("It is understood that each consenting de-
fendant is now supplying many dealers on a spot basis ... "), discussed in note 167 infra.
148. See Brief of Union Oil Co., p. 20, United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra note
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steady supply of gasoline. 149 A newcomer might overcome this reluctance by
entering the industry at a sufficiently large scale as to assure his being able to
meet his dealers' full needs.150 This, however, would increase the capital require-
ments for entry. If, in the alternative, the major refiners did not follow a
policy of refusing to deal with stations outside their integration system, entry
on a smaller scale would be feasible since independent dealers could obtain
supplementary gasoline supplies from the majors. 15 1 Thus, adoption by the
major competitors of an "all or nothing" policy with dealers may have raised
a barrier to the entry of new competition into the industry. But, again, we
lack sufficient information on which to base a judgment. 162 In any case, what
the Court condemned explicitly was a policy of requiring exclusive dealing
from retailers, rather than a policy of refusal to deal with outsiders. Of course,
the two are intimately related, but the Court's focus on the consummated
contracts suggests that its decision did not rely on the consequences of the
policy of refusing to deal.'
149. See Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Econcinic Factors in Delcrinininq
Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L.
REv. 913, 925 (1952). For an example of an active attempt to "discourage" dealers from
handling new lines, see Beltone Hearing Aid Co., 52 F.T.C. 830 (1956).
150. Query: Could a struggling newcomer afford to do this without himself exacting
exclusive dealing contracts? See Excelsior Motor Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Sound Equip.,
Inc., 73 F.2d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 1934) ; B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 Fed. 720
(7th Cir. 1923); Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047, 1066 (1954).
151. The majors also have supply continuity problems. They meet them by swapping
gasoline with one another when one is short in his supply. Record, pp. 272-73. If a
newcomer could swap with the majors it would probably eliminate this problem. But the
majors do not exchange with outsiders, according to some complaints. I WITNv,
ANTITRUST POLICIS 172 (1958) ; Complaint, pp. 4, 20, 39, 40, 47, United States v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., TRADE REG. RP. (1959 Trade Cas.) f" 69399 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 1959). But
see Richfield Brief, p. 20, Appendix (deliveries to nondefendants). The consent decree ill
the foregoing case enjoins these conspiratorial refusals to exchange with nonmajors.
TRADE REG. RaP. (1959 Trade Cas.) at 75529.
152. Such information would include at least sufficient qualitative or quantitative data
on the refining side of the industry as to raise the likelihood of an incipient restraint of
competition ("may" of § 3).
153. A case in which a court did consider the refusal to deal aspect of this problem
is Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1892] A.C. 25 (1891). A horizontal
combination of shipowners had agreed not to deal with shippers who used tramp steamers
(or, according to other evidence, to charge a higher rate to such shippers). The "tramps"
were ships which did not follow a regular schedule and which cut prices. Id. at 53-54.
Since shippers could not depend on tramps for all their shipping needs, they could not
afford to forego use of the organized lines belonging to the combination. As a result,
the tramps were foreclosed from a considerable part of the market. In effect, the coni-
bination forced its rivals to establish a complete, year-around service as a condition of
securing access to the market. Since the tramps could not--or would not-do tli, they
were prevented from competing with the combination. However, the House of Lords
held that the combination was a permissible means to extend trade and increase profit.
The tramps were held to have no cause of action in conspiracy, although the hori.,ontal
agreement was unenforceable between the parties. Compare the dual rate shipping con-
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Another possible barrier to competition may have resulted because econ-
omies of scale were unavailable to newcomers since too few retail outlets were
accessible to them. This is probably what the Court meant when it stated that
"requirements contracts . . . enable the established suppliers . . . collectively,
even though not collusively, to prevent a late arrival from wresting away
more than an insignificant portion of the market."'1 4 The record indicates that
twenty-four per cent of the retail outlets in the \est were not integrated with
one of the seven major refiners.1 5 As to these outlets, we have no information
about how many of them were, in a practical sense, available to a newcomer.
If only so few of them were available as to prevent operation at an efficient
scale, then entry was barred. But again on this point we have no data.
Thus, of the three possible barriers to entry which may have existed in the
industry, none was established by the evidence the Government relied upon.
On the basis of the data we are not entitled to conclude that any particular
one of the three barriers existed. But may we consider that there is a pos-
sibility-of low order probability-that each existed? And are we then en-
titled to aggregate these separate low order probabilities into a higher order
probability that some barrier existed ?1so One might be tempted to answer
affirmatively, because "courts are ill-suited" to indulge in comprehensive
economic analysis.
Nevertheless, it would require no "economic extravaganza"1 5 ' for a court
to put into the record sufficient data to justify a conclusion that barriers to
entry may exist. In Standard Stations. there would have been little difficulty
in introducing such evidence, assuming that it existed. Thus, as to choice
locations, gallonage figures were available from state tax authorities.1 8 As to
the stability of gasoline supplies obtainable from independents, testimony from
such independent refiners with respect to regularity of their output and any
consequent marketing problems they face could have been obtained. And as
to economies of scale, testimony by expert witnesses regarding minimal effi-
cient refiner size could have been secured. Because of the relative ease of
securing some such economic data, the authors are in sympathy with M1r.
Justice Jackson's position that the case should have been remanded to the
District Court for further evidence. But the authors do not agree with the
Jackson view that quantity of commerce affected cannot, by itself, justify the
tract cases, Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 239 F2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1956), afe'd stt,
nor. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) ; Isbrandtsen Co. v.
United States, 96 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiant by an equally dividcd
Court sub nwm. Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952). (Note: there was a
rebate aspect in Mogul also.)
154. 337 U.S. at 309.
155. United States Brief, p. 10.
156. See HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL SrArISTICS 36 (1947).
157. STAFF OF AxTITRUST S o0MM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S4ru
CONG., 1sT SEss., INTERxM REPORT 23 (1955). Compare HADLER, ANTITRLUST I. PER-
SPECTIVE 45-46 (1958).
158. See Record, pp. 1159, 1162.
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inference of effect on competition.159 They in no way criticize the principles
of quantitative substantiality and collective foreclosure invoked by the majority
of the Court.
The Standard Stations opinion does not tell us, in terms of exact percent-
ages of output or of dollar sales volumes, what share of the market is "sub-
stantial" in a requirements contracts case. It does not reveal whether the
maximum lawful share in an individual foreclosure case would be larger or
smaller than that in a collective foreclosure case.1 10 It is further uncertain
whether the Court will adopt a flexible yardstick, varying with the market
structure of individual industries. 6 ' In Standard Stations, the Court was in
the position of a man who knows he has about two hundred dollars in the
bank, more or less, and who wants to write a check; this man has no prob-
lem if he writes a fifty dollar check, but if he writes a hundred eighty dollar
check, he may overdraw his account. 162 Whether the Supreme Court made
an overdraft in its Standard Stations decision is by no means clear. But in
159. "But proof of their quantity does not prove that they had this forbidden quality:
and the assumption that they did, without proof, seems to me unwarranted." 337 U.S.
at 322 (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.); see note 120 supra.
160. Judging by Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922)
(40%), and United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957)
(neighborhood of 25%), as distinguished from Standard Stations (over 65%, perhaps
76%) and FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1935) (75vc%),
individual foreclosure is more suspect than collective foreclosure. This may reflect the
known greater stability of monopoly over oligopoly. See BOULDING, EcoNomic ANALYSIS
645-47 (3d ed. 1955) ; STIGLER, THEORY oF PRicE 228-40 (rev. ed. 1952).
161. Such reintroduction of a rule of reason into § 3 appears problematical at the
present moment, but past antitrust experience suggests that this is by no means unlikely.
See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 528 (1948) ("The relative effect
of percentage command of a market varies with the setting in which that factor is
placed."). Under the standard of quantitative substantiality, evidence of lack of actual
anticompetitive effect of a questioned integration practice is said to be inadmissible. See
Dictograph Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1954). When a substantial
enough fraction of an industry is so affected by integration that it is not farfetched to
infer a significant effect on competition in that industry, the antitrust laws ban the inte-
gration arrangements. However, economic evidence is relevant in determining how sub-
stantial a fraction must be affected in order to presume the forbidden effect. But what-
ever scope economic analysis is permitted in defining "substantiality," it can hardly be
excluded in determining the relevant market. Much of the economic evidence the rule of
Standard Stations is thought to exclude as irrelevant can be introduced as bearing on
the definition of the relevant market. Thus, cross-elasticity of supply or demand can be
used, in effect, to show lack of anticompetitive effect by demonstrating the need for a
broader market definition. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956) (cross-elasticity of demand) ; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1952) (cross-elasticity of demand); United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (cross-elasticity of supply). The economist is not yet
excluded from this "not insubstantial" field. See Adelman, Corporate Integration, in How
To COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 290, 304 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954).
162. See Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HAv. L. RE,. 27, 31 (1949).
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subsequent cases, courts and the FTC appear to have drawn three hundred
dollar checks along with fifty dollar checks.
Avoiding Standard Stations: Agency, Understandings, Refusal to Deal.
The impact of Statdard Stations depends primarily on the extent to which it
affects distribution systems, the availability of alternative devices, and the degree
of control which can be exercised with their help.103
With regard to gasoline marketing, Mr. Justice Douglas, as has been pointed
out, criticized the majority for forcing the majors into either adopting owner-
ship integration'164 or making use of the agency device, thus turning their
retailers into clerks. The majority opinion seems to leave the way open for
other alternative devices. In addition to mentioning fixed-quantity contracts,
163. According to the prosecuting attorney in Standard Stations and United
States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 343
U.S. 922 (1952), the impact of the two decisions on the distribution patterns used by
West Coast petroleum industries was negligible. Nondefendant members of the Big Seven,
according to this testimony, did not attempt to comply with, or even evade, the decision:
instead they ignored it, and "adopted a policy of a calculated business risk." Hearings
before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Select Committee on Small Btuaness, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 300-01 (1955). See also 1 WmiTNEY, ANTRmusT Poicms 131 (1958). But see
id. at 130.
Given the institutional framework of gasoline marketing the effectiveness of banning
exclusive arrangements has been questioned. "It contradicts both common sense and
marketing experience to assume that the broad picture of single brand distribution would be
appreciably altered even if dealers were completely free to choose." DE CHAZEAU & Kara,
op. cit. supra note 144, at 515-19. But the authors seem to concede that in the absence
of exclusive arrangements "coercion" through integration might become less of a
problem and access to the market might become easier for the independent. For
the impact of Standard Stations on provisions or practices forcing the dealer to handle
only company approved motor oil and TBA, see 1 WHrrNEY, op. cit. supra at 129-33 ("in
bringing the Standard Stations suit, the Department of Justice probably had in mind dim-
ination of exclusive dealing in motor oil and TBA as much as or more than in gasoline").
164. See text at note 101 supra. See Rostow, Over-All Size, in How To CoMPLY
Wirn = ANUTRUST LAws 311, 324 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954), for the view that
amendment of § 7 has swept away this alternative and therefore the basis for the dissent.
Major refiners have decreased the number of owned outlets from 125,000 to 3,000 because
of disadvantages of ownership integration. Presently, service stations fall into five
categories, and number in each roughly as follows: (1) stations owned by the company
-- over 3,000; (2) "commission-type" stations-about 8,000; (3) stations leased from the
supplier-90,000; (4) stations leased from a third party-15-20,000; and (5) stations
owned by the dealer-60,000. 1 WHiTxNE, op. cit. supra note 163, at 125-26. "[Blut even
today about 90 percent of all pumps and a somewhat smaller percentage of tanks are said
to be owned by suppliers." I id. at 109. For a discussion of the use of consignment contracts
in gasoline distribution, see National Petroleum News, July 1956, p. 93; DF CnZEALu &
KAaN, op. cit. supra note 144, at 426. Courts, as Richfield indicates, in interpreting the
status of the "consignee" will continue to look to substance rather than form.
The legal consequences of ownership integration are discussed in this section of the
Article in the text following note 289.
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it may not have disturbed the validity of equipment contracts conditioned on
the understanding that "the right or license" of the dealer is dependent on
his using the equipment (tanks and pumps bearing the brand insignia of
the supplier) only for dispensing the products of the supplier.105 Finally,
consideration must be given to informal understandings of exclusive dealing
backed up by the sanction of refusal to deal.
Standard of California, in reaction to the opinion, did not turn its dealers
into employees. But it informed its equipment lessees that it still had the right
to control the use of its equipment to assure that it was used exclusively for
165. 337 U.S. at 303, 310.
The validity of such arrangements was tested and upheld in FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,
261 U.S. 463 (1923). The Commission had prohibited these equipment contracts as un-
reasonable restraints on competition and unfair trade practices, since their practical effect
was directed in larger measure against dealers who did not have more than one pump.
The Supreme Court disagreed. It stressed that the contract did not contain a
covenant ... which obligates the lessee not to sell the goods of another; and its
language cannot be so construed.. . . He may carry on business as his judgment
dictates and his means permit, save only that he cannot use the lessor's equipment
for dispensing another's brand. By investing a comparatively small sum, he can
buy an outfit and use it without hindrance. He can have respondent's gasoline, with
the pump or without the pump, and many competitors seek to supply his needs.
Id. at 474. The validity of these equipment contracts, as the Court reasoned, could not be
challenged as unfair methods of competition:
The devices are not expensive-$300 to $500-can be purchased readily of makers
and, while convenient, they are not essential. The contract, open and fair upon its
face, provides an unconstrained recipient with free receptacle and pump for storing,
dispensing, advertising and protecting the lessor's brand. The stuff is highly in-
flammable and the method of handling it is important to the refiner. He is also
vitally interested in putting his brand within easy reach of consumers with ample
assurance of its genuineness. No purpose or power to acquire unlawful monopoly
has been disclosed, and the record does not show that the probable effect of the practice
will be unduly to lessen competition. Upon the contrary, it appears to have pro-
moted the public convenience by inducing many small dealers to enter the business
and put gasoline on sale at the crossroads.
Id. at 475. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in distinguishing the Sinclair case, had this to say:
"The present case [Standard Stations] differs of course in the fact that a dealer who
has entered a requirements contract with Standard cannot consistently with that contract
sell the petroleum products of a competitor of Standard no matter how many pumps he
has . . . ." 337 U.S. at 303-04. Query: What effect, if any, has Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), on Sinclair? Since the basis for the decision in Sinclair
was, in part at least, that an exclusivity clause was aimed at the protection of the supplier's
good will, is not the decision weakened by International Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States,
298 U.S. 131 (1936) ? One cannot overlook, however, the fact that IBM is the dominant
firm in its industry, as Sinclair was not.
Since the validity of this scheme presupposes, as Justice Frankfurter clearly indicates,
absence of an anticompetitive effect, see 337 U.S. at 303-04 n.6, the question may well be asked
whether the force of the decision does not depend on the opportunity of a dealer to sell
more than one brand (split-pumping). For a discussion of split-pumping, see DE CitAU'At^
& KAHN, op. cit. supra note 144, at 516.
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its products. Later on, we are also informed, it changed the status of some
of its employees into consignees.165a
The alternatives of turning station lessees into agents, of using fixed-quantity
contracts, and of using informal understandings of exclusiv'ity backed up by
the refusal-to-deal (cancellation) sanction were tested in United States v. Rich-
field Oil Corp.,166 which casts serious doubt on the availability of any of
these devices as means of evading section 3. In that case, the Justice De-
partment continued its attack on the West Coast oil oligopoly. 07 Again the
165a. 1 WirTNEy, op. cit. supra note 163, at 127-28; DE CHxZEAU & K,.N, op. Cit.
supra note 144, at 516.
166. 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 9227 (1952).
167. In 1950, the Justice Department brought still another suit, this time against all
seven major Western refiners. United States v. Standard Oil Co., TRAE- RFix. Ru'.
(1959 Trade Cas.) 1 69399 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 1959) (consent decree).
The distribution system used by the west coast oil industry is now in large measure
covered by the Final Judgment which has brought to an end nine years of litigation
in which the Government attempted to strengthen its victory in Standard Stations and
Richfield by breaking up the vertical integration systems used by the individual oil com-
panies. The consent decree represents only a partial victory for the Government. Divesti-
ture was not granted. Section XII A requires and directs each consenting defendant
(i) to offer to each dealer operating at any location in the Pacific States Area
where he is being supplied with gasoline by such defendant . . . and
(ii) to grant to each such dealer who accepts such offer a supply agreement
wherein such defendant undertakes to supply such dealer with gasoline for sale at
such location. Each such agreement shall be for a term of at least three years; ...
and provided, further, that each such agreement with a dealer who, with the consent
of such defendant, as a dealer occupies premises owned or leased by such defendant,
shall contain a provision granting to such dealer a right to terminate said agreement
upon ninety days' written notice.
Id. at 75531. (Emphasis added.)
The supply obligation need not exceed half of the dealer's requirements. Subsection
XII(D), id. at 75532. Subsection G adds significantly: "It is understood that each con-
senting defendant is now supplying many dealers on a spot basis, or under supply con-
tracts having less than a three-year term, with whom such defendant may be unwilling to
enter into a supply agreement or a lease having a three-year term." Id. at 75532-33.
Subsection XIV enjoins the consenting defendants other than Standard Oil and Rich-
field from entering or enforcing any agreement with any dealer reseller in the Pacific
states area, or forcing any such dealer to enter into any agreement, whereby such dealer
agrees
(i) to purchase from said defendant or from a source designated by ,aid de-
fendant all or substantially all of such dealer's requirements of any refined
petroleum product or of tires, batteries or accessories, or
(ii) to refrain from handling refined petroleum products or tires, batteries ur
accessories obtained from any other person;
Id. at 75533.
Consignees are not resellers by virtue of a provision in definitional Section II (n).
Id. at 75528.
St ndard Oil and Richfield are not affected by the exclusivity provision since they
are covered by the original decrees. Section XIV, id. at 75533. The Texas Company
is not a party to the consent decree. Id. at 75525.
Whatever may be the impact of the consent decree on the oil distribution system on
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focus was on a contract integration system. In one set of contracts, cov-
ering stations which Richfield owned and leased to retailers ("leased-out"
stations), an attempt was made by the defendant to bring the exclusive
arrangements outside the scope of sections 1 and 3 by labelling them employ-
ment or agency contracts. This strategy was apparently based on FTC v.
Curtis Publishing Co.,168 and United States v. General Elec. Co.' 0  In the
former, agency was held to put a contract vertical integration system beyond
the reach of section 3; in the latter, agency legitimized a price-fixing scheme
which would otherwise have violated section 1. But in two earlier cases deal-
ing with similar situations, the Supreme Court had not honored the agency
defense because it found that no genuine agency relationship existed.'1 0 And
in the recent case of United States v. Masonite Corp.,171 the Court had
declared that the agency label does not prevent a price-fixing scheme from
running afoul of section 1. Thus, the Richfield district court had two tech-
niques for disposal of the agency defense. It used both. It found as a fact that
the dealers were independent businessmen, and it read Masonite to rule the
agency defense out both under section 1 and section 3.172
Another group of Richfield's contracts were for fixed amounts covering
about eighty per cent of the dealer's requirements. However, there was an
informal understanding that the dealer would buy one hundred per cent of
his requirements from Richfield or Richfield would stop dealing with him. In
some contracts there was the added sanction of being required, if cancelled,
to repay Richfield for having painted the station with its colors and insignia.
The court treated the combination of written and oral agreements as full
requirements contracts despite their not being explicitly so denominated.SIU
the West Coast, the force of the rules of law laid down in Standard Stations and Richfield
is still intact as far as vertical integration in other industries is concerned.
168. 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
169. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
170. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 354 (1922);
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
171. 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
172. For a criticism of the district court's finding that Richfield's service station
lessees were independent business men, see Da CHAZEAU & KAHu, op. cit. supra note
144, at 516.
A few months later the Fifth Circuit used Curtis to reverse an FTC cease and
desist order against exclusive dealings contracts. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co.
v. FTC, 194 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1952). On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, 344 U.S.
392 (1953), on the ground, inter alia, that the proceedings were under § 1 rather than
§ 3, thereby making Curtis inapplicable. The Court then extended the Masonite § I rule
for horizontal integration by contract to the § 1 vertical integration by contract context.
Id. at 397. Although Curtis was distinguished rather than overruled directly, it would
appear that there is little life left in it. For a discussion of agency as a device of forward
integration, see Rifkind, Division of Territories, in How To CompLy WITH TIE ANTI-
TRUsT LAws 127, 138 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954).
173. Suppose each Richfield station sold about 10,000 gallons a month: Could Rich-
field, each year, make a "spot market" sale of 100,000 gallons to the station, informally
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Accordingly, these contracts were held to be within the scope of sections 1
and 3.174
Richfield presented fairly simple problems of proof so far as the existence
of exclusive dealing was concerned. The same was true of Standard Stations.
There was little doubt in either case that the supplier demanded and got
exclusivity. In other cases, however, proof of exclusive dealing has been more
difficult. The Justice Department failed in its suit for an injunction against
J. I. °Case Co., a farm equipment manufacturer.'-- The Government alleged
that exclusive dealing was an unwritten term of Case's franchise contracts and
that Case forced its dealers to drop competing lines on pain of cancellation.
Finding that the acts proved by the prosecution did not show any "pattern
or policy on the part of Case to obtain an agreement or understanding from
its dealers that they will not handle competing lines,"170 the court explained
that cancellation of a dealer who carried dual lines might be coincidental or
merely in pursuance of a sound business policy of dealer selection. In addi-
tion, the court found the fact that many dealers handled Case exclusively not
to constitute evidence of an understanding forced upon them, because such
practice was frequently a matter of volition.77 Finally, the court drew atten-
agreeing that the dealer need not accept delivery of all his 100,000 gallons at once? It
would hardly appear that such a "spot" sale would fare any better than the term contract
for a fixed amount, which was followed in Richfield.
174. 99 F. Supp. at 294-96. The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction per curiam,
343 U.S. 922 (1952), on the basis of Standard Stations, apparently choosing not to pass
on the § 1 issue. The Standard Stations dissenting justices concurred in the opinion. See
Avr'Y GEN. NA'L Comm. Aawrrrusr REP. 142 n.51 (1955). See also 20 U.S.L WEEK
1161, 3261 (1952).
The aftermath of the Richfield decision was that the company cancelled all existing
lease contracts and adopted a new leasing system under which rent was raised from
1€ to 2.50 per gallon of gasoline sold. At the same time, Richfield dropped its tankwmgon
price, presumably below the level of the other majors' prices. As a result, it became
cheaper for a dealer renting a Richfield-owned station to carry Richfield than the gasoline
of another major-unless the competitor would meet Richfield's price. The Justice De-
partment has indicated dissatisfaction with this practice. 1 VmiTNx, A.NTrRusT Pol-
crxs 129 (1957). Perhaps this scheme is not as objectionable as it appears. Richfield may
be separating revenue from two components of its operations--the business of gasoline
marketing and the business of being a landlord of gasoline stations. Maximization of
revenue from each business would not appear unlawful unless horizontal monopolization
at each level could be shown. Query: Under the rule of Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), would the new Richfield plan be a tie-in, illegal per se?
175. United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951). The suit
was brought under § 1 and § 3.
176. Id. at 865.
177. Ibid. Volenti non fit injuria is by no means an antitrust maxim. The prevailing
view expressed in cases involving express contracts for exclusive dealing is that acqui-
escence to the system by the dealers is no bar to Government prosecution. See FTC v.
Miotion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1953) ; Anchor Serum Co.
v. FTC, 217 *F.2d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1954); text at note 372 infra. Even in private
damages actions the pari delicto defense has been much eroded. See Red Rock Bottler_ ,
Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1952-1953 Trade Cas. 67962 (N.D. Ga. 1952) (distributor
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tion to the fact that many Case dealers did in fact carry lines of other manu-
facturers,'1 78 and that Case was subject to vigorous competition from other
farm equipment manufacturers.
Reliance by a manufacturer on unwritten contract clauses backed up by
the sanction of refusal to deal puts the prosecution at a severe disadvantage.
As United States v. J. I. Case Co. reveals, the evidentiary problems may
prove insuperable. When the prosecution has convincing evidence that ex-
clusive dealing was in fact required however, there is no doctrinal problem.'"
Thus, the FTC found a prima facie section 3 case made out against a manu-
facturer when evidence was introduced that he refused to deal with jobbers
who dealt in the goods of his competitors. Although refusals to deal are not
actionable as such under section 3, which requires a "sale," the Commission
aggregated the refusals to deal into a concerted plan from which it could be
inferred that those sales which were consummated were made on the under-
standing that the buyer would stop dealing in the goods of the seller's com-
petitors.180
The FTC and the Rule of Standard Stations: Quantitative Substantiality
v. Injury to Competitors. Since Standard Stations the FTC has carried only
two of its section 3 cases to the courts, Dictograph Prods., Inc. v. FTC,181
and Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC.8 2 These cases reveal a distinct evolution
in the Commission's application of the rule of Standard Stations. Dictograph
was another Standard Stations: the respondent, "one of the industry's three
leaders, all or some of whom use this restrictive device," had tied up over
wins judgment for damages occasioned by exclusive dealing contract). For a collection
of authorities on par delicto, see Banana Distribs., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp.
32, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
178. 101 F. Supp. at 866-67. Contrast United States v. General Motors Corp., 121
F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941), where defendant GM attempted
to show that many of its dealers did not finance through GMAC, the GM subsidiary
with whom dealers allegedly had been coerced to deal exclusively. The court refused
to admit the evidence, stating that "evidence that the [defendants] had not restrained
the commerce of some dealers would not . . . disprove the affirmative evidence that
a conspiracy to restrain the trade of dealers had been formed." 121 F.2d at 405.
179. Compare notes 379-410 infra and accompanying text.
180. Timken Roller Bearing Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 1 27244
(1958) (nonsuit reversed). This was the theory of the recent antitrust prosecution of
Sun Oil. See United States v. Sun Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) U 69398, at
75506-07 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1959). See also ATi'Y GEN. NAT L COMm. ANTITRUST REP.
135-36 (1955).
In other cases, § 3 violations have been found when dealers received special discounts
for dealing exclusively. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940) :
United States v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 83 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. I11. 1949); Maguire
Industries, TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 1 27446 (1958) (also Robinson-
Patman Act violation). But cf. Lipson v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 87 F.2d 265 (1st Cir.),
cert. granted, 300 U.S. 651, cert. dismissed, 301 U.S. 711 (1937); Shell Oil Co., 3 TRADE
RE. R P. U[ 27762 (FTC Feb. 5, 1959). See notes 534-37 infra and accompanying text.
181. 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954), affirming 50 F.T.C. 281 (1953).
182. 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954), affirming 50 F.T.C. 681 (1954).
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twenty-two per cent of "the nation's choicest retail outlets for hearing aids"
and two million dollars worth of annual sales via requirements contracts. 13
The Second Circuit accepted the FTC position that the rule of Standard
Stations compels "a finding of unlawful conduct under section 3 ... [once it
has been shown that] competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share
of the line of commerce affected."' 8 4 The court felt itself driven to this con-
clusion "even in the face of evidence tending to indicate that the number of
competitors in a particular line of commerce has increased."'18 Thus, respond-
ent's attempt to show the absence of actual anticompetitive effect of and
economic justification for its exclusive contracts was rejected. The substantial
lessening of competition banned by the Clayton Act was conclusively pre-
sumed from the degree of market foreclosure.
Dictograph probably involved a situation in which the conclusion wvas
justified that the quantity of commerce affected by exclusive dealing had a
significant effect on competition. Parallel use of exclusive dealing contracts
by the major hearing aid manufacturers may well have denied newcomers to
the market access to well-established, trained, responsible, independent hear-
ing aid distributors. 80 These dealers were the "choice outlets." New entrants
would then be forced to turn to less desirable outlets, such as optical, drug,
and department stores.'8 7 Such outlets probably entail higher unit selling costs
for manufacturers who must distribute through them. 88 These higher costs
would bar fully effective competition by new entrants. To avoid suffering
higher distribution costs than the established firms, entrants could train their
own dealers.'8 9 But this would require the investment of time and capital in
183. 217 F.2d at 826, 828. Neither court nor FTC gives the total market share fore-
dosed by parallel use of exclusive dealing contracts. However, a subsequent decision,
Beltone Hearing Aid Co., 52 F.T.C. 830 (1956), asserts that there was nearly total
foreclosure. Id. at 836.
184. 217 F2d at 825. The court is quoting Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 314.
185. 217 F.2d at 824.
186. See Beltone Hearing Aid Co., 52 F.T.C. 830 (1956).
187. 50 F.T.C. at 294-95.
188. The competitor Cleartone had 500 such outlets and 15 regular dealer outlets,
each of which groups sold 509 of total Cleartone sales. See Beltone Hearing Aid Co.,
52 F.T.C. 830 (1956). This represents about a 30 times better showing by dealer distri-
butors. But note that Zenith, a major producer, relies on "inferior" outlets successfully.
50 F.T.C. at 295.
189. Dictograph originally had to do this. 217 F.2d at 824. However, that Dictograph
could do this at an earlier stage of the hearing aid industry's development is no reason
to believe that this is equally feasible now. Possibly, the early entrants to the industry
were at no cost disadvantage with respect to one another when they all had to incur
the same training program .expenses. But now, an entrant forced to meet current price
levels might not be able to absorb the cost of carrying so large an investment.
Query: Does the firm which invests in a training program "deserve" a reward in the
form of an exclusive dealing arrangement so as to have an incentive for its efforts? Or
is the reward from the first use of the trained outlets enough? Cf. U.S. CoxsT. art. 1,
§ 8 (patents and copyrights); Stern, Buyer Indifference and Secondary Meaning in
Trademark and Unfair Competition Cases, 32 CoNN. B.J. 381, 396-97 & mi46, 47 (1958).
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a training program. Thus, the exclusive dealing system probably imposed
barriers to the entry of effective new competition into the hearing aid in-
dustry, either in the form of a higher distribution cost barrier, or a training
cost barrier plus a time delay. Consequently, it appears that Dictograph's
application of the rule of Standard Stations can be economically justified.
The vertical integration system, however beneficial to the integrating firm,
would not, if these barriers in fact existed, have been consistent with the
preservation of effective competition in the industry.
Between the time the Commission decided Dictograph and its counsel
argued the appeal before the Second Circuit, the Maico Co. decision was
handed down. 190 And in Maico, the Commission changed directions and ex-
pressly rejected the quantitative substantiality rule of Standard Stations. An
initial hearing examiner had declared Maico's requirements contract integra-
tion system of hearing aid distribution in violation of section 3, stating that
"there must have been lessening of competition because respondent [was] the
'fourth, fifth, or sixth' largest company in the hearing-aid field" and had en-
joyed annual sales of nearly two million dollars.' 91 Evidence concerning the
lack of actual anticompetitive effect of the distribution system had been ex-
cluded, in accordance with the rule in Standard Stations. On appeal, the
Commission reversed the initial order, directing the examiner to hear and
evaluate the excluded evidence. 10
2
The Dictograph case tells us that Maico was in an industry whose market-
ing practices may appropriately be described as amounting to collective fore-
closure. The inference would not be farfetched that Maico's requirements
contracts created a significant clog on competition and helped prevent late
arrivals from wresting away more than an insignificant portion of the market.
Nevertheless, the Commission did not feel bound to rely upon such inferences.
First, it did not believe, as did the Court in Standard Stations, that such an
economic investigation would stultify the Clayton Act's legislative mandate.Ima
When this defense was invoked in the Outboard Marine & Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1553
(1956), and respondent suggested that newcomers should train their own dealers, the
initial hearing examiner's view was:
But that can be no justification for respondent foreclosing experienced and 'de-
veloped' dealers from its competitors or their distributors, The fact that the latter
can go the longer and more expensive route is no answer to the law's evident corn-
mand that they should have equal competitive opportunity to sell through all dealers,
'developed' as well as ignorant. Here they have been walled off from the best
outlets and left to persuade and train newcomers.
Id. at 1575.
190. Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953) (interlocutory appeal).
191. Id. at 486.
192. The case then terminated in a consent order, Maico Co., 51 F.T.C. 1197 (1955).
193. 50 F.T.C. at 487; see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 313
(1949). The FTC interpreted "may" less inclusively than did Justice Frankfurter. It
adopted a standard of actual or probable anticompetitive effect like that presented in the
Jackson dissent.
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Nor, apparently, did it agree that the investigation would prove inconclusive.'
Finally, although the investigation might be one "most ill-suited for courts,"ulm
the Commission believed itself possessed of sufficient economic expertise to
essay the task.
A reading of section 3 of the Clayton Act clearly indicates Congress in-
tended to outlav only those exclusive dealing agreements which are
lessening or which if allowed to continue will probably lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly. We believe the structure of the Federal
Trade Commission was specifically designed to make decisions involving
this type of complex economic problem. To refuse to exercise our talents
as an administrative tribunal in these cases because the courts feel "ill-
suited" to weigh all of the relevant factors, would deprive the country
of the very services which we were created to furnish.100
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission relies on a footnote in the Frank-
furter Standard Stations opinion:
The dual system of enforcement provided for by the Clayton Act must
have contemplated standards of proof capable of administration by the
courts as well as by the FTC and other designated agenies .... Our
interpretation of the Act, therefore, should recognize that an appraisal
of economic data which might be practicable if only the latter were faced
with the task may be quite otherwise for judges unequipped for it either
by experience or by the availability of skilled assistance.107
That it was Mr. Justice Frankfurter's intention to justify a dual standard
for the dual system of enforcement is questionable. 08 In any case, the Com-
mission, since Maico, has pursued its own approach to the Clayton Act stand-
ard, one which departs, as it claims, from the quantitative substantiality test
of Standard Stations.99
Anchor Serum was the first .Commission decision rendered under the new
dispensation. Anchor was the largest of nine producers selling hog cholera
serum to farmers and farmers' cooperatives. "Specific instances [were] shown
. . . where the market for serum . . . [was] substantially foreclosed to pro-
ducers other than petitioner by reason of the latter's requirements con-
tracts.' 2 °0 For example, Anchor did 500,000 dollars worth of business a year
194. See id. at 309, 314.
195. See ibid.
196. 50 F.T.C. at 488.
197. 337 U.S. at 310 n.13.
198. Compare the Frankfurter dissent in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv.
Co., 344 U.S. 392, 398 (1953). See also ATr'y GEx. Nxr'L Coum. AnTITRUST RL-a. 148
(1955).
199. In a recent § 7 horizontal merger case, Brillo Mfg. Co., TR.,Az REG. REP.
(1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 27242 (1958), the FTC reversed and remanded the decision of an
initial hearing e.xaminer who had followed a "quantitative substantiality" rule to find
a violation on one count and a "quantitative insubstantiality" rule to dismiss a second
count. The case was remanded to the examiner and he was directed to consider actual
competitive effects in both situations. See Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1649-63 (1959 ,.
200. Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 1954).
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with an Iowa and an Illinois co-op. Before Anchor instituted the exclusive
contractual arrangements, a competitor, Lederle, sold these co-ops about
200,000 dollars worth of serum annually; afterwards, Lederle could make no
sales to them.
It is evident that this competitor was completely stymied in its effort to
do business with these two contract holders . . . because the latter were
under obligation to make all their purchases from petitioner. A similar
fate was met by the Diamond Serum Company, another competitor of
petitioner .... It would require a naive mind to conclude, as petitioner
would have us do, that the agreements under consideration could result
in other than an adverse effect upon competition. . . . It thus appears
plain that the products handled by petitioner's exclusive contract holders
are removed from the competitive area.2
0 1
Anchor Serum is apparently a case of individual rather than collective
foreclosure. Neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Commission alluded to the
market effect, or even existence, of parallel arrangements. Moreover, the test
of substantiality employed was apparently not market percentage, but dollar
volume. The injury to competitors from which injury to competition was
inferred was not foreclosure of a substantial portion of the market; rather,
it was preemption of a substantial amount of sales to the detriment of those
competitors who had previously enjoyed them.20 2 Since the size of the market
share foreclosed by integration is not relied upon, this case would appear to
come close to embracing the rule, attributed to Standard Stations by its
critics, 20 3 that a significant lessening of competition can be inferred whenever
a "significant" (beyond de minimis, rather than "substantial") market share
201. Id. at 873.
202. In addition to the injuries suffered by the two competitors, Lederle and Diamond,
$200,000 and $100,000 of annual sales respectively, one more competitor was injured by
Anchor's requirements contracts with the farmer co-ops. This competitor was Fidelity,
who sold to drug stores in Illinois and Iowa. Fidelity's sales dropped from $42,000 to
$14,000 a year because the drug stores were "unable to compete" with the co-ops under
contract to Anchor. Anchor Serum Co., 50 F.T.C. 681, 685-88, 690, aft'd, 217 F.2d 867
(7th Cir. 1954). Anchor's total sales under requirements contracts amounted to about
$2 million a year. See 50 F.T.C. at 684.
203. See note 124 supra and accompanying text. It is submitted that the Anchor
contracts, on the basis of the sparse evidence relied upon in the decisions, properly belong
in the gray, "not proved" zone. See text following note 130 m¢upra.
A recent case that may be open to the same criticism is United States v. Sun Oil Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) ff 69398 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1959). At the time the
suit was commenced, Sun was the twelfth largest oil company in the United States and
sold 8% or 9% of the relevant market. Brief for United States, p. 9.
The government case was not premised on the theory of collective, although not
collusive, market foreclosure. Brief for United States, passim. Both the Justice De-
partment and the court focused on the absolute number of dealers affected (6500), and
the dollar volume of commerce involved. This approach harks back to International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) ("not insignificant"). See text at note
126 supra.
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is foreclosed. In any case, the move to injury to competition from injury to
competitors required a greater leap than it did in Standard.21°
While the Maica case has been enthusiastically greeted as a retreat from
quantitative substantiality,20 5 such enthusiasm may prove premature. In the
cases since Anchor Serum, the Commission has frequently turned its back
on the rule of Standard Stations, but the rule it has espoused in place of
quantitative substantiality is pure "injury to competitors." It is readily ap-
parent that this rule is far more unfavorable to defendants than quantitative
substantiality, and the test of illegality it poses far more casual.
Among the post-Maico cases Revlon Prod. Corp.20 is particularly inter-
esting because it seems to mingle the injury to competitors and injury to
competition approaches, but does not emulate Standard Stations by attempt-
ing to synthesize the two. The following passage in the Commission's decision
illustrates the two approaches:
Competitors shut off from respondent's jobbers by its agreements pre-
sumably can sell through the other jobbers in the area. However, re-
spondent's jobbers are recognized as being among the best in the country.
And the record shows that in some cases the only other outlets available
204. Another issue in the case was the relevance of coercion. Anchor had argued
that its customers had approached it to negotiate requirements contracts in order "to
achieve assured continuity of... supply.. . and freedom from 'shopping' around ...."
50 F.T.C. at 692. The Commission rejected the defense, declaring that "the ti-dimensional
aspect of the situation was disregarded and the interests of the public and of those
competitors . . . to whom injury ensued . . . were not considered." Ibid. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit agreed with the Commission:
There was evidence that some of the contracts, perhaps all, were entered into
as a result of negotiations initiated by the purchasers rather than by petitioner.
From this premise it is argued that the terms were not imposed by the petitioner
and that as a result there was no illegality, even though the contracts had the pro-
scribed effect on competition. The Commission rejected this argument and so
do we. Certainly there is nothing in the language of the Act from which it can
even be inferred that two classes of contracts were contemplated, depending upon
whether the contract was initiated by the seller or the buyer. ,Ve think it is a
novel theory that the rights, liabilities and obligations of parties to a contract
depend upon which of the parties propose it. And we think it immaterial whether
the contract was for the benefit of the seller or the buyer. In any event, the
determining factor is whether the contract had the proscribed effect.
217 F2d at 870. Compare note 240 infra.
205. See, e.g., Arr'Y GmN. NAT'L Comm. AirTausT REP. 142-44 (1955); L :Au.EE,
AirrrmusT IN PEnsrEcpwvE 38-39, 44-46, 124-126 (1957); Hodson, Exclusive Dealing, in
How To COaPLY Wrrx THE ANTTrrUST LAWS 140, 148 n.52 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954)
("Thus, exclusive arrangements may be approved by the Commission in instances where
the courts would refuse to examine [economic evidence] and exonerate."). But cf. Hand-
ler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 10 Rr.con or N.Y.C.B.A. 332, 341 (1955).
206. 51 F.T.C. 260 (final order), motion to reopen denied, id. at 466 (1954). Revlon
was prosecuted for violating § 3 by integrating with exclusive dealing contracts 16%A
of the "1100 first-class beauty supply jobbers." Id. at 279. Revlon sold to 176 out of the
1100, 157 of whom had formal franchise contracts. It appears that second cla's o'utlets
were poor credit risks. Id. at 265, 277.
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to such competitors were of lesser quality, and that they were deprived
of full coverage in the area involved as a result of respondent's agree-
ments. Further, if these contracts are found to be legal, there is a very
great likelihood that similar contracts will be put into use by respondent's
competitors, further restricting the number of beauty supply jobbers avail-
able to the small cosmetic houses. The cumulative effect of such agree-
ments could as effectively close the market to competitors as if one com-
pany monopolized all of the jobbers. 20 7
The authors submit that this is all "injury to competitors." Even the last two
sentences, in which "cumulative foreclosure" is envisioned and effect on "the
market" mentioned, appear to regard such foreclosure as unlawful because
it injures the excluded competitors ("the small cosmetic houses") rather than
because it ultimately injures the public in the form of higher prices, poorer
goods, or decreased output. Thus, on a motion to reopen the case because a
new competitor had emerged as a leading national contender to Revlon, the
Commission held the proffered evidence inconclusive, since it did not affect
the finding that the exclusive dealing contracts had a "substantial restrictive
effect on smaller competitors who, [unlike Hazel Bishop, did] not have suffi-
cient resources to spend millions for advertising or to establish a complete
jobber setup for their products from coast to coast. °208
The Commission might have justifiably concluded that the enormous ex-
penditures by Hazel Bishop proved that Revlon had erected substantial bar-
riers to the entry of new competition.20 But the Commission was not content
to rely on injury to competition in the abstract. Instead, it observed that the
Clayton Act is concerned with helping small business, and because the power
of smaller companies to compete is adversely affected, a section 3 violation
existed. 210 Although this might be interpreted to be the language of "injury
to competition," the thrust of the Commission's opinion seems to be "injury
to competitors."
Perhaps a break with the injury to competitors rationale may be found in
Outboard Marine & Mfg. Co.2 1 1 Outboard, the dominant small boat motor
manufacturer, 212 did not allow its dealers to carry other marine motors. Since
dealers preferred to carry a full line of motor sizes,213 those competitors of
Outboard who manufactured only short lines of motors were unable to secure
access to many first class outlets.214 The FTC initial examiner found that "it
207. Id. at 279. This passage suggests the possibility that higher costs were imposed
on competitors. If the case were to be economically justified at all, it would require re-
liance on the "incipiency doctrine," see note 276 infra, since only 16% of the market was
affected.
208. 51 F.T.C. at 468.
209. For discussion of barriers to entry created by advertising, see BAIN 114-43. See
also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946).
210. 51 F.T.C. at 468.
211. 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956).
212. Outboard sold over 50% of all outboard motors. Id. at 1554.
213. Id. at 1569, 1572.
214. Ibid.
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cost a capital outlay of $1,500,000 to produce one size motor.. . and $350,000
to add one more size."2 15 Had Outboard not foreclosed so many outlets to
competitors, entry with a partial range of motor sizes might have been
feasible. But Outboard's dealing policy forced competitors to produce a full
line or else fall back on second-rate distributors.210 The choice was between
a large capital outlay or high distribution costs.217 Moreover, the examiner
found that it took from one to three years to develop a new dealer to the
point where he became "satisfactory." 218 It is quite likely that this time lag
discouraged entry of competition into the industry. Nevertheless, the examiner
assumed that no injury to competition occurred,219 and he condemned Out-
board solely for injuring competitors. In affirming the initial order, however,
the Commission seemed to return to quantitative substantiality: "The trial
record fully supports a conclusion of probable injury to competition through
the foreclosure of competitors from a substantial and highly desirable portion
of the outboard motor market.2 2 0
Thus, in the various post -Maico cases, the extent of the Commission's
215. Id. at 1576.
216. Compare Aogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25 (1891).
See also WiLcox, ComPmvsoN AN-D MONOPOLY IN AmFRiaCA- INDUSThY 166 (TNEC
Monograph No. 21, 1940) (agricultural machinery). Query: Was the greater part of
the potential outlets for competitors really foreclosed? The examiner found that no other
manufacturers followed a parallel policy. Outboard Motor & Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1553,
1572 (1956).
An extreme example of a single manufacturer foreclosing the greater part of available
outlets for competitors is found in Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954).
The dominant heavy motorcycle manufacturer refused to permit his dealers to carry any
other lines. The competitor Simplex, who manufactured only lightweight motorcycles,
was thus denied access to 80% of the potential market for his product. Id. at 1057.
(Query: Does this mean 80% of potential outlets or 80% of potential sales volume?)
Simplex's sales dropped to 25% of its former volume as a result of the policy.
Evidence indicated that dealers would have preferred to retain Simplex had Harley
Davidson permitted this. Id. at 1058-59. But when confronted with the choice between
Harley-Davidson's full line and Simplex's short line, "the cold facts of business and
analization [sic] of potential markets... [forced dealers] to remain with Harley beause
of the increased demand for large motorcycles." Id. at 1058. Whether or not Harley-
Davidson's policy actually maximized its revenues, see Bowman, Tying Arrangements and
the Leverage Problem, 67 YALr LJ. 19, 20-21 (1957), it does seem that the policy
inhibited competition. In condemning Harley Davidson's policy the Commission does
seem to have been concerned with effects on competition rather than on competitors alone.
See 50 F.T.C. at 1066.
217. See text at note 189 -upra.
218. Outboard Motor & Mlfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1553, 1571 (1956).
219. "There is no evidence that the buying public had any difficulty in finding dealers
from whom to buy motors manufactured by competitors of respondent, and the fact is
so found." Id. at 1574. The authors read this statement to be a finding of the availa-
bility of comparable motors at "reasonable' prices (i.e., prices which would obtain under
a regime of workable competition), rather than a finding that competitors' motors can
be found without difficulty, but at a high price.
220. Id. at 1579.
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economic analysis for the determination of actual anticompetitive effect has
frequently been to specify instances of injury to individual competitors.221
One who agrees with Mr. Justice Jackson in Standard Stations and considers
it farfetched for the Court to find significant injury to competition from fore-
closure of a substantial share of the market cannot then take consolation in
an "economic analysis" which finds injury to competition from bare injury
to specific business rivals. The authors prefer the view of Professor Adelman:
From the observation that certain forms of integration can hurt com-
petition by hurting certain competitors it had been fatally easy to slip
into the habit of looking simply to the effect on competitors as the
criterion. ... Integration is always and necessarily an exclusion of com-
petitors. Whether it is also an exclusion of competition . . . depends on
the particular market situation. Absent a recognition of this principle,
there must always be a chronic tendency under the antitrust laws toward
making exclusion [of competitors ]-and therefore integration-illegal
per se. . . . So long as we have effective competition, however, there
will be disgruntled competitors and pressures toward soft competition.
22
The authors suggest that the rule of Standard Stations is far preferable to a
flat "injury to competitors" rule.223 Emphasis on injury to competitors as the
wrong forbidden by the Clayton Act, rather than injury to the general pur-
chasing public, may well develop into a standard of legality which will pre-
vent effective competition by denying business the benefits of integration.
Although the post-Maico cases may be reconcilable with an injury to competition
approach, the Commission's dominant theme seems to be injury to competitors.
221. In addition to the cases discussed in text, supra, see Beltone Hearing Aid Co.,
52 F.T.C. 830 (1956), where an exclusive dealing contract system was enjoined because
of (1) injury to dealers who submitted to the contracts and lost the opportunity to sell
competitive products, (2) injury to dealers discontinued because they refused to submit
to the contract integration system, (3) injury to competing manufacturers, and (4) sup-
pression of free and open competition. 52 F.T.C. at 841-42.
A possible break with the injury-to-competitors rationale, and perhaps a return to
Standard Stations, may be detected in two recent trial-examiner decisions. General Mills,
Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 28201 (FTC Aug. 21, 1959); The Ice Cream Cases [Carnation
Co., No. 6172; Borden Co., No. 6173; Beatrice Foods Co., No. 6174; National Dairy Prod-,.
Corp. No. 6175; Pet Milk Co., No. 6176; Fairmount Foods Co., No. 6177; Arden Farms
Co., No. 6178; Foremost Dairies, Inc., No. 6179; H. P. Hood & Sons, No. 64251 FTC,
June 26, 1959.
222. Adelman, Corporate Integration, in How To COMPLY WITH TnE ANTITRU7ST
LAws (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954) 290, 305, 310 (1954) ; see Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1910).
223. Cf. Adelman, supra, note 222, at 305 ("... the test of share of the market is at
least a first and wavering approximation to degree of market control.").
To the extent that the cost reductions which integration makes possible are passed oil
to the consumer in the form of lowered prices, the public benefits from integration. But
even when such savings are not passed on in the form of lowered prices, the public
benefits in the long run, at least to some degree, from the release of capital or factors
of production for allocation elsewhere in the economy, even if public benefit iq not at itq
maximum. See BOULDING, EcoNomIc ANALYSIS 607-08 (3d ed. 1955).
[Vol. 69:1
HeinOnline -- 69 Yale L.J. 50 1959-1960
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
and no reason exists to anticipate that future cases will be compatible with a
market injury standard2
MPAS: Sherman-Clayton Coalesccnce?
Section 3 of the Clayton Act declares unlawful the sale of goods or other
commodities on the condition or understanding that the buyer is not to deal
in the goods of a competitor of the seller. Conditions imposed on the seller,
however, are not within the language of the statute, and accordingly output
contracts are immune from section 3.225 Moreover, restrictive contracts for
the sale of anything which is not a "commodity" are outside the scope of the
act.226 The problems created by the narrow wording of section 3 are stril:ing-
ly illustrated in the MPAS case..2 27
Like Standard Stations, MPAS deals with an oligopolistic industry--in this
case film advertising. Along with newsreels, cartoons, and coming attractions,
224. It appears unlikely that rejection by the Commission of Standard Stations would
be subject to court reversal. Since the dismissal of a complaint is not subject to appellate
review, appeal can be had only when a losing respondent is disgruntled by a final order.
The present law on this point and its policy are discussed in Comment, 65 YALE UJ. 34,
38, 84 (1955). Even a final order unfavorable to respondent would not appear to he
subject to attack merely because the Commission refused to apply the principle of quanti-
tative substantiality; § 5 would appear to afford the Commission free rein. See text at
note 276 infra.
225. HANDLER, ANTCrEUST IN PEsPacrivn 44-45 (1957); cf. 81 C0u:c. Rrc. 2340
(1936) (informal opinion of the Commission) (cream output contract not within Clayton
§ 2). In cases involving arrangements similar to those declared unlawful by § 3, but where
the restraint is on the seller, suits have frequently been brought under the less specific
provisions of §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act. See KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207 (1959); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 13 & n.l (1958)
(dissent) ; Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); FTC v.
'Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 397 (1953) ; Fargo Glass & Paint Col.
v. Globe Am. Corp., 201 F2d 534 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 t 1953) ; United
States v. National Screen Serv., 1957 Trade Cas. 72721 (S.D.N.Y.) ; United States v.
National Cranberry Ass'n, 1957 Trade Cas. 73442 (D. Mass.) (consent judgment);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1942),
aff'd as modified, 321 U.S. 707, 719 (1944).
It is said that the standard of behavior imposed by §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act is easier
to conform to than that of § 3 of the Clayton Act. In the one case, there is a violation
when commerce is unduly restrained or is monopolized; in the other, there is a viulation
when the effect of conduct may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
monopoly. "[T]he Clayton Act requires a lower standard of proof of the same kind uf
facts .... evidence ... less impressive than where the Sherman Act is involved." Pills-
bury 'Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555, 567 (1953). See also text at note 267 infra.
226. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 13 & n.l (195S) (dissent
notes that land is not commodity within § 3) ; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. Y. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 n27 (1953) (Justice Department conceded newspaper advertising
contracts not within § 3) ; cf. General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 132 F2.1
425 (6th Cir. 1942) (building contract not a sale within Robinson-Patman Act § 2).
Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3rd Cir. 1934) (hu-,
transportation not a commodity within Clayton Act § 2); United States v. Investor,
19591
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advertising films precede the main feature in 12,000 of the nation's 20,000
motion picture theaters. Advertising films differ from others, at least as far
as the theater owner is concerned, in that they reverse the usual flow of
revenue: while the theater owner must pay to show other films, he is paid
to show advertisements. 22 The producers of advertising films buy time from
theaters for resale to advertisers. For each advertiser the producers select an
appropriate film from their "library," splice in appropriate "personalizing"
captions at start and finish, and then turn the film over to theaters for pro-
jection.229 When the FTC took action against MPAS and the other three
leading producers of advertising films,23 0 seventy-five per cent of the 12,000
Diversified Servs., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951) (money not cjusdem gcncris
with "goods, wares . . .").
But when the sale or lease of the non-commodity is closely coupled with a sale of
goods, as in a patent tie-in (i.e., a chose in action is conveyed on condition certain goods
be bought only from the seller of the chose), there may be a violation. Lord v. Radio
Corp. of America, 24 F.2d 565, 567-68 (D. Del.), aff'd, 28 F.2d 257, 259-61 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 278 U.S. 648 (1928). Patent tie-ins are subject also to the patent misuse
doctrine, i.e., a patent may not be utilized in a way which conflicts with the policy of the
antitrust laws. The development and expansion of this doctrine has been influenced by
the public policy declared in Clayton Act § 3. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488 (1942) ; Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283
U.S. 27, 34 n.4 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502, 517 (1917). The foregoing case law may largely have been superseded by
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), which declares illegal per se
under § 1 of the Sherman Act all tie-ins with greater than de minims effect. But the
principle that § 3 extends to transactions even touching commodity sales remains of
interest.
A further exception to § 3 is found in requirements contracts for patented, copy-
righted, or trademarked goods. The requirement that the purchaser buy all his needs
of the goods over which the vendor has a lawful monopoly is said not to fall afoul of
the antitrust laws because there is no attempt to extend the scope of the monopoly into
an unprotected area; moreover, for the purchaser knowingly to secure any of his needs
from an infringer would itself be unlawful, and therefore a contract requiring that lie
not do this is said to be perfectly reasonable. Nor is it misuse or abuse of the monopoly
to grant a license over only part of the monopoly power (copyright: print, publish, copy,
vend, exhibit, perform, represent, produce; patent: make, use, vend). Steiner Sales Co. v.
Schwartz Sales Co., 98 F.2d 999, 1007-11 (10th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 662 (1939) ;
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Syss. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1, 25,26 (E.D,
Pa. 1958), aff'd per curiant, 268 F2d 395 (3d Cir. 1959) ; Cardinal Films, Inc. v. Republic
Pictures Corp., 148 F. Supp. 156, 157-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
227. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), rcersing
194 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1952), affirming 47 F.T.C. 378 (1950).
228. "Features, news reels and shorts cost [the theatre owner] money. However,
trailer ads actually reverse the flow of film money back into his own till. He pays for
a film of somebody's love life, but he gets paid for showing the cold facts about some-
body's breakfast food or shaving mugs." Reid H. Ray Film Indus., 47 F.T.C. 326, 342
(1950) (dissenting opinion).
229. MPAS, 47 F.T.C. at 385, 391.
230. See Reid H. Ray Film Indus., 47 F.T.C. 326 (1950); Alexander Film Co., 47
1-.T.C. 345 (1950); United Film Ad Serv., Inc., 47 F.T.C. 362 (1950).
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theaters in the country which show these films had exclusive dealing
contracts with one of the Big Four.231 This was not respondents' first bout
with the Commission; in a previous encounter, a cease and desist order had
been issued forbidding them from conspiring together to fix their prices. -*"
Once again the FTC issued cease and desist orders against each of the four.
The maximum term for their exclusive contracts was limited to one year.=-
Contracts of duration up to a year were allowed because of the economic
advantages a reasonable degree of vertical integration offered the parties, but
the existence of longer arrangements was deemed anticompetitive.2 4 The
Supreme Court, over a vigorous dissent by Mr. justice Frankfurter, affirmed
the Commission's order.
MPAS could not have been brought as a Clayton Act case: first, theater
time is not a commodity, and, second, there was no sale on condition that the
buyer (IMPAS) was not to deal in the goods of other sellers (the theater
owners).25 Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, accepted
231. There were approximately 20,306 theaters in the country, of which about 12,676
exhibited advertising films. MPAS had exclusive contracts with 2,493 in 27 states. 47
F.T.C. at 386. MPAS had, then, 20% of the national market and 40% of the 27 state
local market under exclusive contracts. Of the other leaders, Alexander had exclusive
contracts with 4,913 theaters or 40% of the national market, United had 1,562 or 12c ,
and Ray had 458 or 4%. Id. at 386-87. In some states MPAS controlled as much as 70
to 75% of the market under exclusive contracts. Brief for FTC Before Supreme Court,
pp. 18-19.
232. Screen Broadcast Corp., 36 F.T.C. 957 (1943). Both rates to be paid by adver-
tisers and to exhibitors were fixed.
233. Not all the exclusive contracts used by the Big Four had exceeded one year in
duration. 344 U.S. at 398-99 (dissent) ; Hodson, Exchsive Dealing, in How To Coeeitv
Wrra THE AN ITRUS LAws 140, 147 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954).
234. "The Commission ... concluded that, although the exclusive contracts were
beneficial to the distributor and preferred by the theater owners, their use should be re-
stricted in the public interest. The Commission found that [one-year contracts] ...
would not be an undue restraint upon competition, in view of the compelling business
reasons for some exclusive arrangement." 344 U.S. at 395-96. See also id. at 396 n.2.
This language appears to be an attempt to reconcile the "good business reasons" and
"public injury" tests. See text at notes 87, 88 supra. Is this a retreat from the unqualified
position of Standard Stations? "[I]t would seem unimportant that a short run by-
product of stability may have been greater efficiency and lower costs, for it is the theory
of the antitrust laws that the long-run advantage of the community depends ul¢on the
removal of restraints upon competition." 337 U.S. at 309. In this connection it should be
remembered:
(1) In MPAS the Supreme Court did no more than affirm an FTC order permitting
one-year contracts; it did not allow one-year exclusive contracts, sua sponte.
(2) The Court in Standard Stations may have been motivated by the belief that the
contracts involved were actually "perpetual." See note 138 Mipra and accompanying text.
Compare United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 31 (N.D. Cal. 1949)
(allowing one-year contracts).
235. The seller is the theater proprietor who binds himself not to sell to anyone
else "the privilege of boring the public" with film advertisements, which is the "theater
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the position urged by the Solicitor General 280 that the rule of Standard
Stations was appropriate to the case.2 3 7 The majority treated the integration
system as if they were dealing with requirements contracts instead of output
contracts. And possible formalistic distinctions between forward and backward
integration by contract were disregarded.
The Commission found in the present case that respondent's exclusive
contracts unreasonably restrain competition and tend to monopoly. Those
findings are supported by substantial evidence. This is not a situation
where by the nature of the market there is room for newcomers, irrespec-
tive of the existing restrictive practices. The number of outlets for the
firms is quite limited. And due to the exclusive contracts, respondent
and the three other major companies have foreclosed to competitors 75
percent of all available outlets for this business throughout the United
States. It is, we think, plain from the Commission's findings that a device
owner's inalienable right... "' Reid H. Ray Film Indus., 47 F.T.C. 326, 342 (1950) (dis-
senting opinion). Thus, the restrictive sale is in the wrong direction for the Clayton
Act to apply.
The majority was well aware that this was not a Clayton Act § 3 case. 344 U.S.
at 397.
236 .... Section 3 of the Clayton Act reflects a strong public policy against exclusive
dealing arrangements. That section flatly prohibits such agreements by buyers of
goods where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition . . . [citing
Standard Stations and Richfield]. Although the contracts in the instant case are
presumably not within Section 3 since the exclusive commitment is by the seller
of screen space (the theater) rather than by the buyer (respondent), the effect
on competition is the same in either situation. The basic public policy against ex-
clusive dealing arrangements which adversely affect competition, as declared by
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, bring respondent's exclusive contracts within the
Commission's authority to prohibit unfair methods of competition.
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 25-26.
The (Acting) Solicitor General did not go so far as to argue that the rule of Standard
Stations was applicable in any § 1 case; his position was that the public policy enunciated
in Standard by the Court gave the Commission the power to declare the exclusive con-
tracts in question violations of § 5.
Exclusive dealing agreements have repeatedly been held unlawful under both the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. Whether or not these agreements are pro-
hibited by either of these acts it is clearly competent for the Commission to con-
clude that their effect in the situation here disclosed was unreasonably to restrain
competition and to tend to monopoly and that they should, therefore, be prohibited
as unfair methods of competition.
Id. at 13. Note that the majority opinion does not directly cite Standard Stations, al-
though the dissent does.
237. Careful study of the Court's opinion indicates that it was willing to go beyond
the position urged by the Solicitor, and hold the contracts in violation of § 1, and there-
fore in violation of § 5, rather than in violation of § 5 even though not in violation of
§ 1. See HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 126, n.51 (1957) ("Although the Supreme
Court actually found that the exclusives at issue violated the Sherman Act, it indicated
by way of dictum that the Commission might have been entitled to relief under Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, even if it had not been able to prove a violation
of either the Sherman or Clayton Act.").
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which h7s sewed up a ntarket so tightly for the benefit of a few falls
within the prohibition of the Sherman Act and is therefore an "unfair
method of competition" within the meaning of § 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.m8
To Justice Frankfurter, the Standard Stations rule urged by the Solicitor
General 9 and accepted by the Court would be inappropriate in a Sherman
Act case. In his view, imputing the total market effect of parallel exclusive
dealing arrangements to each user is appropriate only in actual conspiracy
cases or in Clayton Act cases. "While the existence of the other exclusive
238. 344 U.S. at 395. (Emphasis added.) It may be noteworthy that the language
used by the majority opinion "unreasonably restrain competition and tend to monopoly"
shows a blending of the phraseology employed in § 1 of the Sherman Act and in the
Clayton Act. Moreover, "tend to monopoly" is similar to both "tend to create a
monopoly" in the Clayton Act and "monopolize or attempt to monopolize" in the Sherman
Act § 2.
239. As is seen from note 236 stpra, the Solicitor General urged that the Court
adopt the "substantial foreclosure" test of Standard Stations. The interpretation of
Standard here urged appears to be the 65% or 76% collective foreclosure rather than
the 6.7%, 16% or even 23% fractions also involved in that case. Moreover there is no
reliance on gross dollar volumes at all.
Here the Commission has found that respondent's long-term exclusive dealing
contracts unreasonably restrain competition and tend to monopoly. That finding
is supported by a showing that respondent, in the 27 states in which it operates,
has exclusive contracts with almost 40% of the theaters exhibiting advertising films,
and that the four major companies, against all of whom the Commission entered
cease and desist orders, together had exclusive contracts with 75%c of all available
outlets throughout the United States. In view of the highly limited number of
opportunities for displaying advertising films it is obvious that such a situation
enables the established companies "collectively, even though not collusively, to
prevent a late arrival from wresting away more than an insignificant portion of
the market." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309.
Brief for Petitioner, p. 13.
The Commission found that the effect of respondent's exclusive contracts in limit-
ing the outlets for advertising films was increased by the like exclusive contracts
made by the three other principal companies in the business. The four major
concerns, together, foreclosed to other companies 75% of all available outlets
throughout the United States, and, as indicated above, undoubtedly the foreclosure
of the more desirable available outlets ran considerably higher. When, as here.
the four dominant concerns in the industry pursue the same restrictive practices, the
limitations on competition which result are compounded. In Standard Oil Co. v.
UEbited States, 337 U.S. 293, 309, this Court observed that, since all the major
suppliers had been using requirement contracts, it would not be far fetched to
infer that the effect has been to enable the established suppliers "collectively, even
though not collusively, to prevent a late arrival from wresting away more than an
insignificant portion of the market.
Id. at 20. (References to record omitted.) See also MPAS, 47 F.T.C. at 391 ("injurious
effects ... increased by the cumulative effects of similar agreements"). Note, the over
75% of outlets in MPAS is strikingly close to the 76% of Standard Stations. See text
at note 98 supra.
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contracts is, of course, not irrelevant in a market analysis, see Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309, this Court has never decided that
they may, in the absence of conspiracy, be aggregated to support a charge of
Sherman Law violation. Cf. id., at 314."240
Is this criticism of the majority opinion justified? In Standard Stations,
Justice Frankfurter had no difficulties in aggregating contracts in the absence
of a conspiracy. In order to evaluate the competitive effect of Standard's
contracts, the Court had to consider the market setting in which they
occurred. It was the word "effect" in the statutory phrase, "where the effect
may be to substantially lessen competition," which justified aggregation; the
incipiency word "may," peculiar to the Clayton Act, was not the basis for
aggregation, but for the jump from quantity to quality. Nor is there any
need to resort to a conspiracy doctrine in order to aggregate. Testing con-
tracts in their whole business setting is the very essence of the Sherman Act
rule of reason. According to that general test, restrictive agreements are
banned whenever they are intended to have, or in fact have, a significant
anticompetitive effect-this being measured in terms of price, output, or
quality of goods.241 Thus, in MPAS, it was essential to evaluate the effect of
respondents' contracts in their whole business setting in order to determine
whether they passed the Sherman Act test.
MPAS appears to reveal the use of vertical integration by exclusive deal-
ing contract to bolster horizontal power. It seems clear that the Big Four
240. 344 U.S. at 399-400. The dissent also asserts that the facts found by the Com-
mission do not bring the respondent within the Standard Stations rule. Id. at 401-03.
In MPAS, in contrast to Standard Stations, there was no coercion by respondent. First,
"the obvious bargaining power of the seller vis-a-vis the retailer" was absent, and
second, there was evidence in the Commission's findings that theaters often demand ex-
clusive arrangements. Id. at 402. Justice Frankfurter asserted that in Standard Stations
"we recognized the discrepancy in bargaining power and pointed out that the retailers
might still insist on exclusive contracts if they wanted. See 337 U.S., at 314." Ibid.
However, the page cited reveals only the statement that requirements contracts would
be superfluous if they were really economically desirable for service stations, because
then the stations would buy all their needs from a single supplier without being bound
to do so by a contract, and might indeed secure firm offers from suppliers for their re-
quirements "without binding them[selves] to refrain from looking elsewhere." Compare
note 204 supra.
The majority opinion does not meet this criticism squarely. It gives the reply that
the Commission considered this argument but found that the use of the agreements "should
be restricted -in the public interest," a finding within the limits of the Commission's "allow-
able judgment." 344 U.S. at 395-96.
241. This is the test of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493, 500, 512
(1940), the leading case on the definition of "unreasonable" under § 1. This test is
followed in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614-15 (1953) ;
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525, 527 (1948); accord, United
States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1927); Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) ("invariably affects prices or is intended to do so").
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producers had considerable power over the price of film advertising. The best
indication of this is that they had exerted it in the past.24 Another indication
of their strength is the share of the market they controlled-seventy-five per
cent. And this figure is an average market share. In some markets, MPAS
alone possessed a near monopoly. 43 It is highly probable, although data are
lacking on this point, that in still other areas of the country, MPAS and
other members of the Big Four together possessed monopoly power.2 "
Monopoly power at both levels of the operation, i.e., at the theaters and at
film production seems necessary to guarantee the enjoyment of the fruits of
this particular monopoly. The basis of power over price in the local adver-
tising market is control of the limited number of local theaters.24 He who
controls the theaters is in the position to enjoy the benefits of monopoly
power in the business of selling film ads, or, at the least, to wield counter-
vailing power against any advertisement producer monopolist and force him
to share the monopoly "take." Strategically, then, even in the absence of other
considerations, MPAS had to integrate the theaters to assure itself protection
against another's seizing the opportunity. Moreover, it is probable that the
advertising film producer is the person in the best strategic position to or-
ganize the monopoly, -40 and the person least likely to be forced into sharing
the monopoly revenues with the theater owners. 417
The collective control of the Big Four of over seventy-five per cent of the
national market may have "sewed up a market so tightly" that entry by new-
242. See Screen Broadcast Corp., 36 F.T.C. 957 (1943).
243. See note 231 supra. The relevant market for power over price exacted from
advertisers would appear to be quite local. The radius of travel that a patron will go to see
a movie would seem to define this market. Compare the nation-wide relevant market
for economies of scale to the producer, who can mail his wares anywhere in the country,
note 251, infra.
244. Whether the Big Four exercised their power over price by following con-
sciously parallel policies or by actual agreement is, it is submitted, immaterial. Moreover,
under the philosophy of § 2, it would be irrelevant even whether the Big Four had ex-
erted their power, so long as they acted to maintain it. Arr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. A.i-
Tnusr REP. 56 (1955).
245. Moreover, the screen time available in each theater is limited by the amount
the patrons will tolerate. MPAS, 47 F.T.C. at 387; Record vol. 2, p. 10.
246. Perhaps an owners' cooperative booking agency would be another possibility, at
least until the Justice Department started a Sherman Act prosecution for price fixing.
247. The bargaining power of the theater proprietor is usually weak because of the
economic necessity to him of advertisement revenue, ". . . a sort of subsidy to keep
the marginal operator alive." Reid H. Ray Film Indus., 47 F.T.C. 326, 342 (1950)
(dissenting opinion). In this connection it is interesting to note that the large Interstate
Circuit Theater chain realized that substantial profits could be made from dealing directly
with advertisers; accordingly, it pulled its theaters out of the exclusive dealing integra-
tion system and handled its film advertisements on its own. Record, vol. 2, pp. 186-88.
However, Interstate eventually gave the venture up and abandoned all screen advertising.
During the period that Interstate used its ownership integration system, it did not pro-
duce all its own films, but rented some from the MPAS and Alexander libraries. Id. at
188-89.
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comers was effectively barred. 248 This industry appears to be characterized
by economies of scale. Each producer requires a library of shorts which can
be tailored to an individual advertiser's needs by splicing in his name at the
beginning or end of the film.2 4 9 Clearly, the unit cost of the library decreases
with the number of times each short is used, since the marginal cost is only
the price of the name clips and perhaps an extra print of the ad strip.210 If a pro-
spective entrant cannot hope to use his library intensively, he must anticipate
high unit costs. Thus, collective control by the Big Four of over seventy-five
per cent of the available market to producers may have effectively barred
entry.251 The uncommitted twenty-five per cent may be too "thin" a market
to attract entry. If the volume attainable from whatever share of the remain-
ing twenty-five per cent a new competitor can secure is insufficient to cover
his library costs, then he will not enter.25 2 Furthermore, the use of long term
contracts with theaters isolates them from the market more effectively and
lengthens break-in time for an entrant.2 53
Given this business setting, the MPAS case reveals, minimally, a potential
restraint on competition which, given a Clayton Act prosecution, would be
within the scope of "may" as interpreted by Standard Stations. Probably,
the restraint can even be considered a "full blown one." 251 Thus, the decision
probably furthers the cause of free competition. Some, however, might share
the misgivings of the Frankfurter dissent about the Commission's lack of
discerning economic analysis or failure to enunciate standards by which
potential anticompetitive effect is to be judged. In Frankfurter's view, that
seventy-five per cent of the market was covered by similar exclusive con-
tracts, "does not automatically bring the accused arrangement within the pro-
hibitions of" the Sherman Act 2-5 and the Commission, echoed by the Court,
"merely states a dogmatic conclusion that the use of these contracts constitutes
an 'unreasonable restraint and restriction of competition.' ,250
The dissent appears to object, not only to aggregation of various firms'
contracts, but to the very idea that effect on competition may be inferred
from quantitative share of the market affected. Underlying this position is
248. 344 U.S. at 395.
249. See MPAS, 47 F.T.C. at 385, 391.
250. Ibid.
251. The relevant market with respect to economies of scale is that accessible to pro-
ducers. Since transportation costs of the product are relatively low-films are light in
weight-any producer can sell anywhere in the country. For example, MPAS has offices
in New Orleans, but it supplies advertising films to the theater in the Connecticut town
in which one of the authors lives. See also note 231 supra.
252. There is, however, evidence that MPAS and Alexander were willing to rent films
from their libraries to at least one outsider. Record, vol. 2, pp. 188-89.
253. Compare text at notes 189, 218 supra.
254. See 344 U.S. at 394-95.
255. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 322 (1949) (dissenting
opinion of Jackson, J.).
256. 344 U.S. at 399.
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the absence of "may" language in the Sherman Law. The majority never
replies to this objection.
However, can the case be justified on the doctrinal level? It may be tempt-
ing to explain the majority opinion in terms of reliance on section 5 of the
FTC Act. Under such an interpretation, it is the latter act which harmonizes
the Sherman and Clayton Act standards. But such a narrow interpretation
is not warranted in the light of the explicit language of the majority opinion
that the contract system "falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act
and is therefore an 'unfair method of competition' within the meaning of
§ 5 .... 257 If MPAS is to be justified at all, it must be on the basis of the
Sherman Act.
The Sherman Act proscribes restrictive agreements whenever they are in-
tended to have, or in fact have, anticompetitive effects. Since the problem is
to infer an anticompetitive effect from the share of the market affected by
restrictive contracts, the actual effect branch of the rule is not available. That
is, "effect" is the terminus of the inquiry, not its premise. Thus, the only
conceptual tool available is the "intent" branch of the rule. Absent a con-
spiracy,258 can intent, or even constructive intent, under the Sherman Act,
carry the Court as far as "may" under the Clayton Act? The MPAS Court
never chose to decide this question, since it allowed the FTC finding of anti-
competitive effect to stand as a finding of fact rather than a legal inference
subject to appellate review. Probably there is a residuum under the Clayton
Act beyond the ambit of the Sherman Act "intent" test. But the lesson of
MPAS appears to be that an "intent" test can go a long way towards "may."
MPAS has eroded much of the imagined distinction between the Sherman
and Clayton Act standards, at least in the vertical integration area.
Read together, Standard Stations and MPAS cover the most significant
antitrust aspects of vertical integration by contract. First, they indicate a
strong tendency in the Court to use essentially the same standards for for-
ward or backward integration by contract-the policy of the Clayton Act is
read into the Sherman ACt250 and the narrow language of section 3 is not
permitted to restrict the application of that policy. The unresolved question
is-how complete will this Sherman-Clayton coalescence prove? Second, they
demonstrate that the legality of an integration system is to be measured by
the standard of market foreclosure. However, the courts have not determined
whether "intent" permits as much of a move from quantitative share of the
market affected to qualitative effect on competition as "may" does. Third,
they teach that market foreclosure may be collective as well as individual.
Thus, for any individual defendant who is one of the major firms in an in-
dustry where other majors use exclusive arrangements similar to defendant's,
"restraint of trade" or "substantial lessening of competition" can be shown
257. Id. at 395.
258. ,Compare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
259. Compare United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 507 n.7 (1948).
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from the market effect of the aggregate 260 of similar arrangements, 20 ' even
when they are not collusive.
2 62
260. An unresolved question in the cases is how "major" the firms using the exclusive
arrangement must be before the collective foreclosure doctrine is appropriate. In Standard
Stations, seven controlled 76% of outlets and sold over 65% of output. In MPAS, four
controlled 75% of outlets. In FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948), a price fixing
case, ten out of 74 respondent corporations controlled more than half of the 150 mills in
the country, id. at 712-13. Probably, forty firms, each controlling about 2% of the market
by vertical integration arrangements, would not be said to foreclose the market. But cf.
Ray H. Ray Film Indus., 47 F.T.C. 326, 344 & n.1 (1950) (dissenting opinion). First, that
there are forty "majors" is a symptom that the economy of scale barrier to entry problem
is not acute. Therefore, a prospective entrant could probably succeed even though he could
capture only a small share of the market. Here, not even a potential ("may") barrier to
entry would exist. Second, the stability of a forty-member "oligopoly" is so uncertain that
continued parallel action to bar entry is unlikely to occur. See note 160 supra. Where the
boundary between forty firms in control of 80% of the market (probably lawful), and
seven firms in control of 80% (probably unlawful) is located depends on the structure of
the industry in question. See note 161 supra.
261. The collective foreclosure doctrine of MPAS and Standard Stations may also be
viewed as a highly sophisticated version of conscious parallelism. See Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226, 227 (1939). However, neither overt conspiracy
nor conscious parallelism is relied upon in either opinion. Indeed, § 3 has no conspiracy
requirement and in MPAS, a conspiracy under § 1 could not have been utilized because it
would have been barred by res judicata. 344 U.S. at 397-98; see text at note 232 supra.
Yet the two cases represent a further refinement of the doctrine. The aggregation of like
contracts to measure their market effect is quite similar to the aggregation of like acts to
infer intent to conspire. A corresponding evolution of conscious parallelism is seen in the
Clayton Act § 2 context where individual use of a basing point system -with knowledge
that other sellers use it has been declared an unfair method of competition under § 5.
Compare FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948), with Triangle Conduit &
Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175, 180-81 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd per curiant by an cqually
divided Court sub nont. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949). See also FTC
v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429-31 (1957). The majority was well aware that
MPAS was not a Clayton Act § 3 case. 344 U.S. at 397. Note the majority opinion does
not directly cite Standard Stations, although the FTC brief had relied upon that case, id.
at 401.; note 236 supra.
Perhaps some doubt is cast on conscious parallelism and related doctrine by Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954). See A'rr'"
GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 38-42 (1955). However, such speculation must be
mere conjecture until the Supreme Court declares its position in the matter. Packer, Book
Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1141, 1144 n.16 (1958).
262. The Standard Stations Court followed the collective foreclosure route to a finding
of violation of § 3 despite the fact that the Justice Department did not build its case around
collective foreclosure. The Government relied, in its brief, pp. 46-47, only on one case on
the point, Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48, 54 (4th Cir. 1942), where the
court had held, with respect to a tie-in policy used by the leading packaging industry firms:
[T]he effect of the trade practice of the company is materially increased by reason
of the fact that it forms a part of the cumulative effect of the practices of the three
leading companies in the tying machine industry. . . . The fact that these three
companies controlled from two thirds to three fourths of the business done by the
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Northern Pacific: Further Sherman-Clayton Coalesccnce?
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,2 6 the most recent Supreme Court
decision dealing with restrictive contractual arrangements, although not strict-
ly an integration case, sheds considerable light upon the possible unification
of the standards of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act. The railroad was charged with selling and leasing land along its
right of way on condition that the buyer or lessee agree to ship his products
via defendant's lines. The question presented was whether the "tie-in"--an
exclusive dealing arrangement 20 4 --violated section 1.
The most recent prior case dealing with the tie-in problem was Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,0- 0 also a section 1 prosecution.
There, the Court determined that a newspaper publisher could lawfully con-
clition the sale of advertisements in its morning paper on the purchase of
advertising in its evening newspaper. The Court based its decision on two
grounds: (1) Morning and evening newspapers constitute one market rather
than two; thus there was only one product sold and hence no "tie-in" edsted
(2) Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, a tie-in is illegal per se only if the
seller enjoys a monopoly over the tying product and a significant volume of
commerce in the tied product is restrained. Since there were two morning
papers in New Orleans, defendant had no monopoly over the tying product,
and the per se violation was held not to have been made out.20 0 According
to the Court, a section 3 violation would have been easier to establish: tie-ins
violate the Clayton Act when either monopoly exists over the tying product
or a significant volume of commerce in the tied product is restrained.2G7 Thus,
tying machine industry... was sufficient justification, without more, for the finding
that the lessening of competition... was substantial within the meaning of the act.
The Government had raised the point primarily to rebut the defense argument that the
exclusive dealing policy must be all right because all the majors used it and, anyway, that
Standard would be excluded from the market by the remaining "Big Six' if it didn't use
it. From this "admission," the Government concluded "that there can be no free competition
in the Western area until appellants and their competitors have released their captive
markets." Government Biief, p. 47. See also 17 U.S.L. IV=ax 3263, 3264 (1949).
263. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
264. "... [A] tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell
one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier."
Id. at 5-6.
265. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
266. The Court found no monopoly or dominance on the same principle that it found
no tie-in. By defining the relevant market as morning and evening newspapers together,
it reduced defendant's share of the market from 100% of the morning paper market to 40%
of the total paper market. Thus, by one stroke, both monopoly and the very existence of
a "tie-in" were eliminated, allowing the Court to test the practice under the "Sherman
Act's general prohibition on unreasonable restraints of trade." Id. at 614. Such doctrinal
manipulation of the tie-in concept and more general exclusive dealing concept may suggest
to some the doubtful utility of tie-in as a category for decision making purposes.
267. The Court assumed, but did not decide, that the Sherman Act's substantiality test
was met. Id. at 610 n2& This would have satisfied the § 3 standard were it applicable.
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Times-Picayune contemplates a considerable difference between the standards
of the two acts with respect to tie-ins.
In Times-Picayune, the Justice Department relied on section 1 rather than
section 3 because it doubted that newspaper advertising could be brought
within the meaning of "commodity" in section 3.268 In Northern Pacific, the
tying product was land and the tied product was services as a carrier-neither
of which is a section 3 "commodity. '269 Nevertheless, the Court in Northcrn
Pacific rejected as dictum the Times-Picayune prerequisite of monopoly power
over the tying product for a per se violation of section 1.270 "[Tie-ins] are
unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic
power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free com-
petition in the market for the tied product ....
To the authors, the language "sufficient economic power ... to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market" comes close to, if it does not go be-
yond, the "may" of section 3. Thus, the distinction between tie-ins which
violate section 1 and those which violate section 3 has been weakened or even
obliterated. All significantly anticompetitive tie-ins are now declared illegal.2 '12
Despite the use of per se language, the rule advanced in Northern Pacific is
close to the general rule-of-reason test under the Sherman Act. By using the
qualifying phrase beginning with "whenever" the Court held in effect that the
restrictive agreements are per se illegal, provided they are actually or con-
structively intended to have, or in fact have, a significant anticompetitive
effect. Thus, the per se language adds little to the holding: a per se test which
requires a showing of actual or potential anticompetitive effect is hardly a
per se rule at all.273
268. Id. at 609 n.27.
269. See 356 U.S. at 13 & n.1 (dissenting opinion).
270. 356 U.S. at 10-11.
271. Id. at 6.
272. An example of the de minimis exception is given by Justice Black, 356 U.S. at
6-7:
Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying product so
that it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers into taking the
tied item any restraint of trade attributable to such tying arrangements would ob-
viously be insignificant at most. As a simple example, if one of a dozen food stores
in a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar it would
hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if its competitors were ready and able
to sell flour by itself.
273. The problems Northern Pacific raises with regard to the role of per se in anti-
trust will be considered in connection with the Kior's case, infra notes 413-35 and accom-
panying text.
The preceding analysis of Northern Pacific is confined to the doctrinal level. No at-
tempt at economic analysis is essayed, nor is any opinion ventured here as to whether the
case was correctly decided on its facts. To the authors, the case is interesting primarily
because it undermines the authority of Times-Picayune, which was an anticoalescence case,
and because it represents an important phase in the evolution of the per se doctrine.
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The Scope of Section 5
As an alternative to the Sherman-Clayton route, section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act274 offers another path to coalescence. Section 5 is a
particularly potent weapon of the Government against integration systems
because its violation does not presuppose a contract, combination, or con-
spiracy.2 7 5 Minimally, section 5 includes all violations of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. And certain practices may be attacked as unfair methods of
competition or unfair acts or practices in commerce, via the "incipiency doc-
trine," even before they develop into "full blown" Clayton or Sherman Act
violations.2 76 The outer limits of section 5 are uncertain.
2 77
In arguing MPAS, perhaps because of uncertainty whether the Court would
permit aggregation of the parallel contracts in the absence of a showing of
conspiracy, the Solicitor General took the position that even if there were no
Sherman Act violation there was still an FTC Act violation.278 The Court
did not choose to decide the case on this basis; instead it found a section 1
violation. There is a very strong intimation, however, that the scope of sec-
tion 5 goes beyond the Sherman and Clayton Acts: "The 'unfair methods of
competition,' which are condemned by § 5 (a) of the Act, are not confined to
those that were illegal at common law or that were condemned by the Sher-
man Act.112 7 9 The Court then went on to discuss the "incipiency" doctrine.
In the authors' view, it is quite uncertain whether the quoted remark meant
only to reaffirm that section 5 embraces incipient Sherman or Clayton Act
violations, or rather was intended to define a new class of offenses within
section 5 which, even when "full-blown," will not constitute a Sherman or
Clayton Act violation but which, nevertheless, are unfair acts, practices, or
methods of competition.2 80 Hence, it cannot be determined at the present
274. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
275. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721 n.19 (1948).
276. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392-, 394-95 (1953);
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 691, 708 (1948) ; Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC,
112 F2d 722, 734-36 (8th Cir. 1.940) ; General Motors Corp., 34 F.T.C. 58 (1941). See
also AT'y GEN. NAT'L Co m. Avn=usr REP. 148 n.78 (1955). The Clayton Act itself
has been declared to embody an incipiency standard. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co., 238 U.S. 346, 356 (1922) ; cf. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931)
(dictum: incipient Sherman Act violations).
277. The FTC has held a wide variety of methods of competition and acts and prac-
tices in commerce, both inside and outside the antitrust area, to be unfair. See, e.g., FTC
v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934) (lottery device held unfair method of com-
petition); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (§ 5 forbids a resale price
maintenance system enforced by espionage, blacklisting); 1957 FTC AN.in. REP. 73-78
(list).
278. See note 236 supra.
279. 344 U.S. at 394. For discussion of whether this is dictum or holding, see note
237 supra.
280. The case cited as authority by the Court, FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S.
304 (1.934), is a lottery case, and the offense involved could hardly ever grow to the pro-
portion of a Sherman or Clayton Act violation, no matter how "full blown" it became.
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moment whether MPAS signals the emergence of a new category of antitrust
violations applicable to exclusive dealing contract cases. Since MPAS, the
Government has refrained from closely pressing the Douglas statement.
28 1
Section 5 must therefore remain an enigma to the student of integration until
its scope is further clarified by the Court.2 8 2 Perhaps, it will afford still a
further means for integrating the law in this area.
Section 7 and dit Pont-GM
Like section 3 of the Clayton Act, the original section 7 had a very narrow
scope.2 83 The sales and commodity restrictions of section 3 found their
analogue in a limitation of old section 7 to stock acquisitions; asset acquisi-
Compare 344 U.S. at 400-01 (dissent). One FTC exclusive-dealing case rejects such a
broadened scope for § 5. General Mills, Inc., No. 6926, FTC, July 31, 1959 (initial order),
adopted without opinion-, id., Sept. 19, 1959. See also Carnation Co., No. 6172, FTC, June
26, 1959 (initial order), where it is faintly suggested that § 5 may have a higher standard
of proof than § 3: actual anticompetitive effect or tendency must be demonstrated. Id. at
118, 127. FTC counsel are seeking a Commission overruling of this order.
281. Both the Justice Department and the FTC have continued to rely on the Sherman
and Clayton Acts in exclusive dealings cases, rather than on § 5 alone. See Harley-David-
son Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047, 1067-68 (1954) ; Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 34, 39 n.27 (1955).
But see the use of § 5 counts in: Scott Paper Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC
Cas.) f[ 27716 (Jan. 5, 1959) (interlocutory appeal) (§ 7 case) ; International Shoe Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 1 26611 (1957), consent order entered, id. ff 27074
(1958) (loans on condition of exclusive dealing); Maguire Industries, TRADE REG. RaP.
(1957-1958 FTC Cas.) f" 27446 (1958) (consent order) (rebate proportional to degree of
exclusive dealing) ; Dictograph Prods., Inc., 50 F.T.C. 281, 295-96, 299 (1953), aff'd, 217
F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954). Whether the Justice Department can invoke § 5 is uncertain.
Section 5 specifically empowers the FTC to suppress unfair methods of competition, and
it is doubtful that the Justice Department has concurrent jurisdiction over prosecution.
See Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 147 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1945), aff'd sub
noma. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701 & n.11 (1948) (Supreme Court did not
directly pass on Justice Department jurisdiction as did Seventh Circuit).
282. For symptoms of professional alarm at the potential scope of § 5, see AT', GEN.
NAT'. COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 148 n.78 (1955); HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE
39-40 (1957) ; Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 9 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 171, 182
(1954); Hodson, Exclusive Dealings, in How To COMPLY WITH TnE ANTITRUST LAWS
140, 148 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954); cf. Gordon, Walking Backward Into the Future,
in id. at 45, 48. See also Rostow, Over-All Sice, in id. at 311, 315; Schwartz, Control of
Affiliates, in id. at 234, 242.
It should be noted that § 5 is not available in private actions. Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 296 Fed. 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1923), aff'd, 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926) ; Samson Crane Co.
v. Union Nat. Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D. Mass. 1949), afJ'd per curian, 180 F.2d
896 (1st Cir. 1950) ; see FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929) (dictum) ; cf. National
Fruit Prods. Co. v. Dwinnell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 504 (D. Mass. 1942), aft'd,
140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944) (Congress preferred an administrative agency approach).
But see Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARV. L. REV. 987, 988-98
(1949) ; Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a Com-
petitorf, 33 Micn. L. REv. 321 (1935).
283. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914).
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tions were immune.28 4 And stock purchases were not severely affected since
actual competition "between" the acquiring and acquired firms was usually
held to be a prerequisite for the application of the act.2 85 This requirement,
of course, rendered old section 7 inapplicable to vertical integration situations,
in which the parties are not in direct competition.28 Thus, prior to 1950
section 7 was ineffective in curbing anticompetitive ownership integration.2 7
The shortcomings of the statute became a matter of deep concern to Congress,
and consequently, in 1950, section 7 was amended 288 to cover asset acquisi-
tions and to eliminate the requirement of competition between the merging
firms. The remainder of this section is devoted to a discussion of the impact
of section 7 on vertical integration.2 8 9
Section 7 Before du Pont-GM. While no vertical integration cases arose
under new section 7 before 1957,290 several horizontal merger cases were
litigated during the 1950-1957 period.2 91 In Transamerica Corp. v. Board
of Governors,2 92 the Third Circuit vacated a Federal Reserve Board anti-
284. This immunity was present even when asset acquisitions were the immediate con-
sequence of a stock acquisition which itself was declared forbidden in a court action pend-
ing at the time the asset acquisition was consummated. See Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec.
Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554, 561 (1926).
285. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930); V. Vivadou v.
FTC, 54 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1931); Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F2d 656
(3d Cir. 1931); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Ohio
1935).
286. See United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913) (complementarity); Bork,
Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Miscon-
ception, 22 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 157, 171-72 (1954). But see United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), discussed in text at notes 297-309 infra. The authori-
ties on this point are reviewed in 353 U.S. at 590.
287. ,As a result, the more general prohibitions of the Sherman Act were utilized
against vertical integration. Compare note 225 supra. The authors do not propose to review
the pre-1950 history of ownership vertical integration since this subject has received ex-
cellent coverage elsewhere in the legal and economic literature. See, e.g., Adelman, Inte-
gration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HA{v. L. Rnv. 27 (1949) ; Bork, supra note 284. See also
Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 IL. L Rnv. 745
(1949).
288. Celler-Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952) ; see United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 582-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (historical
discussion); Dirlam, The Dt Pont-General Motors Decision, 58 CoLUm. L. REv 24, 42
n.87 (1958). See generally Note, 63 YALEI U]. 233 (1953).
289. Discussion of Sherman Act §§ 1-2 in the ownership integration context is omitted
because new § 7 appears to cover the field. Query: Does the term "asset acquisition" cover
internal growth? Are vertical joint-venture agreements included in new § 7?
For a penetrating analysis of the role of § 2, see Rostow, supra note 287.
290. Between 1950 and 1957, there were also no important Sherman Act ownership
vertical integration decisions in Government cases.
291, For a treatment of the problems of horizontal mergers under new § 7, see Com-
ment, 68 YALE LJ. 1627 (1959).
292. 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953) (case decided on pre-
1950 § 7, but the relevant provisions of the statute were the same).
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merger order, because the Board had misapplied the relevant market test. The
court added, by way of dictum, that the quantitative substantiality theory of
Standard Stations which the Board had used was inapplicable to section 7
situations.2 93 Transamerica was enthusiastically seconded by the FTC in its
interlocutory opinion in Pillsbury Mills, Inc. 294 The initial hearing examiner's
dismissal of a complaint against a horizontal merger was reversed by the
Commission and the remand was accompanied by a detailed discussion of the
evidence to be weighed in section 7 cases.29 5 The rule of Standard Stations
293. The court declared that the § 3 and § 7 rules should not be assimilated because
of important differences between the two situations:
The use of exclusive dealing contracts per se lessens competition . . . so that the
fact of lessening need not be proved. For one who agrees to purchase all his require-
ments from a single seller . . . is consequently eliminated entirely from the com-
petitive market. In order to establish a substantial lessening of competition in sucl
a case, therefore, it is only necessary in addition to prove that the sales covered
.. amount to a substantial portion of the total involved.... [But] acquisition...
is not per se a violation of the section. On the contrary such acquisition is a violation
only if its effect may be in fact to substantially lessen competition between such
corporations .... Evidence of mere size and participation in a substantial share of
the line of business involved, the "quantitative substantiality" theory relied on by
the Board, is not enough.
206 F.2d at 170.
The distinction advanced by this court does not seem logical. Merger eliminates com-
petition as entirely and as "per se" as does exclusive dealing, perhaps even more so because
of the greater permanence of the tie. Hence, if the court is correct in stating that It is
necessary only to prove that the sales covered are substantial to establish a substantial
lessening of competition in the contract case, then it should follow that no more should be
necessary in a merger situation. Even though we might expect to find some valid factual
distinctions between the effect of the vertical integration in Standard Stations and the
horizontal or conglomerate integration, see Adelman, Acquire the Whole or Any Part of
the Stock or Assets of Another Corporation, in AN ANnvausT HANDBOOK 195, 204-05
(American Bar Ass'n ed. 1958), in Transamerica, the statement of the court relies on no
such distinction; on the contrary, the court addresses itself only to the legal form of in-
tegration adopted.
294. 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953). This merger was subsequently forbidden. Pillsbury Co., 3
TRADE REG. REP. ff 27845 (FTC March 11, 1959) (initial order).
295. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953). Analysis was to begin with the com-
petitive pattern of the industry as a guide to measure the competitive effect of further con-
centration. Id. at 571-72. However, that an acquiring and acquired firm together control a
substantial share of the market was not-as counsel supporting the complaint had asserted
-an adequate index of substantial lessening of competition. Id. at 564 & n,29. The FTC
cannot be deprived of the right, despite Standard Stations, to examine relevant economic
factors (even in § 3 cases) when it desires to do so. Ibid. And at any rate, the § 3 standard
for "substantially lessen competition" is not the § 7 standard, despite the use by Congress
of the same language in both places. Id. at 562-63, 564. The appropriate standard is not
specified, but its location is somewhere in the territory between the Sherman Act § 1 per se
and § 1 rule of reason cases. Id. at 569. A suggestion was made that while the § 3 standard
is in terms of effect on third party competitors, that of § 7 is in terms of competition. Id.
at 563. The Commission conceded that the hearing examiner was being furnished "far from
specific standards," but regarded this as desirable and consistent with the "convenient
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was expressly rejected. Thus, on the eve of dit Pont-GM, the meager body
of case law which had accumulated under new section 7 200 seemed to indicate
that coalescence with section 3 was unlikely. None of the cases, however, had
dealt with vertical integration situations.
The du Pont-GM Case. On a literal reading, dit Pont2 0 T does not interpret
the key phrase "substantially lessen competition." The Justice Department
brought suit under unamended section 7,298 which contained the "between"
vagueness" needed in antitrust proceedings, id. at 569, and at any rate the FTC felt itself
possessed of sufficient economic expertise for a case-by-case approach to the problem, id.
at 562. With the exception of the suggestion that § 7 looks to competition rather than
merely to competitors-a view which the FTC might appropriately adopt in § 3 cases also,
see text at notes 200-24 supra-the authors are not in sympathy with the position taken by
the FTC in the Pillsbury case. In particular, they agree with the position taken in Bow-
man, Incipiency, Mergers and the Size Question, 1 Az,nrrsT BuLL. 533, 537 (1956),
that a case-by-case analysis, pushed far enough, is no analysis at all. See also Ja'wuns,
ORDEAL BY PLANNING 14 (1948).
296. In addition to the cases discussed, the FTC had adopted an initial hearing e-x-
aminer's order based on what the examiner had called the "quantitative view." A horizon-
tal merger had united magazines controlling 20% and 15% of the relevant market; in-
volved was nearly $20 million worth of annual business, termed "hardly ... insignificant
or unsubstantial." Farm Journal, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) tff 26023,
26127 (1956). The "hardly insignificant" echoes the "frugal" standard of International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), deplored by the antitrust bar. HAN.LEn,
ANTmUST IN PERSPECriVE 36-37 (1957); Arry GEN. NAT'L Comm. A.-rnTusT REP.
147-49 (1955). See also literature cited in HANDLER, Op. cit. supra at 136-37, 143. The
opinion also referred to possible injuries to respondent's competitors which may be occa-
sioned by respondents' lower prices made possible because of economies of scale. Compare
the subsequent Brillo Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) if 27243 (1958),
where Commission counsel's attack on economies in production was rejected.
In another case a district court had refused a preliminary injunction requested by the
Government against a horizontal merger. The Department of Justice relied solely on a
comparison of sales and production figures for the acquired, acquiring, and combined firms
versus the market totals. However, the court directed that the merger be so made that
assets be not commingled, pending plenary action. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956
Trade Cas. 71109 (E.D. Mo.); 24 U.S.L. NVaaK 2369 (1956).
And in a private action brought by a watch company to prevent acquisition attempts
by a competitor, Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.),
aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953), the court had granted a preliminary injunction under
what appears to be the standard later used in Anchor Serum, supra note 200. Also of in-
terest from this period is the private damages case, Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe
Am. Corp., 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953), brought under uld
§ 7 and §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act. A stove distributor sued his supplier and the firm
which had bought 40% of the stock in the supplier in order to secure an output contract.
The court held that the relevant market share, 2%, was far too insignificant a foreclosure
to permit a finding of antitrust violation. The remaining decrees which were entered con-
cerned purely procedural matters or were entered by consent. See HA~NDLER, ANTiTnus
IN PEnspFzcn- 136 n.6 (procedural), 135 n.3 (consent decrees and orders) (1957).
297. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
298. Id. at 588 & n.4. The complaint also charged violation of §§ 1, 2 of the Sherman
Act. The latter counts were "the focal point of eight years of litigation" and the briefs in
the case. Id. at 609 (dissenting opinion).
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requirement. Since du Pont's offense was the use of its stock interest in Gen-
eral Motors to secure that company's business in fabrics and finishes, there
could be no "lessening of competition" between the two corporations. Instead,
the Government charged,290 and the Court held, that du Pont's acquisition
of twenty-three per cent of General Motor's stock would "tend to create a
monopoly.) 300
But in stating that "the threatened monopoly must be one which will sub-
stantially lessen competition," the Supreme Court construed the two phrases
-"substantially lessen competition" and "tend to create a monopoly'-as
virtually synonymous. 38 1 Hence, despite the wording of the statute, the Court
explored the meaning of "substantially lessen competition" in a section 7-
vertical integration context. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
declared that the substantial lessening of competition necessary for a section
7 violation occurs when the market affected is substantial and when there is
a "likelihood that competition may be 'foreclosed in a substantial share' of that
market." The Court noted that this is the criterion of Standard Stations.02
This test, the Court found was met by GM and du Pont: GM accounted
for half the automobile sales market; its automotive finish and fabric pur-
chases must therefore have represented half those markets. 0 3 Since du Pont
supplied "the largest part" of GM's requirements, with respect both to per-
centage and to absolute quantity, the court "must conclude that du Pont has
a substantial share of the relevant market."8 °4 Thus the Court found that
there was sufficient market foreclosure to allow the inference of injury to
competition.
In du Pont, the Court defined the relevant market as automobile finishes
and fabrics, because in its view these products "have sufficient peculiar char-
acteristics and uses" to make them distinguishable "from all other finishes
and fabrics." 0 5 But the dissent points out that these same finishes and fabrics
are used in large volume by many industries other than automobile manu-
299. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justice Department presented as its § 7
question: "Whether DuPont's acquisition of General Motors' stock violates the provisions
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbidding stock acquisitions which may result in restraint
of commerce or tend to create a monopoly." Brief for Appellant, p. 2. Again, in the main
portion of its brief, the contention was made that in neither of the two clauses was there a
limitation that there be competition between purchaser and the corporation whose stock Is
purchased. Id. at 146.
300. 353 U.S. at 590-91.
301. See id. at 593.
302. Id. at 595 & n.15; cf. id. at 593. But see id. at 607 ("reasonable probability"
Query: Is this closer to the language of the test of the Jackson dissent in Standard Stations
or the "not farfetched" of the majority?).
303. Id. at 596.
304. Ibid.
In 1946 du Pont sold GM 67% of its requirements for finishes; in 1947, 68% for $19
million. In 1946 du Pont sold GM 52% of its fabrics requirements; in 1947, 38% for $3.7
million. Total 1947 du Pont-GM sales were $27 million. Ibid.
305. Id. at 593-94.
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facturing.306 For the purpose of foreclosing competitors from the market in
order to effect barriers to competition, the relevant market would appear to
be the entire market for the product. Economies of scale--in manufacturing,
at least-depend on total output; therefore, only foreclosure from a market
sufficient to prevent competitors from securing an efficient output level will
bar their entry. Since the automobile market foreclosed represents only a
small portion of the paint and fabric market, it would appear farfetched to
infer likelihood of injury to competition in finishes and fabrics from its fore-
closure.
The du Pont case is perhaps less interesting to the student of vertical in-
tegration than to the student of political science in general. The authors be-
lieve that da Pont-GM is sui generis: it involves control of the largest cor-
poration in the country by another industrial giant.3 07 Perhaps the concentra-
tion of national economic and political power effected by this combination is
more the reason for the decision than any potential anticompetitive effect on
the paint and fabric industries.30 8 The authors therefore ascribe a broader
policy basis for the holding than "lessening of competition" in a line of com-
merce. Du Pont is therefore less interesting for its result than for what it
says. On the doctrinal level it appears clear that the Court rejected earlier
lower court and Commission attempts to introduce an antithesis between the
proscriptions of section 3 for contract integration and section 7 for ownership
integration.30 9 Moreover, the decision indicates that similar considerations
306. Id. at 649-54.
307. As of 1957, GM ranked first in terms of net profits while du Pont ranked fourth.
In terms of sales, GM was first while du Pont was fifteenth; for assets, GM was second,
du Pont seventh. TH FoRTon E DmcroRY 2 (1958).
308. Compare the Douglas dissent in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 536 (1948):
In [the] final analysis, size in steel is the measure of the power of a handful of men
over our economy. That power can be utilized with lightning speed. It can be be-
nign or it can be dangerous. The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that it should
not exist. For all power tends to develop into a government in itself. Power that
controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people,
not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized.
It should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people vill not be
dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of
a few self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious men but respectable and
social minded is irrelevant. That is the philosophy and the command of the Sherman
Act. It is founded on a theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands so
great that only a government of the people should have it.
See also Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1941) ("the
combination is... an extra-governmental agency.., and provides extra-judicial tribunals
for determination and punishment of violators, and thus 'trenches upon the power of the
national legislature,' [Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242
(1899)]") ; McGovern, The Power and the Glory, 46 Gao. L.J. 655 (1958).
No attempt is made here to give exhaustive analysis of the many-faceted da Pont case.
309. Although ownership ("tight-knit" combination) %%as subjected to a stricter
"quantitative substantiality" test in dit Pont than contract ("loose-knit" combination) %.a-,
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govern in individual foreclosure and collective foreclosure cases. Du Pont-
GM, like MPAS, by adhering, in name at least, to the rule of Standard
Stations, shows that the centripetal tendencies in antitrust may yet prevail
over the centrifugal tendencies.
Post-dit Pont-GM Cases. Since du Pont, both the courts and the Commis-
sion have had opportunity to reexamine the role of section 7 in vertical in-
tegration cases. In Crown Zellerbach Corp.,310 a dominant paper manufac-
turer was forbidden to engross any more of the industry. The vertical inte-
gration aspect of the case, which was not the principal issue involved,81' arose
because a paper manufacturing firm Crown acquired had previously sold its
output to independent paper jobbers and converters. Since Crown already had
its own jobber and converter divisions, these independents were forced to seek
a new source of supply or else buy from their competitor Crown. It is unclear
from the Commission's brief discussion whether the vice seen in this particular
acquisition was a potential "squeeze" of the independents by Crown, or the
erection of further barriers to entry in an already concentrated industry. Per-
haps, the case can best be rationalized in terms of the possibility that Crown's
acquisition would erect serious capital barriers to competition in the paper
industry by making it necessary for a prospective entrant to go into the mar-
ket as an integrated firm. This necessity would exist if intermediate markets
became much thinner as a consequence of Crown's horizontal integration.
However, the opinion is devoid of evidence from which the existence of such
barriers can be inferred.
In Scott Paper Co.,3 12 the Commission moved under section 7 to bar the
acquisition of three suppliers by a leading paper manufacturer-the "number
one company" in the sanitary paper industry. 13 Finding a "vast difference
between leadership and dominance," the initial hearing examiner dismissed
the complaint at the close of the Government's presentation of its case.314
The examiner declared that Scott possessed "no control over raw materials,
production, price, channels of distribution, or entry of new competitors into
the market." 315 On appeal to the Commissioners, the dismissal was reversed
and remanded for further hearings.310 The Commission noted that market
in MPAS or Standard Stations (cases of collective foreclosure by contract integration),
policy considerations in favor of a unified standard would not appear to have been ignored.
Since ownership integration is relatively more stable than contract, it may pose greater
threats to competition.
310. TRADE REG. RE'. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) f[ 26923 (1957).
311. The principal issue was the horizontal integration by Crown of half the market,
almost a § 2 problem.
312. TRADE REG. RE. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) ff 27716 (Jan. 5, 1959), rcvcrring id. If
27312 (1958) (initial decision dismissing complaint).
313. Sanitary paper includes toilet tissue, facial tissue, paper napkins, paper towels,
and household waxed paper.
314. Id. at 36675.
315. Ibid.
316. Id. ff 27716 (Jan. 5, 1959).
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concentration in the industry was high; two-thirds of the business was done
by the four largest companies. "The inference is that the probability of the
entry of any substantial new competitors is remote. The high cost of break-
ing into the market with a new product and the problems of opening chan-
nels of distribution contribute to this difficulty of entry."'317 The FTC also
considered the effect of the acquisition on competitors of Scott who relied on
the acquired firms as a source of supply. These problems raised by the
mergers were too grave and the record developed too insufficient to allow the
case to be disposed of by motion to dismiss, and consequently the Commission
remanded the case for plenary action.
The third post-du Pont Commission order involved the acquisition of a
converter of plain aluminum foil into decorative aluminum foil by its supplier,
the Reynolds Metal Company.318 The relevant market was defined as decora-
tive aluminum foil, rather than all aluminum foil or all aluminum, because of
the unique characteristics of decorative foil. In this market, the acquired firm
accounted for twenty-five per cent of sales volume.310 The examiner found as
a fact that Reynolds acquired, by the merger, "the power to exclude its
aluminum foil producing competitors from selling to [the acquired firm, whose
purchases were] . . . quite important sales-wise not only to respondent but
to its competitors, Alcoa, Kaiser and others .... ,,320 Alleged foreclosure of
these competitors from the market was not, however, the basis of the initial
examiner's order. The market in which the likelihood of substantially lessen-
ing competition was found was the converted decorative foil market.3 -1
Before expansion by Reynolds, entry into foil conversion had "been easy,
with low capital outlay, standardized and plentiful machinery, no dearth of
supplies.13 22 But Reynolds' arrival on the scene was found to have "material-
ly altered this picture," by putting a firm with 600 million dollars in assets
into competition with the eight or ten small converters who specialized in
decorative foil.3m Reynolds had economic power to wage fierce and predatory
competition with the established converters solely because of its deep pock-
ets. 324 Moreover, because of its wide conglomerate of activities, Reynolds
could secure horizontal economies of scale, for example, in styling and adver-
tising, which were unavailable to its competitors. 2 5 The result was asserted
to be that "'the low cost, ease of entry, plentiful supply of basic material and
317. Id. at 36843. Query: Is the inference valid? Note, this is an appeal against a non-
suit.
318. Reynolds fetals Co., 3 TRA.E REc, REP. 27857 (FTC March 3, 1959) (summary
of No. 7009).
319. Reynolds Metals Co., No. 7009, FTC, March 3, 1959, p. 24 (finding 70) (about
$500,000 out of "a potential market of $2,000,000").
320. Id. at 24-25 (finding 71).
32. Id. at 25 (finding 73).
322. Id. at 20 (finding 57).
323. Id. at 21 (finding 62), 13 (finding 34).
324. See id. at 21-24.
325. See id. at 22.
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machinery while still there, are, in effect, unusable. 3 20 To the argument that
the merger had negligible effects on competition itself, the examiner retorted
that this argument
seems to be founded basically on the assumption that the law ignores the
capture of small markets from small businessmen. This hearing examiner
does not believe the statute as amended was so intended. This case pre-
sents the picture of eight or ten small commercial units in imminent
danger of being forced out of a formerly commercially livable enterprise
by reason of the acquisition attacked. . . .If the present and probable
plight of these victims is to be ignored and written off as too insignificant,
it will have to be for others, at higher levels, to do it.827
Whether the "plight of these victims" should be ignored and written off is
a subject to which this study will return later. At this point, it is sufficient
to observe that Reynolds appears to have been condemned primarily for its
efficiency. 328 The objection that Reynolds had power to wage predatory com-
petition, because of its "deep pockets," would appear relevant whenever a
wealthy corporation, or even an entrepreneur with a rich aunt, acquires a firm
or starts a business. At most this is a size problem, rather than a vertical
integration problem.
Similar solicitude for the plight of the customer in competition with his
supplier is shown in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.829 As in the
Crown case,330 the proposed integration was primarily horizontal. " 1 But
there were small, independent fabricators of steel, who bought from and sold
to Youngstown, one of the two merging firms, various fabricated or semifabri-
cated steel products. For example, Youngstown accounted for over ten per cent
of the wire for wire rope produced by nonintegrated manufacturers.33 2 The
other integrating firm, Bethlehem, had its own divisions in these fields. "In
view of the price squeeze and other competitive disadvantages under which
the independent wire rope fabricators labor, to remove Youngstown as a source
of supply would render even more hazardous the competitive position of the
independents, and might well mean the difference between their continued ex-
istence and their extinction." 383 Moreover, Youngstown purchased 1.3 per cent
of all wire rope manufactured in the country, and in some cases as much as
ten per cent of an independent fabricator's output. Since, as a result of the
326. Ibid. (finding 64).
327. Id. at 25.
328. Compare Adelman, Integrationz and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. Rzv. 27, 52-53
(1949).
329. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
330. See text at note 310 supra.
331. 168 F. Supp. at 611.
332. The court considered the relevant market to be wire produced by firms not com-
peting in the manufacture and sale of fabricated wire rope, because firms integrated for-
ward into rope fabrication represent a precarious source of supply to the independent. Id.
at 612-13. The precariousness results principally from actual or potential price squeezes.
Ibid.; see text at note 333.
333. 168 F. Supp. at 613.
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merger, Youngstown's needs would presumably be supplied by the Bethlehem
wire rope fabrication division, the court concluded:
The impact [of the merger] would be ... a significant restriction of
access to a vital source of supply and also to a needed market Thus the
merger presents a double-edged threat to the independent wire rope fab-
ricators. Here it may be emphasized that one of the factors which led
to the passage of section 7 was threat to small business by the merger
movement. The proposed merger poses just that threat.334
The merger was enjoined as violative of section 7. The decision is based
primarily on the horizontal integration issues, however, and we can only con-
jecture how the court would have treated the vertical aspect of the case had
it stood alone.
The recent case of United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n 3-
is the only vertical integration decision under new section 7 presenting an
unambiguous "leverage" problem, i.e., the use of power at one level-distribu-
tion-to secure or strengthen power at another level-production. a3G The de-
fendant milk association is an agricultural cooperative of about 2000 dairy
farmers in Maryland and Virginia. About eighty-six per cent of milk sales to
dealers in the District of Columbia area-one relevant market-were made by
this co-op. Another ten per cent of area sales were accounted for by "a disturb-
ing influence which [had] been a thorn in the side of the Association for many
years"a3 -the Embassy Dairy. In the second relevant market--sales made
to Governmental installations in the area-the co-op accounted for forty-five
per cent of total volume while Embassy sold forty-seven per cent. as Embassy
bought its raw milk from about 120 independent farmers (so-called "boot-
leggers") who did not belong to the co-op and whose product was characterized
as "distress milk."339 Embassy, through its ability to buy cheap milk from
independents, had cut heavily into co-op sales. Between loss of sales and
Embassy price pressure, co-op producers lost revenues of 700,000 dollars a
year.340 The defendant's solution to its problem was to buy Embassy ouL3 41
334. Ibid.
335. 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), prob. juris. notcd, 360 U.S. 927 (1959). For other
opinions in the case, see 167 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C 1958) (§ 2 count dismissed), and 168
F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1959) § 1 violated by combination with Embassy).
336. For the reasons given in text at notes 309-11 supra the authors do not consider
d, Pont to present an unambiguous leverage problem.
337. 167 F. Supp. at 804-05. The quotation comes from an internal memorandum of
the association written by its general manager.
338. The size of the Government market, about $2 million a year, is quite "minor in
proportion" to the total market, 167 F. Supp. at 804, amounting to about 7%-10% of the
latter, see id. at 804-05 (authors' computation) ; Record on Appeal, p. 557 ($1-2 million
estimate).
339. See 167 F. Supp. at 805. Embassy secured about three-quarters of its supply
from local independent producers and the balance from others, including middlemen.
Record on Appeal, p. 647.
340. See 167 F. Supp. at 805-06. Embassy, although a low volume producer, wat able
to act as an area price leader. See BouLDiNG, Ecoxouic ANALYsIs 644-45 (3d ed. 1955),
341. In setting its sale price, Embassy exacted from the co-op the value of the mo-
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The result of the merger, at least for the time being, was to eliminate the
"distress milk" from the market. The independent producers no longer had
access to the Washington market unless they would join the co-op. Some of
them chose to do this, but most stopped shipping their output to the District
market and began shipping, instead, to Baltimore.3 42 Embassy's price pressure
on the Government and consumer markets ceased. Thus, by vertical integration,
the co-op removed its competitors' means of distribution, thereby foreclosing
them from the market 43 and securing to itself a monopoly of production. 44 For
nopoly power that would accrue to the co-op; the defendant paid a price for Embassy far
in excess of the worth of its assets. 167 F. Supp. at 806. It would appear that the proprietor
of Embassy made a habit of threatening the security of local milk monopolies and then
selling out to them. Ibid.
342. Id. at 806.
343. The foreclosure of the market thus realized, however, was not complete. "Ap-
parently the continued existence of several comparatively small dairies kept alive consider-
able competition in the industry." Ibid. The former role of Embassy is now, to a large
extent, played by High's Dairy, a vigorous and aggressive competitor who relies on inde-
pendents for supply. See Record on Appeal, pp. 632, 634.
344. The market situation may be represented, in greatly simplified form, diagram-
matically as follows:
BEFoRE MERGER
PRODUCTION 2000 Co-op Dairy 120 Independent
Farmers Dairy farmers
Dairies Buying
WHOLESALING From Co-op Embassy
I I
86% of Sales in D.C.
plus
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this strategy to work, it would be necessary that entry into wholesale distribution
be difficult. Otherwise, a new competitor could step in and threaten the
expensively purchased monopoly. Apparently, there .was some degree of im-
perfection in the market or barriers to entry into milk wholesaling, because
the court found that the strategy was successful. But the opinion is utterly
silent on the nature of the barriers.
345
The Future of Section 7. The full scope of new section 7 has not yet been
defined, but the courts may soon probe its frontiers. Until 1958, action had
been taken only against acquisitions of entire enterprises by another. Asset
acquisitions within section 7 are, however, expressly not limited to the merger
of firms.346 The legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act is vague on the
point of what constitutes an asset acquisition. The most pertinent discussion
touching the question is in the House Report: "It [the bill] covers not only
the purchase of assets or stock but also any other method of acquistion, such
as, for example, lease of assets. It forbids not only direct acquisitions but also
indirect acquisitions, whether through a subsidiary or affiliate or otherwise." 347
Moreover, the term "asset" may not be restricted to tangible property; in-
tangibles or choses in action may be included as well.3 48 In the Senate hear-
ings on the bill, a manufacturers' association suggested an amendment defining
" 'assets' . . . not [to] include stock in trade, inventories, or other property
held by a corporation primarily for sale in the ordinary course of . . . busi-
345. Perhaps, when the percentage of market control goes above 90%, courts are en-
titled to use a conclusive presumption of foreclosure without singling out any particular
barrier to entry. This appears to be the rationale of Judge Learned Hand's celebrated dictum
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945), that 90"
control of the market "is enough to constitute a monopoly; [but] it is doubtful whether
sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough, and certainly thirty-three percent is not." If
the presumption is valid in the context of § 2, which is the most difficult antitrust statute
for the prosecutor to prove violated, a fortiori the presumption is valid for a "may" statute
like § 7.
Even § 2, however, permits the defense to prove that monopoly was "thrust upon!' it.
Id. at 429-31; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110, F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). But, as we have seen, § 3 of the Clayton Act
allows no affirmative defenses at all, see text at notes 104-09 supra, while the only affirma-
tive defense which has consistently prevailed uider § 7 is that of the "failing competitor,"
see Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1662-68 (1959). Perhaps in the absence of availability
of affirmative defenses, adoption of a conclusive presumption of anticompetitive effect,
despite lack of showing by plaintiff of potential barriers to entry, is unduly harsh on
defendants.
346. The statute says: "acquire the whole or any part of the assets .... " Celler-
Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
347. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1949).
348. The only chose in action covered expressly by § 7 is stock. Ibid.; see -arm
Journal, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) 26023 (1956) (initial order),
adopted without appeal, id. ff 26127 (Commission cease and desist order).
The legislative history of the 1950 amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the
amendment itself, and its purpose, persuade the hearing examiner that the term
'assets' as used therein means property or property rights, real or personal, tangible
19591
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ness."349 No action was taken on the proposal. This may indicate congressional
determination to leave the concept of "asset" broad and flexible, or it may
equally well manifest lack of congressional appreciation that "asset" is not
a fully determinate concept without troublesome ramifications.
Two recent Justice Department complaints raise interesting problems in
the interpretation of this portion of the statute. When Universal Pictures
conveyed the exclusive television rights to its library of pre-1948 films to Screen
Gems, a distributing subsidiary of Columbia Pictures, the Government brought
an action charging violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 7
of the Clayton Act.3s 0 The transaction may fit more easily into the conceptual
pigeonhole of "asset transfer" when it is labelled a sale of an "exclusive license,"
as the complaint does.35' But this license is extremely close to an output con-
tract.3 52 By pleading under Clayton Act section 7, in such cases, the "easier"
or intangible which is subject to transfer and which has been used by the seller
and could be used by the buyer competitively.
Quoted in 1 TRADE REG. REP. 4205.200 (10th ed.). The foregoing refers to an acquisition
of a subscription list and the "right to solicit" subscriptions from those on the list.
In Bender v. Hearst Corp., 152 F. Supp. 569, 578-79 (D. Conn. 1957), an advance
sheet service which supplied information on estimated parts and labor costs for various car
repairs was acquired by a competitor. The assets consisted of trade names, copyrights,
technical data, records and forms, and goodwill. The court held the assets in question were
not subject to § 7, because they were the property of an individual rather than a corpora-
tion, as § 7 requires. However, the court went on to say that "except for this, it is appar-
ent" that § 7 would apply. In affirming, the Second Circuit held § 7 inapplicable be-
cause there was no proof of "public injury," and thus did not address itself to the question
of whether the assets in question came within the asset definition of § 7.
349. Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 313-15 (1950). Compare the proposed premerger notifica-
tion bills, H.R. 264, § 1, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.R. 2143, S. 198, H.R. 2325, § 1,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), which exclude stock in trade from the asset definition.
350. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., TRADE REG. Rs'. 45058 (Case 1378)
(S.D.N.Y. filed April 10, 1958) (summary of complaint), Governmcnt motion for rim-
mary judgment on Sherman Act count denied, 169 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
351. Compare Complaint, p. 7 ("defendant Screen Gems acquired assets of defendant
Universal, said assets consisting of an exclusive license ... for exhibition ... [of] defend-
ant Universal's library of ... films") (§ 7 count), with id. at 6 ("defendants have effec-
tuated the aforesaid combination and conspiracy in part by means of a contract ... [for]
the exclusive license to distribute . . .") (§ 1 count).
In Screen Gems, defendants first contended that § 7 covers only "physical" assets. De-
fendant's Memorandum Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and Preliminary Injunction, pp. 4 9-50. They subsequently shifted their position and now
deny "acquisition" of assets. Their theory is that "acquire" refers to "title" or "ownership"
and that this transaction falls far short of conveying either of these. Defendant's Memo-
randum Regarding the Meaning of "Assets." Defendants reaffirmed their position that they
did not "acquire" assets in their Memorandum for Pretrial Conference.
352. Of course an output contract is usually for entire future output, i.e., for future
goods, while the Columbia-Universal license covered an entire past output, i.e., specific
goods. Query: Are Sales Act distinctions helpful here?
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Clayton Act standard may be invoked despite the restrictive wording of section
3 of that statute353
When Monsanto conveyed to Lever Brothers all its rights in the synthetic
detergent "all," and Lever agreed to buy from Monsanto its requirements of
the ingredients of "all,"35 the Justice Department filed a complaint praying that
"the contractual arrangement between Lever and Monsanto and the resulting
acquisitions... be adjudged in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act" and
that "Lever be required to divest itself of the .. rights acquired ... under
the contractual arrangement." 355 As in the Columbia Pictures license transfer,
the contractual arrangement has "asset" overtones. Trademarks, copyrights,
and patents related to "all" were transferred. Thus, the case is not purely one
of a requirements contract. Moreover, despite the joinder of Monsanto as a co-
defendant, the action and the relief requested are directed primarily against
the buyer Lever,356 who is the party bound by the restrictive arrangement.33'
353. See note 225 supra. A more recent complaint in the television industry deals
with an even greater fragmentation of the bundle of rights involved in motion picture
copyrights. One asset acquisition attacked in Complaint, United States v. United Artists
Corp., Civ. No. 150-267, S.D.N.Y., Sept. 15, 1959, TRADE. REG. REP. fI 45059, at 66404
(case 1477) (summary of complaint), is that of "residual rights" after the preliminary
exhibition of a film library. Such rights are analogous to the reversionary interest of a
fee holder after the grant of a term of years. Hence, the rights have not only been divided
according to the field of exploitation, but also along the plane of time.
The Columbia Pictures case does not appear to represent a case of barriers to entry
caused by vertical integration. The complaint appears to have strong overtones of purely
horizontal combination reminiscent of the early railroad cases: United States v. Southern
Pac. R.R., 259 U.S. 214 (1922) ; United States v. Union Pac. R.I., 226 U.S. 61 (1912) ;
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) ; United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171. U.S. 505 (1898) ; cf. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). See
generally Phade, Screen Gems, 8 CAm.m 123 (1958). Thus, the interest of the case to the
student of vertical integration is directed primarily to the doctrinal issues involved.
354. In May, Lever Brothers Company purchased from us the trademark and franchise
to market the detergent all and Dishwa.her all. We have contracted to manufac-
ture these products for Lever Brothers for a period of years and, for an interim
period, to package them.
This agreement permits Monsanto, in the detergent field, to devote all of its
energies to the development and sale of its chemicals to detergent manufacturers.
Monsanto Ann. Rep., 1957, p. 7.
355. The complaint included no Sherman Act counts. Complaint, United States v.
Lever Bros. Co., Civ. No. 135-219, S.D.N.Y., July 8, 1958.
356. The complaint prays that the Monsanto-Lever requirements contract be adjudged
in violation of § 7, but no relief against Monsanto is asked. Complaint, pp. 8-9. The court
is asked to decree divesture against Lever and enjoin it from making any further acquisi-
tions from corporations in the soap or detergent business. ]bid.
357. Lever is bound to deal exclusively with Monsanto for its "all" requirements. Of
course, under this integration contract, Monsanto is bound to supply Lever with all the
"all" it requires. However, there is no indication that Monsanto is bound not to sell deter-
gent chemicals to others than Lever. Thus, in Monsanto Ann. Rep., 1957, p. 7, it is stated
that the agreement will make it possible for Monsanto "to devote all of its energies to the
development and sale of its chemicals to detergent manufacturers."
1959]
HeinOnline -- 69 Yale L.J. 77 1959-1960
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Nevertheless, the complaint suggests the potentiality of section 7 for neutralizing
the commodities limitation of section 3.35s Thus, a contract by which the buyer
agrees to purchase all its requirements of some service might be vulnerable,
because the seller acquires the "asset" constituted by his contractual rights.
And there may well be further latent possibilities in the asset clause of section
7, since there is nothing in the statute to limit its application to the exclusive
dealing context. Any contract creates mutual rights in the parties which have
many of the incidents normally associated with assets, such as real or personal
property: most contractual rights can be sold, assigned, or hypothecated359
When the acquisition of contract rights tends substantially to lessen competition,
there may be a section 7 problem. Impatience or dissatisfaction with imagined
difficulties of proof under the Sherman Act rule of reason or resurgence of it
trend against Sherman-Clayton coalescence could motivate attempts to expand
the concept of "assets" under revised section 7.860
Conclusion
Three routes by which the courts do or may unify the law of vertical
integration have been explored. One possible route is over-all coalescence of
the standards of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act. A second
route exists via section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, but this is a
route which only the Commission can take and on which the Department of
Justice and private litigants cannot travel. Expansion of section 7 of the
Clayton Act to cover contractual arrangements offers a third possibility, but
any conclusions about its role would be premature.
In any case, further unification of the law in this area is to be anticipated.
Still, the distinction between industrial integration by ownership and by con-
tract retains its value. Contract integration is more impermanent and reversible
a tie than is ownership. For that reason, perhaps a greater degree of inte-
gration is tolerable when contract is used. Perhaps, also, there exist valid
functional distinctions between forward and backward vertical integration, and
the extent to which integration may proceed before anticompetitive effects are
felt may differ with the direction. But compartmentalization of the law of inte-
gration into a section 1 test for backward integration by contract, a section 3
test for forward integration by contract, and a section 7 test for ownership
integration is not rational, unless these heterogeneous standards are based on
358. The thrust of the Government's complaint is against Lever, the requirements con-
tract purchaser. See note 356 supra. Use of § 3, which is directed against requirements
contract sellers, would probably not lead to satisfactory relief.
359. See 4 CoRaiN, CONTRAcrs § 860 (1951).
360. Compare the efforts to expand the per se rule against vertical integration. Coln-
pare United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), with United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-74 (1948), and United States v, Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 521 & n.18, 523-25 (1948). While we cannot predict how far § 7 will
take the courts, it appears safe to say that refusals to deal are beyond its scope, since a
refusal to deal could hardly be considered a direct or indirect "asset acquisition."
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the differing economic impact of the various forms of integration. In the cases
in which the Government moved against integration systems, the courts appear
to have recognized that the three statutes do not embody different standards
established on such a basis. As a result, they have declined to measure the
legality of the different types of vertical integration with tests based purely on
formal differences in the wording of the statutes.
Although it appears that a single criterion of legality for integration systems
is evolving, it is not yet clear what that standard will be. Certainly, the standard
is closely linked with the term "foreclosure." But the meaning of this key word
is much debated. To the authors, it is properly identified with barriers to
competition itself. As they read the Supreme Court cases, this is the meaning
of "substantially lessen competition" and "unreasonably restrain trade" in the
key decisions. But strong indications exist that the FTC regards foreclosure
as mere injury to competitors. The struggle over whether antitrust edsts
solely to monitor free competition in the market place, or to redress torts or
private wrongs as well, is a central issue in an analysis of the law of vertical
integration and one to which this study will return again.
REFUSALS To DEAL: PRIVATE SuITS AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION BY CONTRAcr
Vertical integration by contract or ownership is banned by the antitrust laws
whenever it may substantially lessen competition, unreasonably restrain trade,
or constitute an unfair method of competition. The ban applies to restrictive
agreements irrespective of their form as express provisions or informal under-
standings backed up by the threat of refusal to deal. These arrangements may
be dissolved by the courts at the behest of the Government, and criminal
sanctions may be imposed upon the firm and its officers.30 '
But the Government is not the only litigant in antitrust. As a needed supple-
ment to public enforcement of the antitrust laws, Congress has provided for
private antitrust suits as well.3 02 Three classes of private litigants are found
in vertical integration cases: (1) competitors of the integrating firm, (2) the
integrated firm itself, and (3) firms subjected to the refusal to deal sanction.
Relatively few cases in the first category have been brought,303 but competitors
361. Fine and imprisonment may be decreed under Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209
(1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958), and Clayton Act § 14, 38 Stat. 736 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 24 (1958).
362. :Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952) ; see, e.g., Maltz v.
Sax, 134 F2d 2, 4 (7th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943); Weinberg v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.NJ. 1940); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 284, 296
(1939). For general discussion of private antitrust actions, see Loevinger, Private Action
-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 AEN=TUST BULL 167 (1958) ; Comment, 61 YALE
L.J. 1010 (1952).
363. Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe Am. Corp., 201 F-2d 534 (7th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953) ; Ox'ford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764
(6th Cir. 1936); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935),
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injured by the integration system should be able to seek damages or an in-
junction on the same legal theories as are available to the Government.A0 4 The
few cases in the second category, between firms related by integration, have
established that courts will deny the integrating firm the right to invoke legal
sanctions to preserve its position if there is an antitrust violation. The dis-
gruntled contract integrated buyer 305 or seller 06 may refuse to carry out his
contracts with impunity, or he may even sue for and collect treble damages8 07
In ownership integration situations the right to vote the stock of an acquired
firm may be enjoined 368 and damages may be levied by opposition stock-
holders.369 Thus, it appears that there are ample private remedies available,
at least in principle, to competitors or members of an integration system.
aff'd, 299 U.S. 3 (1936) ; cf. Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942);
Bender v. Hearst Corp., 152 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1957), aff'd, 263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1959) ; McWirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
364. But see McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 167 F. Supp. 949, 954
(W.D.S.C. 1958) (dictum), aff'd and remanded, 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959). The
authors submit that there is no basis in the case law or in policy for the distinction the
district court found between suits by the Government and by a competitor.
365. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
366. See Tempa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
This case should be disapproved on its facts, which do not bring it within the rule of
Standard Stations. The reasoning of the court seems to be an extreme example of the
Anctwr Serum approach. See note 203 supra and accompanying text.
367. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1.948) (seller) ; Libman v. Sun Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1954) (buyer) ; Red
Rock Bottlers, Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1952-1953 Trade Cas. 67962 (N.D. Ga. 1952)
(buyer).
368. See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1958) (suit by corporation being acquired); Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co.,
231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956) (states a cause of action) ; Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953) (preliminary injunction). See also De Koven v.
Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 216 Fed. 955, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (equity could be invoked
by dissenting minority even in absence of specific statutory provision) (dictum). But see
Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (injunction to
undo merger denied, possible injury to corporation too remote; derivative suit by direc-
tors) ; Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132, 142 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (injunction to
prevent asset sale denied, injury too remote; derivative suit by minority stockholders).
369. Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956) (derivative suit);
Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 202 F.2d 731. (2d Cir. 1953) (same);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 171 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (complaint against
integrated and integrating corporations by stockholder in former states cause of action) ;
Kogan v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 20 F.R.D. 4 (D. Del. 1956) ; see Schechtman v. Wolfson,
244 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1957) (counsel fees may be allowed in derivative suit; inter-
locking directorates) (dictum). Contra, General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 23 F.2d
822 (6th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 588 (1928) (private suit, merger) ; Continental
Secs. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741
(1927) (private suit) ; see Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S, 27 (1916)
(derivative suit dismissed because Sherman Act must be action at law). But Judge Clark,
in Fanchon, supra, appears to find that the law-equity merger in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure superseded Pleihnann.
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However, these potential litigants have seldom availed themselves of the
antitrust laws. While an integration relationship is functioning, an integrated
firm usually would be reluctant to jeopardize its position by bringing a law-
suit.3 7 0 The relatively speculative nature of the damages a firm sustains because
of integration,3 7' and possibly the fear of a pari delicto defense 3 72 may further
deter such suits.373 For competitors of integrating firms, the evidentiary prob-
lems illustrated by J. I. Case37 4 probably discourage many suits.
370. See Kessler, Autonwbile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract,
66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1165 (1957).
371. See notes 368 and 369 supra. However, injury to the integrated firm has figured
in two important cases. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1948), a com-
plaint was held to state a cause of action under §§ 1-2 when an integration system was
alleged to injure the public, the integrated firms, and competitors of the integrating firm:
It is said that appellees have agreed to control the operation and purchase of taxi-
cabs by the principal operating companies in Chicago, New York City, Pittsburgh
and Minneapolis, insisting that they purchase their cabs exclusively from CCM....
[T]he trade of the controlled cab companies is restrained since they are prevented
from purchasing cabs from manufacturers other than CCM. The result allegedly is
that these companies must pay more for cabs than they would otherwise pay, their
other expenditures are increased unnecessarily and the public is charged high rates
for the transportation services rendered. . . . [B]y preventing the cab operating
companies under their control from purchasing cabs from manufacturers other than
CCM, the appellees deny those companies the opportunity to purchase cabs in a free,
competitive market.5
5 To the extent that the controlled operating companies are charged higher than
the open market prices, they are injured.
Id. at 224-27 & n.5. In Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D.
Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953), a preliminary injunction vas granted against
stock voting by a watch manufacturer who sought to take over control of one of his com-
petitors, or at least obtain representation on its board. "(T]he immediate effect of such
representation would be... as between Hamilton and Benrus to improve the competitive
position of Benrus with a reciprocal impairment of Hamilton's position." 114 F. Supp. at
317. However, the court also found likelihood of lessening of competition between the two
firms, and the question of private harm was probably important only because the action
was a private suit rather than one brought by the Government. Perhaps the du Pott-GM
case also has faint overtones of injury to the integrated firm. And there are references in
Standard Stations, Richfield, and the reappraisal of Standard Stations in the 3MPAS dis-
sent, to the effect of the integration system on the retail operators. However, no case is
authority for the proposition that an antitrust violation can be predicated purely upon injury
to a firm integrated into the industrial empire of another firm. But see Red Rock Bottlers,
Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1952-1953 Trade Cas. 67962 (N.D. Ga. 1952).
372. Such fears may be quite unwarranted; "the effectiveness of In Pari Delicto as a
defense has been considerably limited [in antitrust suits] . . . ." Banana Distribs., Inc.
v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (dictum) (collecting author-
ities).
373. Moreover, by the time the relationship collapses, the statute of limitations may
bar recovery of the greater part of the damages accrued, thus making a suit unprofitable.
374. See text at notes 173-80 supra.
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In contrast, the firm subjected to the refusal to deal sanction 315 because it
declines integration faces no evidentiary problem. The negotiations leading tip
to the refusal to deal will usually provide ample evidence that the refusal is
rooted in an exclusivity policy. At the same time, the dealer who is cast out
no longer has any relationship to jeopardize, and his reluctance to offend the
integrating firm vanishes.8 76 But paradoxically the cast-out dealer, despite his
most advantageous position to vindicate the public interest in free competition
by acting as a private law enforcement agency, is the one potential litigant to
whom the courts uniformly deny a remedy under the antitrust laws. Serious
technical obstacles created by the wording of the statutes presently bar relief
in such actions, and the cases have often been decided on the pleadings. In
addition to these technical problems, the courts have been confronted in cancelled
dealer cases with grave problems of public policy which touch upon the function
of antitrust. The proper scope and function of the treble damages action is
not settled: the clash between antitrust as tort and as the guardian of competi-
tion continues to trouble the courts.
The Cause of Action Under Section 4
Private damage suits are available to a party injured by a violation of the
antitrust laws under section 4 of the Clayton Act which allows treble damage 871
recovery to "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." According to the case law,
a cause of action under section 4 has three essential ingredients: (1) a violation
of the antitrust laws by defendant,3T8 (2) an injury to plaintiff, and (3) a
375. Refusal to deal by a seller occurs in three situations: (1) refusal to continue an
existing contract, see Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Engineered Prods., Inc., 237 F.2d 879
(4th Cir. 1956) ; (2) refusal to renew a contract which has expired or continue a course
of dealing, see Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) ; Nelson
Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
925 (1953); (3) refusal to enter a contractual relationship, see Timken Roller Bearing
Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 11 27244 (1958). In general the three refusal-
to-deal situations are treated alike by the law. The first situation, however, unlike the
others, may involve a breach of contract. Violation by the dealer of an unlawful promise
to deal exclusively may not entitle the supplier to refuse to perform. Given severability,
refusal by the supplier to perform will be inexcusable and constitute breach. For a general
discussion, see 6 CoRBiN, CONTRAcTs §§ 1390, 1520 (1951). Given a franchise on under-
standing of exclusive dealing, in violation of § 3, a court would probably find the exclu-
sivity clause void and severable. Compare Red Rock Bottlers, Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co.,
1952-1953 Trade Cas. 67962 (N.D. Ga. 1952) (court appears to regard contract severable),
with Red Rock Bottlers, Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1952-1953 Trade Cas. 68856 (N.D.
Ga. 1953) ("entire rather than severable"), and Allied, supra ('not severable).
376. See Kessler, supra note 370, at 1165.
377. Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1952), provides for in-
junctions in circumstances essentially the same as those in which § 4 recovery is allowed.
378. The discussion which follows centers on §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of
the Clayton Act. The antitrust laws also include § 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act and §§
7-8 of the Clayton Act. Cases brought under Robinson-Patman § 2 have failed becaume
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proximate-cause relationship between the violation and plaintiff's injury.
Typically, cancelled dealers have been unable to make out one or more of these
ingredients.
The Nelson Case
All of these issues are raised in Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,
Inc.,3 79 the leading cancelled dealer treble damages case. Nelson, a radio equip-
ment jobber, was cut off by his supplier, Motorola, when he refused to accede
to a demand that he agree to deal on an exclusive basis. In his complaint,
Nelson alleged violation of sections 1 and 3.3s° The court dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted-in more
traditional terminology, failure to state a cause of action.
Consummated Sales and Intracorporate Conspiracy. Section 3 of the Clayton
Act forbids only sales made on condition, agreement, or understanding of ex-
clusive dealing. According to the Nelson court, a dealer who is disciplined by
nonrenewal or termination, because he refuses to deal exclusively with his
supplier, cannot invoke this statute because no sale at all has been made to
him3 s1 Equally serious obstacles prevent recovery under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Between the cancelled dealer and the manufacturer no injurious
contract, combination, or conspiracy exists of which complaint can be made.
To overcome this obstacle, Nelson alleged a combination or conspiracy by
Motorola and its officials of which he was the victim. The court refused to
entertain the "absurd assertion"382 of a combination or conspiracy between a
corporation and its officers or agents.883
refusal to deal is not considered price discrimination by the courts. See Barber, Refusals
To Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. rEV 847, 849-51 (1955). To
date § 7 has not been applied in intrasystem private suits. But cf. Fargo Glass & Paint Co.
v. Globe Am. Corp., 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Bender v. Hearst Corp., 152 F. Supp.
569 (D. Conn. 1958), af'd, 263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1959) (squeezed out buyers sue). Sec-
tion 8 applies to interlocking directorates between competitive corporations; it is doubt-
ful that it applies to vertical relationships. See Barnes, Conpetitiv Mores and Legal Tests
in Merger Cases: The Du Pont-General Motors Decision, 46 GEo. LJ. 564, 591 n.85 (1958).
Neither § 5 of the FTC Act nor § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is an antitrust law for
the purpose of Clayton Act § 4. Note 282 stipra; Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355
U.S. 373 (1958).
379. 200 F2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
380. See 200 F.2d at 913, 915.
381. Accord, Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.
1954); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 821 (1954); McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 167 F. Supp. 949 (W.D.
S.C. 1958), aff'd and remanded, 269 F2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959) ; Barber, Refusals To Deal
Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Rnv. 847, 860 (1955) ; see Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 162 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
382. 200 F2d at 914; accord, Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F2d 8(9 (7th Cir.
1956), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 355 U.S. 865 (1957); Marion County
Co-op. Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
383. Attack under Sherman Act § 2 dispenses with the conspiracy problem, but mo-
nopolization has not been successfully proved in dealership cases because of the existence,
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Proximate cause. As an alternative, Nelson charged that the consummated
sales Motorola made to jobbers who acceded to the demand for exclusive deal-
ing were violations of section 3. But the court regarded these sales as causing
no injury to the plaintiff: "[I]t is the absence of a contract with the plaintiff,
not the presence of agreements with distributors in other parts of the country,
of which the plaintiff must complain." 384 It appears likely, given this view of
proximate cause, that the court would have made the same response had Nelson
made the section 1 argument that these sales agreements with others were con-
tracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of section 1.
With the help of statutory interpretation, the Nelson court was thus able to
dismiss the complaint on the pleadings. It never reached the issues of sub-
stantial lessening of competition or unreasonable restraint of trade. From the
record in the Nelson case we have very little basis for deciding whether Motor-
ola's practices had an actual or incipient anticompetitive effect. Motorola's
share of the national market was greater than fifty per cent of sales volume.Y88
No information was given however, on Motorola's share of available jobbers,
on their choice quality, on the ease of entry into the jobber-market, 880 or on
other relevant economic factors. Nelson was never given an opportunity to
introduce such evidence. The absence of pertinent data makes it impossible to
determine whether the share of the market foreclosed by Motorola had an
adverse effect on competition.
Refisal To Deal and Public Policy
The Nelson decision raises grave problems of public policy. According to
the interpretation of the antitrust laws adopted by the court, a refusal to deal
with a dealer who has not acceded to the request for exclusivity is not action-
able, even if it is a means of controlling a system of exclusive dealing which
has anticompetitive effects. This is true even though the system could be
challenged by the Government or by a competitor of the integrating firm. Thus,
absent action by the Government (which does not have the time or resources to
intervene in every anticompetitive scheme) and suit by a competitor (who
may often have a similar scheme of exclusivity and therefore would not sue)
customarily, of reasonably close substitutes competing with defendant's product. See, e.g.,
Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441. (4th Cir. 1958) ; Packard Motor Car
Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957). But see Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927). No § 2 charge was involved
in Nelson-Motorola. See Brief for Respondent on Petition for Certiorari, p. 5.
384. 200 F.2d at 915; accord, Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 162 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal.
1958).
385. 200 F.2d at 913.
386. Motorola denied that the case presented a situation where there was no room in
the market for newcomers. Entry into distribution was alleged to be free. However, no
support for this position was given. See Brief for Respondent on Petition for Certiorari,
pp. 12-14.
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the firm wanting to integrate has a device available which exposes it to a
minimum of legal risk. As a result of the Nelson doctrine, there emerges in
addition to integration by ownership and integration by contract, a third cate-
gory-integration by refusal to deal-which differs from ordinary contract
integration only in that no integration (i.e., exclusive dealing) clause or its
equivalent 387 exists; the integration system places sole reliance on the threat
of refusal to deal. This is a most effective way of protecting exclusivity; first,
it replaces contract sanctions-i.e., damages, rescission, or specific performance
-whose invocation would be futile anyhow. Second, it avoids the risk that
exclusive dealing clauses might be used as evidence in an antitrust action. Third,
for the dealers who are not admitted to the system or who are cast out because
they refuse to accept integration, the Nelson case-literally interpreted-creates
unsurmountable doctrinal obstacles to a claim for damages.
Consequently, Nelson deserves close examination to determine whether the
decision is required by a fair reading of the law. Should this be the case, we
must realize that there is a real difference between public and private antitrust
law, at least in the refusal-to-deal area, which the courts must recognize, and
the resolution of which must be left to Congress to deal with. An alternative
solution, on the legislative level, will be proposed in a succeeding section.
It is these facets of the Nelson case which constantly should be kept in mind
when reading the pages that follow, which are directed against the Nelson
doctrine. To understand its full significance, let us postulate a situation where
either the Government or a competitor could bring an antitrust suit because the
activities of the defendant have brought about or may bring about a substantial
lessening in competition. Let us postulate further, to avoid evidentiary issues,
that the defendant's refusal to sell is not based on legitimate reasons, business
or otherwise, but clearly on plaintiff's unwillingness to deal exclusively. Given
such fact situations, is a court unable under present law to protect competition
at the instance of an injured dealer because of the wording of the antitrust laws?
Section 3 and Proximate Cause
The narrow wording of the statute leaves little leeway for any other interpre-
tation than that adopted by the courts. Even if courts would construe "sale"
as used in the act to include "offer to sell," or "contract to sell" to include
"offer to contract to sell," the problem of proximate cause would still prove an
obstacle to use of the statute against refusal to deal. The offer to sell on con-
dition of exclusive dealing is not itself the cause of injury. Rather the injury
flows from the refusal to sell on nonexclusive terms. While "sale" could con-
ceivably be stretched to include "offer to sell," the term is hardly so elastic as
to cover "refusal to sell."388 As a result, the only section 3 violation in sight is
387. E.g., a minimum quantity clause like that in the Richfield case. See te-x't at note
173 supra.
388. Compare, however, the liberties taken by the Supreme Court wvith "every" in § I
of the Sherman Act. HANDLER, ANTTrrUsT IN PERSPEcnVE 3-28 (1957). This construction,
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with respect to the consummated sales which are made to those buyers who
agree to the proposal for exclusive dealing. The Nelson case rejected the argu-
ment that this violation caused injury to the would-be buyer who does not sub-
mit to the proposal.38 9 The counter-argument could be made that the disap-
pointed buyer is injured by the contracts with those buyers who submit to
exclusive terms because, without the consummated restrictive sales to the others,
it would be impossible for the seller to exert economic pressure on dealers who
try to hold out for nonexclusive terms.390 Thus, if the exclusive contracts with
others substantially lessen competition, it could be argued that the entire inte-
gration system violates section 3. Since the system is enforced by the refusal-
to-deal sanction, injury caused by refusal to deal is, arguably at least, injury
"by reason of" an antitrust violation.89' Such an approach would get around
the proximate cause problem.892
Expansion of Section 1 Conspiracy
The Sherman Act which focuses attention on conspiracy in restraint of
trade, offers another possibility for further doctrinal evolution in this area.
however, was restrictive rather than expansive. For an unexpected expansive interpreta-
tion, see du Pont-GM, discussed at notes 297-309 supra and accompanying text, noted in
66 YALE L.J. 1251 (1957) (old § 7 applied to vertical integration, and suit 30 years after
acquisition).
389. See text at note 384 supra.
390. Such a theory is based on the supposition that submission to exclusivity by n-1
dealers exerts a coercive pressure on the nth dealer. That is, but for submission by the
n-1 dealers, the nth dealer could successfully resist. Query: Is this indeed the case? Is there
any economic "leverage" exerted this way? Perhaps, when dealers in California, Texas,
New York and Ohio all agree to contracts in violation of § 3, this gives Motorola the
knowledge that it can succeed in imposing restrictive contracts on dealers. Such knowledge
adds to Motorola's power, in effect, and thus makes it more feasible for Motorola to de-
mand exclusivity from Nelson. In this sense, the consummated contracts with the n-1 dealers
injure the nth dealer. On still another theory, if the consummated contracts bar entry to
potential competitors, Nelson's alternatives to dealing with Motorola are lessened, and his
bargaining position worsened when Motorola demands that he too deal exclusively. Is such
injury too remote for proximate cause under §§ 3 and 4?
391. This is an argument analogous to a consideration argument occasionally found
in charitable subscription cases: each promise to subscribe has its consideration in the other
such promises. 1 CoRBIN, CoNTacTs § 198 (1950). A similar argument obtains in com-
position cases. See Johnson v. Parker, 34 Wis. 596, 608 (1874) ; 6 ConBu, CONTRACTS §
1283 (1951) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONRACrS § 126 (3d ed. Jaeger 1957).
392. Once it .is recognized that causation is a public policy notion, "proximate cause"
becomes an accordion-like concept which contracts and expands in relationt to the interest
protected. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1132-33 (1956). To be sure, public policy has usually
been invoked to limit the scope of liability, see, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y.
170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), but the principle should work in either direction, see 2 HARPER
& JAMES, op. cit. supra at 1133; cf. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) ;
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 876(b), comment, illustration 2. Compare MoRIus, TORTS 195
(1953) (approving Summers v. Tice), with id. at 210 (apparently disapproving policy
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A section 1 violation could be based on the seller's efforts to force the would-be
buyer to adhere to the restrictive scheme. 3 3
Essential to finding conspiracy under section 1 is the existence of conspirators.
Since a single person cannot conspire with himself, no conspiracy can be
established 394 if the seller is a single natural person acting alone. When the
seller is a corporation, however, perhaps a combination 305 or conspiracy can
be established. Two theories could be advanced: an intracorporate conspiracy
among the corporation's officers or a hub and spokes conspiracy among the
corporation and its dealers who submit to exclusivity.
The Hub and Spokes Conspiracy. One possible set of conspirators is made
up of the seller and its dealers who agree to restrictive contracts.300 The
dealers, knowing the seller has invited adherence to its scheme, agree to deal
exclusively and thus each participate in a conspiracy with the seller to restrain
trade.397 If these separate "spoke" conspiracies can be aggregated into one
"wheel" conspiracy with the seller at the hub,398 then the injury to the can-
approach). If this is the case for "proximate cause," a fortiori it must be so for the more
broad concept "by reason of.' In the authors' view, "by reason of" is more close to "but
for" than "proximate cause" is.
For a discussion of damages law problems in such cases, see note 514 infra.
393. A contract in restraint of trade is also within § 1, but this category is not appro-
priate to the case at hand, unless courts will understand "contract" to include "proposal
for a contract," an unlikely eventuality, in view of the Nelson case (§ 3, "sale"). Focusing
attention on the consummated contracts with those dealers who submit to the exclusive deal-
ing system appears as difficult here as under § 3. But see MP.AS, text at notes 225-58 supra
(aggregation to show market effect, Government § 1 suit).
394. See PasK.Ns, CGRMINAL LAw 537 (1957).
395. The meaning of combination in the Sherman Act is uncertain. Minimally, it in-
eludes trusts or holding corporations ("combination in the form of trust or otherwise").
It may cover any corporation with a history of mergers or stock acquisition. And, although
there is little authority on this point, perhaps every corporation might thus be considered
a combination. See Adelman, Effectize Competition and the Antitrust La 's, 61 HAW. L
REv. 1289, 1314-15 (1948). This does not mean, of course, that every corporation with
more than one shareholder should be considered a combination in restraint of trade. More-
over, when the shareholders do not form the corporation with a trade-restraining purpose,
but the officers subsequently restrain trade by means of the corporation, the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine, discussed in text at note 393 infra, appears a more appropriate con-
ceptual tool.
396. Perhaps this set of "conspirators" is subject to the same objection as the cor-
porate officer conspiracy-that a corporation cannot conspire with its agents. However,
when the agents in question are franchised dealers, the defense appears less plausible. The
Court could readily find, as the Richfield district court did, that the dealers are not agents
but "independent businessmen." See text at note 172 supra; Cott Beverage Corp. v. Canada
Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. 72165 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 243 F2d 795 (2d Cir.
1957) (beverage company can conspire with its franchised bottlers) (dictum).
397. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1939) ; Note,
64 YALE L.J. 581 (1955).
398. See Rex v. M1eyrick and Ribuffi, 21 Crim. App. R. 94, 45 T.L.R. 421 (1929),
which uses "the metaphor of the center of the circle and the circumference." The difficulties
a court is confronted with when attempting to put the rim of the wheel around the spokes
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celled dealer, when he refuses to become another "spoke," can be said to
have been proximately caused by a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Intracorporate Conspiracy. The intracorporate conspiracy approach to re-
fusal to deal is suggested by Judge Rives in his Nelson dissent and strongly
urged by Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts. 80 There will usually
be a plurality of officers involved in the establishment of the set of exclusive
contracts which the firm succeeds in imposing on its dealers. As part of
this overall plan, the corporate officers and agents attempt to secure the ad-
herence of plaintiff to the trade restraining system. As individuals, each agent
is responsible for his acts.400 But the corporation may also be liable for the
are illustrated by two Supreme Court cases: Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750
(1946), and Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1947). As the Blunienthal
case, in distinguishing Kotteakos, indicates, it is not sufficient that each of the exclusive
agreements signed by the dealers leads back to Motorola. These agreements can only be
aggregated with a single conspiracy if the individual signers are aware that by acceding
to Motorola's demand they are "aiding in a larger plan." Id. at 559.
Would courts impute scienter to dealers-is constructive intent sufficient? The authors
have grave misgivings as to the wisdom of this step. Under this theory, there would be a
case against every submitting dealer. Or to carry things a little further, every newcomer
to the California gasoline market who found himself injured in his business, because he
could wrest away but an insignificant share of the market from the majors, would have a
case against every gasoline retailer who agreed to exclusivity. While the danger of such
suits may be more imagined than real, their possibility shows the dangers of the hub and
spokes approach to the case. While it might be attractive to say that courts could hold
Motorola liable as a conspirator but let the dealers off the hook on policy principles, the
law of conspiracy is otherwise. See WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw 537-38 (1953).
399. 200 F.2d at 916 (Rives, J., dissenting). "Whether the purpose and effect of the
action of these officers and agents were such as to be forbidden by the statutes was the
real question to be decided, a question that did not turn on the fact that these officers and
agents were acting within the corporate form." 6 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1417 (Supp. 1958).
In commenting on another intracorporate conspiracy case, Professor Corbin observes, "The
court puts emphasis on the fact that the defendant is a corporate 'entity' and cannot 'con-
spire' with itself. It is also a fact that such an 'entity' cannot 'conspire' at all, but it can
be held for the conspiracy of its 'agents, servants and employes.'" Ibid.; see Kramer, Does
Concerted Action Solely Between a Corporation and Its Officers Acting on Its Behalf in
Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Actr,
11 FaD. B.J. 130 (1951), urging that courts not focus their attention on "conceptual con-
siderations having no relation to economic fact." Id. at 142.
400. It is submitted that they are liable despite the fact that they do not directly profit,
a fact which was given weight by the Nelson court. 200 F.2d at 914. See also Arthur v.
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824, 830 (D. Md. 1938) (cited as authority ln
Nelson). But the weight of authority is that corporate officers are liable for unlawful acts
they commit, irrespective of whether the act personally profits them. See, e.g., United
States v. Bach, 151 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1945) (corporate agent held liable for violation of
price controls on behalf of corporation) ; Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Nash-
ville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 728, 738 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd sub norn. Fitch v. Kentucky-
Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943) (price discrimination, same).
See also § 14 of the Clayton Act, making corporate officers criminally liable for corporate
Sherman Act violations. See generally WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw 686-90 (1953). Query:
Are the antitrust laws different from other criminal or tort laws in that conspiracy to
violate them is excusable if the motive is to benefit another altruistically?
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legal consequences of their activity under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior.4 0 ' Hence, by invoking the plurality of its agents, the corporation may
be held in damages for conspiracy to restrain trade.
The celebrated footnote 59 of Socony-Vacuum declares that section 1 strikes
down the contract, combination or conspiracy, "whether the concerted activity
be wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other."4 -0'
Hence, for example, the conspiracy to fix prices violates section 1 "though no
overt act is shown, though it is not established that the conspirators had the
means available for accomplishment of their objective. . . ." In refusal to
deal cases, the seller's behavior may go far beyond "mere preparation" and
come "dangerously close" to fulfillment.403 The only remaining overt act for
a full-blown restraint of trade to exist would be the assent of the prospective
buyer. If the assent is withheld, the conspiracy among the corporate agents
remains nascent and abortive, but if the assent is granted, the conspiracy is
complete. Under the doctrine of Socony-Vacuum, the conspiracy would violate
section 1 either way.40
4
Another problem which remains under the intracorporate conspiracy ap-
proach to refusal to deal is that of proximate cause. Has the would-be buyer
been "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws"? Surely, the buyer is "injured" when the corporate officers
refuse to deal with him for the reason that he will not join their conspiracy
in restraint of trade, irrespective of whether the consummated sales to others
injure him. But is the injury "by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws" ? If intracorporate conspiracy can violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act, then the statutory requirement is met. This theory of injury differs sig-
nificantly from the section 3 theory previously advanced in that here the aggre-
gate of consummated sales contracts in restraint of trade has been introduced
not as the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury itself, but rather only as evidence
of the basic illegality of the corporation's scheme. That is, the coverage of
the market by defendant's contracts shows their actual or potential anticom-
petitive effect, i.e., that they are "forbidden by the antitrust laws" as section 4
requires. By shifting the legal locus of the consummated sales from "by reason
of" to "forbidden by the antitrust laws," the proximate cause problem the
Nelson court saw for section 3 is avoided.
The theory of conspiracy between the agents of a corporation has been at-
tacked by the Report of the Attorney General's Comvdttee. Approving the
Nelsown majority's rejection of intracorporate conspiracy, and disapproving two
earlier circuit court opinions which found such conspiracies, the Report states
that banning the intracorporate "conspiracy" would lead to the unwholesome
401. See WILlAss, CRIMINAL LAw 683 (1953).
402. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
403. See People v. Miller, 2 Cal. 2d 527, 531,42 P.2d 303, 310 (1935); People v. Rizzo,
246 N.Y. 334, 337, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (1927), the two leading cases on criminal attempts.
404. For what this is worth in a damages case, it would appear that there is also a
violation of the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952).
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result that "many activities of any business could be interdicted were joint action
solely by the agents of a single corporation acting on its behalf itself held to con-
stitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade. '40 r But this argument proves too
much; intracorporate conspiracy between corporate agents is hardly a stranger
phenomenon than the well-recognized conspiracy between a parent corporation
and a wholly owned subsidiary.40 6 The real question is whether the accused
business activities ought to be interdicted, because they restrain trade. Would
public policy be better served by striking down the "single person" fiction as
applied to that unique legal person, the corporation? It is the belief of the
authors that the narrow reading of conspiracy under section 1 is undesirable
insofar as it insulates from antitrust sanctions activity which inhibits com-
petition.
But the authors suggest that outside the refusal to deal area the doctrine
should be applied with the utmost caution. Certainly, it should not be applied
to per se situations; otherwise, to give one illustration, every corporate re-
fusal to deal would constitute a "boycott," illegal per se.407 Furthermore, even
beyond the per se area, is the doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy not
"limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy," 408 traditionally asso-
dated with section 2 of the Sherman Act? Perhaps the unreasonable restraint
standard of section 1, bolstered by intracorporate conspiracy, would usurp
the province of the narrower section 2 in dealing with a single powerful
firm. A doctrine, once it has come into life, tends to disregard its ancestry
and to "declare . . . [itself] absolute to its logical extreme." 400 The possible
conflict between the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and section 2 should
be faced squarely and openly.
405. ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 31 (1955). In addition to the cases
cited, ibid., see Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 606 & n.1 (1951)
(dissent), where the Attorney General stipulated away interagent intracorporate conspir-
acy; Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) (Rives, J., dissenting: "[In the Tinken case] Govern-
ment counsel, I think, conceded too much.") ; cf. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953) (possible disapproval of interagent intracorporate con-
spiracy doctrine?).
406. The Report, at 34-35, does not, however, object to the use of § 1 against parent
and subsidiary corporations which restrain the trade of others. Perhaps, in this view, had
Motorola and a subsidiary, say "Motorola Sales Corporation," conspired to secure Nelson's
adherence to the system, there would be a violation. See United States v. General Motors
Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941) (GM-GMAC).
(The Report, at 35, regards GMAC as "more a case of contract than conspiracy.")
407. Compare United States v. New York Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 82-
83 (7th Cir. 1949). By the same token, whenever a corporation set the price of its product,
it would be guilty of "price-fixing."
408. See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes,
J.).
409. See ibid. But "the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic
may be counteracted by the tendency to confine it within limits of its history." CAIWDozo,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 51 (1921).
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Such jurisprudential considerations may help to explain the Nelson court's
rejection of intracorporate conspiracy. For these reasons, courts which see a
need to accord antitrust relief to the dealer in Nelson's position may prefer
the hub-and-spokes or section 3 approach. Although the former theories re-
quire more "fancy doctrinal footwork" than the straightforward intracorporate
approach, they pose less possibility of unexpected results elsewhere in the law,
and thus are in the pragmatic, "interstitial legislation" tradition of the common
law.
To sum up, the wording of the antitrust statute does not necessarily prevent
a court from allowing recovery to a dealer injured by an anticompetitive ex-
clusive-dealing system policed by a refusal to deal. But it must constantly
be kept in mind that the authors, in advancing this criticism of the Nelson
formula, do not intend to abandon the injury to competition standard. They
agree with the existing case law: individual refusals to deal are not actionable
so long as the consuming public is not injured, even if the cancelled dealer is
injured. No injury to the general public is present when close substitute
products or sources are readily available.410
But a dealer's suit should not be dismissed on the pleadings. He should
be able to introduce evidence as to lessening of competition. To be sure,
there is always the danger that the manufacturer who refuses to deal for
legitimate reasons will be subjected to harassment by strike suits, but this
inconvenience is not too high a price to pay for vindication of the antitrust
law by private action-the underlying policy of section 4.
The Klor's Case
At one time, courts regularly dismissed complaints for failure to plead
public injury, which was considered an essential part of the section 4 cause
of action.41 ' More recently, the problem has been treated in more sophisticated
terms: public injury has been abandoned as a pleading requirement under
section 4, a statute whose literal text has no such requirement. The present
410. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420
(D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 904-05
(D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 239 F2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956).
411. See, e.g., Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195
F2d 86, 89 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952) ; Fedderson Motors, Inc. v. Ward,
180 F2d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F.
Supp. 899, 903 (D. Md.), aff'd, 239 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B.
Spreckels Co., 26 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1939) ; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.,
26 F. Supp. 824, 825 (D. Md. 1937). The term "public injury," as used hereinafter, is
synonymous with "injury to competition."
Although the foregoing have been considered pleading cases, they contain a hard nub
of substantive law. "... [S]ubstantive law has ... the look of being gradually secreted in
the interstices of procedure... ." 'MAINF, EARLy LAw AND Cusrom 389 (1836). The au-
thority of these cases, as pleading decisions under the liberal Federal Rules, has been shaken
by Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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position is that the public injury requirement is inherent in the substantive
antitrust laws themselves; absent a per se violation, no unlawful restraint of
trade can be found unless there is a "restraint injurious to the public." 412
The recent case of Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.418 strikingly
illustrates the problems inherent in this position.
Plaintiff Klor's was a retail dealer in home appliances in the Mission District
of San Francisco; defendant Broadway-Hale is a chain of department stores
in California, one of whose outlets is close to the Klor's site.414 A quarrel
arose between the two, the cause of which was not disclosed in the plead-
ings.41 5 As a result, Hale informed its suppliers that if they continued to
sell to Klor's, Hale would cease carrying their goods. When the suppliers
cut K1or's off, Ilor's sued them and Hale for treble damages under sections
1 and 2.416
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that no possible
anticompetitive effect could have resulted from the acts alleged. In support of
the motion, defendants introduced listings of the San Francisco retailers carrying
the defendant-manufacturers' products, and fifteen pages of the telephone direc-
tory, listing hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of dealers in San Francisco selling
home appliances. 417 Plaintiff introduced no counter-affidavits and chose to rely
on his complaint. The district court granted summary judgment in a terse
opinion denying that any possibility of anticompetitive effect existed.
412. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214, 221, 231, 233-35 (9th
Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
413. Ibid.
414. 255 F2d at 219.
415. According to the district court, "it is purely a private quarrel .... arising out of
some undisclosed cause-the nature of which we may suspect, but do not know." 1956
Trade Cas. 72048 (N.D. Cal.). It has been suggested that Klor's was a price-cutter. Note,
68 YALE L.J. 949, 956 & n.45 (1959) ; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp.
9-10. However, on oral argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for defendant denied
that there was any attempt to eliminate a price-cutter from the market: ". . . [W]e raised
this point immediately in the district court and the plaintiff never attempted to show a
price cutting case .... It was never argued by my opponent in the district court or in the
court of appeals that this is a price-fixing case." 27 U.S.L. WEEx 3241 (1959).
416. The complaint originally contained other counts, but the pretrial order limited
the proceedings to the Sherman Act charges. 255 F.2d at 220 & n.16. In his complaint,
plaintiff alleged that "the defendants, all well knowing the facts herein alleged, have re-
strained trade ... by contracting, combining, conspiring together, and each with the other,
in restraint and monopoly of trade .. " Id. at 219 n.13. Plaintiff further alleged that Hale
had "used its monopolistic buying power to deny to plaintiff its competitive position ill the
[market] ... [and had] purchased . . . the products of the manufacturer-distributor de-
fendants upon the condition that [they] ... do not sell their products to plaintiff." Ibid.
417. These dealers sold not only the appliances produced by defendants, but those of
their competitors-approximately 90 in number. See 255 F.2d at 223. About 1000 of these
outlets carried the goods of the manufacturer defendants. The 15 pages of listings show
alternative sources of supply available to the public. The number of competitors of the
manufacturer defendants suggests that Klor's may also have had alternative sources of
supply.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying primarily on Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader41 8 and the Tinws-Picayune case:ao
There was no charge or proof that by any act of defendants the price,
quantity, or quality offered the public was affected, nor that there was
any intent or purpose to effect a change in, or an influence on, prices,
quantity, or quality, either directly or indirectly. It is not suggested that
either the object or effect of the alleged conspiracy was to create an
unreasonable restraint, illegal per se.
42 0
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower court decisions and
remanded the case to the district court for trial. Mr. Justice Black, writing
for eight members of the Court, declared that the complaint adequately
pleaded a group boycott, illegal per se under section 1.' According to the
opinion, no public injury need be proved, given a per se violation.4 2 Mr.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion sought to decide the case solely on the
basis that a cause of action had been pleaded and that the "respondents' affi-
davits are not necessarily sufficient to constitute a defense irrespective of
what the petitioner may be able to prove at trial."42
A Procedural Solution. The Court could have handled Klor's in several
ways. Mr. Justice Harlan's route probably offers the fewest problems. Given
our liberal pleading system,1 4 the Klor's complaint appears to state a cause
of action under the antitrust laws. Defendants' fifteen pages of directory
listings do not establish, "beyond the slightest doubt,"" that no anticompeti-
five effect could occur which would bring defendants' behavior within the ban
of the rule of reason. It does not inevitably follow from the large number
of dealers that disciplining one dealer is without effect on market behavior.
On trial, Klor's might prove to have been a price-cutter or have otherwise
been "unduly competitive." The bouyant effect on price levels of the elimina-
tion of the small price cutter who can act as a price leader is well knovn.Yl
Moreover, the elimination of an "unduly competitive" retailer may serve as a
threat to other retailers; it may inhibit the vigor of price and service com-
petition, casting a cloud over the whole competitive market. 7 Thus, the
motion for summary judgment could have been denied on procedural grounds.
418. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
419. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
420. 255 F2d at 230.
421. 359 U.S. at 212. Justice Black also appears to suggest that monopolization or con-
spiracy to-monopolize has been pleaded. Id. at 209, 213.
422. Compare 255 F.2d at 221.
423. 359 U.S. at211.
424. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
425. See Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.
1945).
426. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); BoUtDIiNG,
EcoN o Ic ANALYsis 644-45 (3d ed. 1955).
427. Note, 68 YALE L.J. 949, 956, 960 (1959). Nor does it follow from the large
number of alternative sources of supply which are potentially available to the plaintiff, that
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The Per Se Solution. But the Court rejected this route; instead, it chose
to reverse on grounds of substantive law. The court declared that a per se
violation of section 1-a group boycott-had been pleaded. The question of
actual or probable anticompetitive effect becomes irrelevant in such cases.
"As to these classes of restraints . . . Congress had determined its own
criteria of public harm and it [is] not for the courts to decide whether in
an individual case injury had actually occurred." 8 Thus, the conclusive per
se rule presumption of intent, or incipient tendency, to restrain trade elimi-
nates any necessity to show, additionally, actual or probable public injury.4" ,
The Court's reversal and remand to the district court does not settle the
substantive issues in Klor's.430 Plaintiff must still show the existence of the
boycott that the Supreme Court held that he had pleaded.431 The Court de-
clared boycotts illegal per se, but it did not delimit the scope of the category
for the lower court. It merely stated: "Group boycotts, or concerted refusals
by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the
forbidden category. '432 If plaintiff could show that the manufacturer and
distributor defendants actually agreed with one another to refuse to deal
with him, he would have no problem. But it is most unlikely that this did
occur or that it could be proved. Probably the most that plaintiff could ever
establish would be that Hale approached each supplier separately and per-
suaded him to agree to stop selling to Klor's. Thus, there would be about
eighteen agreements between Hale and a supplier that the latter refuse to
deal with Klor's. Can these eighteen 433 agreements be aggregated together
to form one boycott, (1) if each of the eighteen suppliers does not know
that the others have been approached, or even (2) if the eighteen are aware
his elimination, and the consequent setting of a disciplinary example, is unlikely. We do
not know whether these potential sources are indeed willing to deal with him or whether
the loss of the cancelled lines will prevent him from competing effectively. Cf. text at notes
213-14 supra.
428. 359 U.S. at 211. Here the Court is paraphrasing the holding of Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1911).
429. The Court takes the position that the violation alleged in the per se suit need not
be shown to be detrimental to the public interest: "In this regard the Sherman Act should
be contrasted with § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(b), which requires that the Commission find 'that a proceeding by it . . .
be to the interest of the public' before it issues a complaint for unfair competition." 359
U.S. at 211-12 n.4. Compare 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3240-41 (1959) (Frankfurter-Lasky
colloquy).
430. Hale's counsel denies the "untrue allegation" of a conspiracy. Letter From Moses
Lasky, Esq., to Friedrich Kessler, May 1, 1959.
431. Compare text at note 420 supra. As for the conspiracy-to-monopolize issue, it
seems utterly improbable that Klor's could show Hale intended to monopolize the San
Francisco or even Mission District home appliance market. For this reason, no further
discussion of the legal problems involved in such a count is offered.
432. 359 U.S. at 212.
433. Actually, only ten agreements would be needed, since eight defendants are dis-
tributors for manufacturer defendants.
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of the other agreements? Boycott, in the past, has proved an elusive and
elastic concept.43 But it is doubtful that its scope can include such behavior.436
Per Se or Not Per Se. Klor's represents the latest phase in the dialectic
of per se.436 Dicta in earlier cases had indicated that the dc miimis effect of a
per se unreasonable restraint would not exonerate it. Particularly emphatic
on this point is the celebrated footnote 59 of Unitcd States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co.:
[C]onspiracies under the Sherman Act are not dependent on any
overt act other than the act of conspiring.. .. It is the "contract, com-
bination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of commerce" which § 1 of the
434. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951);
United States v. New York Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 82, 83 (7th Cir. 1949).
435. Compare Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 541 (1954), with Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953), on the conscious parallelism problem. See generally ATr'Y
GEN. NAT'L Coa-m. ANMrrusT REP. 36-42 (1955). For the problem of whether each of
the eighteen vertical agreements between Hale and a supplier is itself a "boycott" or merely
an "induced unilateral refusal to deal," see Schwing Motor Co. Y. Hudson Sales Corp.,
138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per cmriam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 823 (1957); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NVebster Motor Car Co., 243 F2d 418
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). The Court's reference in Kor's to "con-
certed refusals by traders" (emphasis added), see text at note 432 mipra, seems to indicate
accord with Sclwing and Packard. However, for an approach aggregating these many
agreements to refuse to deal, even if not concerted or consciously parallel on the part of
the suppliers, see Note, 68 YALE L.J. 949, 959 (1959) ("wedge," "pyramid").
436. In its original form, the per se doctrine was used in price-fixing cases to counter
the defense that the price level fixed was reasonable and that, therefore, the restraint
effected was not "unreasonable." See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1,927) ; Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) ; Rex v. Norris, 2 Keny. 300, 96 Eng.
Rep. 1189 (ICB. 1758) (common law rule). The doctrine has been expanded to include
allocation of territories, group boycotts, and finally tie-ins. Moreover, the function of the
doctrine has altered in the course of its evolution. This is illustrated by the language of
Justice Black in the Northern Pacific opinion:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se un-
reasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an
effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-
an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
356 U.S. at 5. This analysis blends two functions of the per se rule: first, on the theory
that, since the inevitable future consequence of certain practices is an anticompetitive effect
on the market, those who adopt these practices must be conclusively presumed to have
intended such consequences, constructive intent is substituted for the actual intent test of
the rule of reason. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911). Second, diffi-
cult and expensive economic analysis for which courts may be "most ill-suited" is obviated
by recourse to a per se rule.
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Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity be wholly nascent or
abortive on the one hand or successful on the other .... [A] conspiracy
to fix prices violates § 1 of the Act although no overt act is shown,
though it is not established that the conspirators had the means available
for accomplishment of their objective . .. .48
Yet courts have frequently regarded it desirable to avoid a rigid application
of the per se rule against practices they regarded as "necessary and legitimate" 408
from a business standpoint. 4 9 In such cases, the courts have simply denied
that the practices in question belonged in a forbidden category, and have
instead chosen to analyze them in terms of the more general Sherman Act
prohibitions under the rule of reason. As a result, the border lines of the
per se categories have been blurred and their territories pockmarked with
enclaves. Predictability in this area has thus been jeopardized. 440
By apparently introducing a de minimis exception for at least one per se
offense, tie-ins, Northern Pacific revealed another method to mitigate the
rigors of per se. But in so doing, it may have undermined the whole per se
doctrine by opening the door to a general de minimis qualification. Judge
Barnes, in the Ninth Circuit Klor's opinion, appears to have understood
Northern Pacific to support a general antitrust requirement of adverse effect
on competition. 441 But the Supreme Court's reversal of Kor's seems to
mark a return to the rule of Socony-Vacuum.4 4
437. 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (dictum) ; accord, Nash v. United States, 229 U.S.
'373, 378 (1913). See also the dicta in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
522-23 (1948) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947) ; Albert Pick-
Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 1932). The early com-
mon law appears to be in accord with Socony-Vacuum iin.59. See Rex v. Starling, I Keb.
650, 83 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1663) (dictum).
438. Compare United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282 (6th Cir.
1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
439. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 1.18 F. Supp. 621 (SD.N.Y. 1953) (Query:
Would the decision have been different were SEC regulation absent? See id. at 698-99.) ;
Note, 63 YALE L.J. 399 (1954). Cases are cited in HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE
106 n.173 (1957) ; Packer, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1141, 1143 & n.13 (1958). See also
note 266 .rpra.
440. If anything can be said for a per se rule, it is that because it has a constructive
intent ingredient, it is a rough substitute for incipiency. Intent approximates incipiency to
the extent that both nip practices in the bud, which, if allowed to mature, would have an
anticompetitive effect. But a doctrine suffering so many vicissitudes and leading to so much
unpredictability may not be an efficient tool for approximating incipiency. The economy
and predictability Mr. Justice Black sees in per se, see note 436 supra, may prove illusory.
441. 255 F.2d at 230 n.41a; see Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 13 RECORD
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 417, 425-27 (1958).
442. The opinion may, however, reveal some reservation on this point by the Court.
At the close of his opinion, Mr. Justice Black discusses the "monopolistic tendency" of
Hale's practices:
As such it is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant
whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.
Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one at
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An Injury to Competitors Solution. The Court could have used still an-
other route to reach its decision, one which the Justice Department seems to
have urged as amicus curiae."3 Hale's practices could have been condemned,
not as per se illegal, but as illegal under the rule of reason, by replacing the
rule's public injury test by an injury to competitors test. While the Court
declined to adopt this solution there is language in Justice Black's opinion
suggesting a willingness, at least on his part, to accept it in a case where the
question cannot be avoided by recourse to a per se test. 444 Whether section
a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups. In recognition of this fact
the Sherman Act has consistently been read to forbid all contracts and combinations
"which 'tend to create a monopoly,'" whether "the tendency is a creeping one" or
"one that proceeds at full gallop."
359 U.S. at 213-14.
The emphasis on monopoly power here is somewhat reminiscent of the "sufficient economic
power... to appreciably restrain free competition" language in Northern Pacific. To the
extent that this is an alternative explanation for the decision, thrown in by the Court to
buttress the holding, Klor's may not represent a complete swing away from Northern
Pacific back to Socony-Vactuin. On the other hand, this language may be interpreted
simply to explain the policy of the position that boycotts are illegal per se however in-
significant the victim.
443. See Brief for the Government on Petition for Certiorari, pp. 3-6 (argued under
rule of reason, not per se); Main Brief for Government, pp. 3 (question presented), 7-11
(not per se), 11-13 (Apex).
444. The court below relied heavily on Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, in
reaching its conclusion. While some language in that case can be read as supporting
the position that no restraint on trade is prohibited by § 1 of the Sherman Act unless
it has or is intended to have an effect on market prices, such statements must be con-
sidered in. the light of the fact that the defendant in that case was a labor union. The
Court in Apex recognized that the Act is aimed primarily at combinations having
commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations,
like labor unions, which normally have other objectives. See United States v. Hut-
cheson, 312 U.S. 219; Allen. Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brothcrhood of
Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797. Moreover, cases mbsequcnt to Apex have made
clear that an effect on prices is not essential to a Shcrinan Act ziolation. See, e.g.,
Fashion Originators" Guild v. Federal Trade Conm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 466.
359 U.S. 213 n.7. (Emphasis added.) See also the Frankfurter-Lasky colloquy at oral
argument, 27 U.S.L. NV\TEK 3241 (1959). The Justice Department's amicus curiae main brief
strongly urges that Apex be treated as merely a labor case. Pp. 11-13; see Brief for the
United States on Petition for Certiorari, p. 4 n.3.
While Apex was a labor case, Mr. Justice Stone did not regard his decision to state a
rule applicable only in the labor context:
Apart from the Clayton Act [§§ 6, 20] it [the Sherman Act] makes no distinc-
tion between labor and non-labor cases. We only hold now, as we have previously
held both on labor and non-labor cases, that such restraints are not within the Sher-
man Act.... Unless the principle of these cases is now to be discarded, an impartial
application of the Sherman Act to the activities of labor and industry alike would
seem to require that the Act be held inapplicable...
310 U.S. at 512. Nevertheless, in its historical perspective, the result in Apex was an
important preliminary step toward removing labor cases from antitrust jurisdiction. Its
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1 is to utilize only an injury to competition standard, or is to include injury
to competitors as well is not answered by the Klor's decision. 445 In the guise
of a per se rule, however, "injury to competitors" may have entered by the
back door.
The Policy of Section 4: Antitrust as Tort
The notion of injury to competitors has played an important role in early
antitrust cases and in the legislative history of the Sherman Act.440 It was
only gradually that injury to competition evolved as the dominant theme.
But the opposing theme has, as we have seen, not disappeared. For the FTC,
injury to competitors has long been a principal standard of judging the
halfway solution to the problem was abandoned the following year in the Hutcheso?; case,
supra, which completely ousted antitrust from "labor disputes." (Allen Bradley, supra,
then helped define the scope of "labor disputes.") Moreover, other antitrust decisions deal-
ing with labor have been distinguished away by the Court. See, e.g., United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1945) (local commerce, interstate com-
merce, interpreted differently in labor, business settings) (Black, J.). But see id. at 298
(follows Apex). Thus, were Apex the sole authority for the public injury rule, its strength
as a precedent might be weak. However, the public injury rule of Apex is followed in the
leading Supreme Court § 1 rule-of-reason cases. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v. Columbia6Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495
(1948). Moreover, the courts of appeals have uniformly applied this test in the cancelled-
dealer antitrust suits. See Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by
Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1166-67 & nn.204, 207, 212 (1957) (collecting cases). The
Fashion Originator's Gild case, cited by Mr. Justice Black for the proposition that price
effect "is not essential to a Sherman Act violation" merely, as the authors read it, enun-
ciates the incipiency doctrine under the FTC Act. See 312 U.S. at 466. But cf. id. at 467
(quotation of injury to competitors dictum from very early Sherman Act price-fixing
case).
The lower court opinion in FOGA, 114 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1940), however, did con-
tain extremely strong injury-to-competitors language: "[T]he interest of the consumer is
not all that determines the 'reasonableness' of the contract 'in restraint of trade.' It is also
unlawful to exclude from the market any of those who supply it . . . and it is no excuse
for doing so that their exclusion will result in benefits to the consumer. .... "
445. Perhaps, the failure to reverse the Ninth Circuit by redefining the rule-of-reason
test reflects a compromise solution. Compare United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 173-74 (1948).
446. Mr. Justice Holmes claimed that the Sherman Act was passed not so much to pro-
tect competition as to protect traders from competition. "The court below argued as if main-
taining competition were the expressed object of the act. The act says nothing about com-
petition. I stick to the exact words used .... It was the ferocious extremes of competition
with others, not the cessation of competition among the partners that was the evil feared."
Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403-05 (1904) (dissent). See also
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-26 (1897). Whether or
not the common law cases supported the Holmes view, see Adelman, Book Review, 46
Am. EcoN. Rav. 481, 486 (1956), the majority of his colleagues on the Court did not agree
with him. The act which "says nothing about competition" is now generally considered to
have as its general objective "the promotion of competition in open markets." Arr'v GEuN.
NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 1 (1955).
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unfairness of methods of competition. 447 In at least one Justice Department
Sherman Act prosecution against a vertical integration system, the case was
based largely on this theory.4" s And, in its amicus curiae brief in Klor's, the
Department came out strongly in favor of injury to competitors as sufficient
for the existence of a Sherman Act violation, irrespective of the presence
or absence of injury to competition. 449
The chief objection to making injury to competitors an alternative stan-
dard of antitrust illegality is that the consequence may be to inhibit compe-
tition itself.45 0 This has already been recognized to be a serious problem
in the Robinson-Patman Act context.45 1 Allowing injury to competitors,
in itself, to be a criterion of antitrust illegality in the vertical integration
context would probably have an anticompetitive effect, since every vertical
integration arrangement injures those competitors excluded from the busi-
ness involved. 452 To deprive industry of the economies of integration in
order to prevent such injury would thus be to exalt protection of com-
petitors over competition. Under our free enterprise system, the premise
is "that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress . . . . "4 Is protection of com-
447. See text at notes 199-221 supra. Indeed, it required amendment of § 5 to allow
the Commission to proceed in cases where there was public injury but no injury to com-
petitors. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1931), which resulted in the
passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958), amending
the original FTC Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
448. United States v. New York Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949).
449. See note 443 supra. See also Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongcst Pillar of
Antitrust, 3 A=TnUSr BuLU 167, 175 (1958).
450. See BouLING, EoNOxmIC ANALYsIs 725-26 (3d ed. 1955). Boulding suggests that
if compensation is to be given to the competitor injured by competition, it should be charged
to society as a whole rather than an individual defendant and no attempt should be made
to freeze the economic structure. Ibid.
451. See ATr'Y GEN. NAr'L Comm. A TRUST REP. 160-70 (1955); Adelman, Inte-
gration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. Ray. 27, 53-57 (1949), Adelman, Effcctive Com-
petition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HAmv. L. Rav. 1289, 1334-37 (1948).
452. Indeed any contract restrains someone's trade because outsiders are excluded from
the business which is the subject of the contract. The problem is: Is the restraint unrea-
sonable? Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 231 U.S. 1, 63 (1911).
453. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (Black, J.). See also
ATr'Y GEL. NAT'L Commar. ANTrmrusT REP. 317 (1955) ; BOULDING, Op. cit. supra note 450,
at 607-08, 654-60. Compare STIGLER, Tn- THEORY OF Pice 213-14 (rev. ed. 1956). It would
appear that we may substitute for Mr. Justice Black's expression "greatest material prog-
ress," the utilitarian notion of greatest good of (or goods for) the greatest number. How-
ever, the passage quoted continues, ". . . while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even
were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the act is com-
petition." 356 U.S. at 4. Perhaps, the passage could be interpreted to endorse the benefits
of competition except when our democratic political and social institutions are threatened
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petitors worth the sacrifice of these benefits of competition to society? 454
A Compromise Solution? But an adherent of an injury to competitors
test might reply that this statement of the issue oversimplifies the differences
between two great principles. The injury to competitor principle, he will
admit, if carried to the extreme, will destroy competition.4"' But this does
by injuries suffered by competitors as a result of the vigor of competition. Compare the
Douglas dissent in Standard Stations, text at note 101 supra. However, it is more probable
that Mr. Justice Black merely intended to equate best allocation of resources and greatest
material progress with the environment most conducive to the preservation of our institu-
tions, or else that both effects inevitably flow from competition.
454. For a view that co-existence is possible, see Adelman, Integration and Antitrust
Policy, 63 HaRv. L. REV. 27, 77 (1949). Another possibility is that the two standards will
not coexist as separate alternatives, but that courts will require both types of injury to be
proved in all cases. This could hamper Government intervention in cases where competition
was inhibited, to the satisfaction of all competitors already in the market, but without in-jury to any of them. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
455. Moreover, extension of antitrust into a host of private commercial grievances
could result in so many different problems being dealt with by one body of law that general
principles would be obfuscated in a maze of case-by-case analysis. At the same time, we
may doubt the propriety of use of antitrust as a cumulative federal tort remedy for the
state-law tort of unfair competition.
Perhaps, the policy of the antitrust laws, as reflected in their wording, is sufficiently
foreign to tort policies as to make antitrust an inefficient means of regulation of unfair
business practices. If we are to have a federal law of unfair competition, Congress should
frame a comprehensive scheme for it. To some, Lanham Act §§ 43(a), 44(h)-(i), 60 Stat,
441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1.125(a), 1126(h)-(i) (1958), already embody a comprehensive
federal unfair competition law. Robert, Commentary on the Lanhiam Trade Mark Act, 15
U.S.C.A. 265, 285-86 (1948) ; RoBERT, THE NEv TRADE MARK MANUAL 177 (1947) ; seeRoss-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1953)(dictum) ; Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Stauffer v.
Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950) ; In re Lyndale Farm, 39 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 825, 186
F.2d 723 (1951). Contra, Royal Lace Paper Works, Inc. v. Pest-Guard Prods., Inc., 240
F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Artype, Inc. v. Szapulla, 228 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1956) ; L'aiglon
Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651-54 (3d Cir. 1954) ; American Auto.
Ass'n v. Spiegel, 205 F2d 771 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953) ; Ramirez &
Ferand Chile Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594, 603, aff'd per curiam, 245
F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957). See also Iowa Farmer's Union v. Farmers' Educ. & Co-op
Union, 247 F.2d 809, 819 (8th Cir. 1957). For policy considerations, see generally Mater-
nally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 545-46 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring
opinion) ; Hyde Park Clothes v. Hyde Park Fashions, 204 F.2d 223, 226 (dissent) (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953) ; Note, 60 HARv. L. REV. 1315 (1947); Chafee,
Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1298-1301. (1940).
Moreover, aside from the inefficiency engendered by utilizing antitrust as a means of
regulating unfair competition or unfair methods of competition, the propriety of so using
antitrust may also be questioned. With respect to labor torts, the Court has declared, "The
maintenance in our federal system of a proper distribution between state and national gov-
ernments of police authority and of remedies private and public for public wrongs is of far-
reaching importance. An intention to disturb the balance is not lightly to be imputed to
Congress." Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513. Until Congress declares its in-
tentions in this area, perhaps the wiser course would be federal inaction rather than action.Query: Should state tort law aimed at protection of competitors so evolve as itself to
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not mean that we have to place sole reliance on injury to competition. Both
standards can be so modified as to bring about this reconciliation: Injury
to competitors should be prevented unless the result is injury to competition.
Under this formula an injured competitor could recover unless it could
be shown that his recovery would destroy an integration system which is
beneficial to competition.
An Addyston Pipe Solution? Despite the superficial attractiveness of the
proposal, an evaluation of its consequences dictates its rejection, at least in
the crude form in which it has been phrased. Clearly, not every contract
or acquisition which restrains the trade of a competitor should be forbidden.
Unsuccessful rivals are always injured when they lose business. To require
a defendent to justify his integration arrangements, or business arrangements
in general, in terms of positively promoting competition would put an in-
tolerable restriction on freedom of contract and freedom of acquisition. The
problem is to define which contracts and acquisitions "unreasonably" injure
them. Is it possible to define a rule of reason which protects competitors
more fully than the rule of Apex, but which does not intolerably hamper
freedom of contract and acquisition? Perhaps such a standard already ex-
ists in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.A 0 where Judge (later
Chief Justice) Taft enunciated the common-law rule for unreasonable re-
straints of trade; contracts in restraint of trade are not lawful unless "an-
cillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect
the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract
.... ."457 This standard is akin to the now-disused formulation of the rule
of reason that restraints are reasonable if adopted for good business
reasons.4 58 The important difference is, however, that under the proposed
formulation, good business reasons are necessary for exoneration, rather
than sufficient.
Were the rule of Addyston Pipe revived, serious difficulties would exist
in adjusting a contract standard to ownership integration situations, but
such problems are not insurmountable. Even graver problems are raised
with respect to the substantive content of the terms "necessary" and "legiti-
mate fruits" and the risk of nonpersuasion in such cases. Certainly any
practice which is anticompetitive as well as anticompetitor is neither neces-
sary nor are the fruits it secures legitimate. However, once we leave the realm
result in injury to competition, would a burden on commerce exist? Is the field preempted
by the Sherman Act? Compare Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), uith Schwegman
Bros. v. Calvert Distilleries Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mer-
cury Records Corp., 221. F2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) (L. Hand, J., dissenting: "publication"
must be a federal question).
456. 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
457. 85 Fed. at 278-89.
458. See, e.g., FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1923) ; Pick Mfg. Co.
v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd, 299 U.S. 3 (1936) (alternative
holding); cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1920)
(wrongful purpose necessary for violation).
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of anticompetitive practices, it becomes extremely difficult to define what
is necessary or unnecessary. 459 Must this be done on a case-by-case basis,
4 10
or does the formula itself furnish "a sufficiently uniform standard" ?401 Prob-
ably, the difficulty of developing a workable, nonsubjective content for "neces-
sary" has contributed to the demise of the Addyston Pipe formula and its
replacement by the modern rule of reason. 40 2 A further difficulty lies in the
proper allocation of the burden of persuasion. Once plaintiff introduces evidence
of existence of a restrictive practice, need he also prove that the practice is
not "necessary"? Or should defendant have the burden of producing evidence
of "necessity," since he is in better control of the relevant facts ? 403 In many
cases this may be of critical importance because neither party can prove any-
thing,464 or because the cost of gathering evidence is prohibitive.
40 5 Such
doubts must temper a lingering affection for the rule of Addyston Pipe and,
it is submitted, dictate that the case continue to be more honored in the
citation than the observance.
The Standard Stations Solution. In the light of the difficulties in framing
an injury to competitors rule to supplement the injury to competition standard,
the authors submit that the only workable synthesis between the two tests
is that already achieved by the Supreme Court in Standard Stations. The
authors advocate that the rule of Standard Stations be carried over in its
entirety to section 4 cases. Under this rule, there would be a treble damages
cause of action by a competitor or dealer 460 against a vertically integrating
459. Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 ("ordinary and necessary") and the vicis-
situdes of its case law; Note, 68 YALE L.J. 528, 534 n.41 (1959) (trademarks may be al-
located among different products when the arrangement serves a "legitimate business pur-
pose," rather than an anticompetitive one).
460. See Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 743, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (C.P. 1831), fol-
lowed in John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 43 (6th Cir. 1907). Compare
note 295 supra (Jewkes-Bowman view).
461. 85 Fed. at 282; see Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wis. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch.
1711).
462. See HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 12 (1957) ("By freezing the law as it
stood in 1890, Taft would have deprived it of all capacity for growth. That is hardly the
construction to be given a law of constitutional dimension intended to safeguard our basic
economic liberties.").
463. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 641, 675 (1954), suggests that the burden on the party in
control of the evidence should be only to bring forward evidence rather than to persuade
the trier.
464. See id. at 686; cf. Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass. 188 (1821.) ; Stern, Buyer Indiffer-
ence and Secondary Meaning in Trademark and Unfair Competition Cases, 32 CONN. B.J.
388 n.26 (1958). For one solution of the dilemma, see Stone, Burden of Proof and te
Judicial Process, 60 L.Q. REV. 262, 278 (1944), where allocation of the burden is urged to
be dictated by probability of cnlpa, so that justice may prevail a majority of the time.
465. Compare the cost-justification problem in Robinson-Patman Act suits, see text
at notes 514-24 infra. If the burden is cast on defendant, may not the juridical risk in adopt-
ing integration create a potential clog on competition? See text at notes 450-54 supra.
466. Or supplier, for that matter, should a backward integration analogue to the Nel-
son case arise. Cf. Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), petition
for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 355 U.S. 865 (1957).
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firm if and only if the integration system does or may substantially lessen
competition in the relevant market by erecting barriers to entry. 0 7 In their
view, only when injury to competitors 4G$ rises to the level of injury or pro-
spective injury to competition itself should there be a cause of action under
the antitrust laws.
THE FUTURE OF PRIvATE ACTION AGAINST VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Section 4 has been generally unsuccessful as a complement to Government
prosecution in the exclusive dealing area. Probably the preferable route to
remedy this situation is via evolution of the case law. A judicial case-by-
case approach, hammering out a rule slowly, is likely to avoid the drastic and
unintended consequences which often attend a blanket prohibition. Moreover,
a judge-made rule is more easily altered to meet later needs than is a legislative
mandate. Hence, if further development of the existing case law could achieve
the desired ends, then it would be better not to tamper with the antitrust
laws. But serious obstacles to such developemnt exist, both within the ex-
isting case law and the statutes themselves. Moreover, the courts have had
ample opportunity to revise their interpretation of the statutes and have evi-
denced an unwillingness to do so. As a result, pressure for new legislation
has mounted. For example, the enactment of the Auto Dealer Day in Court
Act was a legislative response to the problems of automobile dealers whose
franchises had been cancelled. Suggestions have been made for the extension
of this legislation to other industries. Suggestions for more drastic legisla-
tion have also been made. In the subsection which follows, this legislation
will be discussed and an alternative statutory solution will be proposed.
The Auto Dealer Day in Court Act
Cancelled automobile dealers have been among the most vigorous and
least successful users of the antitrust laws. 40 9 After suffering defeat in the
courts, the dealers resorted to another tribunal:470 in 1956 they secured
passage of the Automobile Dealer Day in Court Act.471 The act, according to
its preamble, is to "supplement the antitrust laws . . . in order to balance
the power now heavily weighted in favor of automobile manufacturers," and
permits auto dealers to recover damages "sustained by reason of the failure
of automobile manufacturers to act in good faith in complying with the terms
of franchises or in terminating or not renewing franchises." The duty to act
in good faith is defined by the statute as the obligation of the parties to the
467. "Entry" here is to be understood as maintenance of or expansion of existing com-
petitive activity as well as introduction of new competition. Compare BAnn 5.
468. Or dealers or suppliers. See note 466 supra.
469. Kessler, Autowobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE
LJ. 1135, 1166 & n202.
470. See id. at 1.167-75.
471. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958).
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franchise "to act in a fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to
guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation or threats of
coercion or intimidation from the other party.P472
The Day in Court Act poses serious questions of interpretation. Two
phrases used in the statute are crucial-"good faith" and "coercion, intimida-
tion, or threats of coercion or intimidation." In order to determine what
standard of behavior the act imposes on the parties, the first question which
must be answered is whether the duty to act in good faith is limited to
abstention from coercive practices, or whether the duty has some wider scope.
In either case, the meaning of "coercion" merits careful exploration. And a
very basic problem inherent in the statute is whether the dealer is to be pro-
tected even at the expense of curtailing competition.
Good Faith. Section 1 (e) of the act defines "good faith" as the duty of
each party to the franchise to act in a fair and equitable manner toward the
other so as to guarantee him freedom from coercive practice. The words
"so as" may be read either as words of qualification, limiting the duty to act
in good faith only to abstention from coercion, or else as words of illustration,
exemplifying coercion as only one instance of bad faith. The statutory word-
ing is thus inconclusive in determining the scope of the duty.
The original version of the bill passed by the Senate imposed on the manu-
facturer, in the name of good faith, a duty to act in a fair, equitable, and
nonarbitrary manner toward the dealer in order to guarantee him freedom
from manufacturer coercion and preserve all the equities of the dealer
inherent in the franchise relationship. 473 The House changed the bill in
two ways: the phrase about preserving all the equities was deleted and the
duty to act in good faith was imposed upon the dealer as well as upon
the manufacturer. The two changes suggest two contradictory interpreta-
tions of the scope of good faith. Insofar as the House deleted the phrase
defining good faith in terms of preserving all the equities of the dealer, it
appears that it was found unnecessary to grant any protection further than
guaranteeing freedom from coercion. This would point to correctness of
reading "so as" as words of qualification. But imposition of the duty to
act in good faith upon the dealer suggests the contrary interpretation. It
hardly seems probable that Congress wished to protect automobile manu-
facturers from dealer coercion. 4 74 Yet, if the duty to act in good faith which
the act imposes on dealers is a duty limited to abstention from coercion,7 1
472. Section 1 (e), 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958). The constitutionality
of the act has been upheld in Jim Kelly, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., Automotive News, April
6, 1959, p. 1, col. 5 (E.D. Mich. March 26, 1959).
473. S. 3879, § l(e), 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
474. The preamble states that the purpose of the act is "to balance the power now
heavily weighted in favor of automobile manufacturers." The manufacturer can use lack
of good faith on the dealer's part only as a defense to dealer suits.
475. For the likelihood of the occurrence of dealer acts of coercion, see Note, 70 HARv.
L. REv. 1239, 1247-52 (1957); Comment, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 253, 259 (1957); Comment,
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then this unrealistic conclusion follows as the legislative purpose.470 "So as"
would then seem to be words of illustration. Thus it is necessary to probe
still further to ascertain the scope of "good faith" under the act; the changes
by Congress in the wording of the law do not help us.
Turning to the Haase Report, we find one passage which uses language
which strongly suggests that coercion is a necessary prerequisite for lack
of good faith. In discussing 1(e) the report states that the term "fair and
equitable manner" is qualified by the requirement of coercion and that "in
each case arising under this bill good faith must be determined in the
context of coercion or intimidation or threats .... ,17
Finally, we must consider the probability that, given a statute which
derogates from common law rights of freedom of contract, the courts are
likely to interpret the statute restrictively, despite its declared remedial pur-
pose. Hence, the weight of decision will probably incline toward restricting
the duty to act in good faith solely to the abstention from coercive practices.
Coercion. The crucial question, then, is: What is the meaning of "co-
ercion"? Minimally the term encompasses intimidation or predatory behavior.
Sending a dealer cars of the wrong color or in the wrong quantity, or threat-
ening to drive him out of business if he refuses to accede to manufacturer
9 STAx. L. Rev. 760, 770 (1957). The Harzard note, supra at 1248 n.72, gives an instance
of dealer "coercion" of a manufacturer, Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motur Car
Co., 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955) (dealer Zell threatened Packard that he would quit
unless Packard cancelled dealer Webster and made Zell the only franchised dealer in area;
Webster sues Packard under §§ 1-2 for acceding to Zell demand). The authors prefer the
position suggested by the appellate court in subsequently reversing the cited case. Packard
Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The court there
held that Webster had no treble damages cause of action against Packard because the can-
cellation was "reasonable." First, there was no adverse competitive effect because of the
effective competition by other makes and other dealers. Second, there would be an anti-
competitive effect were Packard not permitted to retain its largest dealer at the price of
cancelling a less important one. Since Packard's behavior %vas not an unlawful restraint
of competition, it would appear that Zell's was not, either. Thus, Zell did not "coerce"
Packard within the meaning of the act. (Query: Was this an allocation of territories gov-
erned by a per se rule? See note 504 infra. Klor's suggests that there is no de mnninit
escape hatch in per se cases. Klor's probably does represent an instance, outside the auto-
mobile field, of coercion of manufacturers by a powerful dealer.)
An interesting problem in statutory construction would have been raised if the fpcbster
case had arisen under the Day in Court Act, and if the assumption be made that Zell did
"coerce" Packard into action which would have an anticompetitive effect. Would Webster
now have a cause of action against Packard? Packard did not directly coerce Webster for
its own purposes. But Packard did act as the conduit for Zell's coercive behavior. Section
1 (e) does not specify whether the coercion must originate with defendant or may also
originate with another party. Perhaps, on an agency or conspiracy theory, Vebster might
succeed in holding Packard liable for acceding to Zell's coercive demand.
476. Another possibility is to give one meaning to "good faith" when considering the
dealer's duty and another when considering the manufacturer's, but this would seem un-
justified by the wording of § 1 (e).
477. H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1956).
1959]
HeinOnline -- 69 Yale L.J. 105 1959-1960
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
demands, are in all probability coercive acts under the statute. But is such
behavior the outer limit of "coercion" under the act"? 478
As in the case of "good faith," the wording of the statute itself is incon-
clusive; "coercion" is not expressly defined. The legislative history, however,
points to a broader meaning of "coercion," which would include disciplinary
cancellation. In discussing section 2(e), the House Report emphasizes that
"in each case arising under the bill good faith must be determined in the
context of coercion or intimidation or threats of coercion and intimidation."470
This indicates that practices can be "coercive" without being actually "intimi-
dating." The Report further states that:
The manufacturer's obligation to act in good faith [e.g., not cancel]
extends to all of his franchised dealers, including: dealers who sell auto-
mobiles to other dealers, franchised or not, for resale to the public; deal-
ers who sell outside of a "zone of influence" or "territory"; and dealers
who sell automobiles at less than the manufacturers' suggested resale
prices. Contract provisions restricting an automobile dealer from trans-
acting business with customers of his choice, or from selling outside a
specified territory could violate the antitrust laws. Any restriction on
a dealer's right to sue based on the fact that he is selling to another
dealer, franchised or not, for resale to the public or based on the fact
that he sells outside of a territory or sells at set rates would contravene
the congressional purposes underlying section 4 of this bill which pro-
vides that this measure shall not repeal, modify, or supersede, directly
or indirectly, any provision of the antitrust laws.480
478. It is the authors' position that the meaning of "coercion" is as follows: X coerces
Y means: (1) X offers Y the choice of doing X's bidding or else being subjected to some
sanction; and (2) X has the power to exercise the sanction against Y; but (3) for X to
exercise the sanction against Y is not lawful, or for Y to do as X bids would serve an un-
lawful end of X. "Lawful," as used here, refers to the laws of the United States other thaln
the Day in Court Act, including criminal, tort, and contract law. That threat to breach a
contract constitutes coercion ("economic duress") is amply supported by the authorities
which hold that extra compensation extracted to avoid a breach is unsupported by con-
sideration. See DAwsoN & HARVEY, CASES ON CONTRACTS AND CONTRACT RFMEDIES 743-50
(1959) (collecting authorities). Note: the second clause of (3) may be subsumed by the
first.
479. H.R. REP. No. 2850, supra note 477, at 9. (Emphasis added.) The Report con-
tinues:
The existence of coercion or intimidation depends upon the circumstances arising in
each particular case and may be inferred from a course of conduct. For example,
manufacturer pressure, direct or indirect, upon a dealer to accept automobiles, parts,
accessories, or supplies which the dealer does not need, want or feel the market is
able to absorb, may . . . constitute coercion or intimidation. Similarly coercion or
intimidation may be found where the manufacturer attempts to require the dealer
to handle exclusively, or sell a specified quota of parts, accessories, and tools made
or approved by the manufacturer.
If the evidence discloses normal sales recommendation or persuasion the manu-
facturer would not be liable. On the other hand, if the manufacturer goes beyond
normal sales recommendation or persuasion . . . his activities could give rise to a
cause of action under the bill. ..
Ibid.
480. Id. at 10.
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In the light of the foregoing, the emphasis on coercion becomes understand-
able. Among the chief targets, if not the chief targets of the act, are the in-
formal exclusive arrangements which do not appear in the franchise and which
are enforced by cancellation or nonrenewal, or threats of such action. Such
coercive practices already constituted violations of the antitrust laws when they
effected a substantial lessening of competition, an unreasonable restraint of
trade, or an unfair trade practice or method of competition, but they could
be attacked only by the Department of Justice or the FTC, and grave evi-
dentiary problems existed. The dealer injured by coercive cancellation or
nonrenewal was given no effective private cause of action under the customary
interpretation of section 4 of the Clayton Act. Under the new act, an auto
manufacturer who fails to renew a recalcitrant dealer can no longer find
refuge in the doctrine that, by refusing to deal, he is merely invoking his
inalienable right to trade with whom he pleases. Nor can the absence of a
consummated antitrust offense bar suit. In this respect the Dealer Act goes
indeed beyond the existing antitrust law, supplementing it as the preamble
asserts.4 8s
Impact of the Act on Competition. It might be argued that the act has
deliberately sacrificed a basic tenet of antitrust policy, the prevention of injury
to competition. Critics of the legislation may claim that Congress, in its
solicitude for the dealer, has granted him a local monopoly, and has built
up the countervailing power of the dealer against the manufacturer to such
an extent as to create more serious market problems than existed before.48s2
That this was the intention of Congress is not borne out by the legislative
history of the act. The House Report declares that the phrase in the Senate
bill which required the manufacturer to act so as to preserve all the equities
of the dealer inherent in the franchise relationship was deleted by the House
"to preclude any interpretation inconsistent with antitrust principles." 4s3 And
section 4 of the act, which states that the act is not intended to repeal the
antitrust laws, becomes even more meaningful in the light of the following
commentary in the Report: "The bill... does not prohibit the manufacturer
from terminating or refusing to renew the franchise of a dealer who is not
providing the manufacturer with adequate representation. Nor does the bill
curtail the manufacturer's right to cancel or not to renew an inefficient or
undesirable dealer's franchise.' '484 Other passages even more powerfully un-
derscore the antitrust orientation of the act. According to the Report, pro-
481. To the extent that intimidatory practices are outlawed, competitive effect vet non,
the act does not have solely antitrust policy purposes, but a tort aim as welL Thus, Congress
has to this extent established a new federal tort, outside the scope of the Clayton Act § 4
tort. However, it should be noted that the dealer receives only single damages under the
Day in Court Act rather than treble damages as under § 4. The Senate bill, supra note 473,
proposed double damages.
482. See note 486 intfra.
483. H.R Rr. No. 2850, supra note 477, at 8.
484. Id. at 9.
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tection will be accorded to a dealer engaged in cross-selling or bootlegging, and
it is emphatically stated that "the bill does not freeze present channels or
methods of automobile distribution" nor does it "afford the dealer the right
to be free from competition. ' 485 Thus, the legislative history shows that it
was not the intention of Congress to hinder competitive automobile retail
distribution.
Nevertheless, despite the assurance the House Report gives, in practice the
act may freeze present channels and methods of distribution and restrain
manufacturers from removing inefficient dealers. Once sued, unless the manu-
facturer can secure a verdict on the pleadings or a directed verdict, he must
run a grave juridicial risk. Hence, the act may function in terroram, and
while it may inhibit borderline coercive behavior, at the same time it could
inhibit manufacturers from eliminating inefficient elements in their distribu-
tion system.
To the extent that the latter occurs, inflexibility in automobile distribution
would be increased. Nevertheless, this result does not compel the conclusion
that the act goes too far. Any remedial legislation is bound to create new
juridical risks. The question of whether the act creates more problems than
it solves is one of fact which only experience can answer. The workability
of the law will depend on the ability of the judiciary to apply the statute in a
manner which accords the dealer a greater degree of independence without
destroying manufacturer and consumer interests in an efficient dealership
system.4
86
The interpretation the courts give to the term "coercion" in the act will
probably prove the key to the effect of the new law on the market. The
485. The bill does not freeze present channels or methods of automobile distribution
and would not prohibit a manufacturer from appointing an additional dealer in a
community provided that the establishment of the new dealer is not a device by the
manufacturer to coerce or intimidate an existing dealer. The committee emphasizes
that the bill does not afford the dealer the right to be free from competition from
additional franchise dealers. Appointment of added dealers in an area is a normal
competitive method, for securing better distribution and curtailment of this right
would be inconsistent with the antitrust objectives of this legislation. Under the bill,
a manufacturer does not guarantee the dealer profitable operation or freedom from
depletion of investment.
Id. at 9. Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F. Supp. 378 (D.
N.J. 1959), upheld the right of a manufacturer to cancel an inefficient dealer who neglected
his franchise and failed to maintain a suitable outlet for the product.
486. The act's opponents have argued . . . that the inevitable consequence of the act
will be "to encourage the parties to regard themselves as legal antagonists rather
than as participants in a [joint] business venture" and that the climate of coopera-
tion prevailing until the advent of the new legislation will be replaced by a "litigious
atmosphere." . . . [S]ome critics have even questioned whether the franchise system
of distribution-heretofore regarded as "the approach best suited to [the] type of
product and to the mutuality of interests existing between the manufacturer and
dealer"-should be retained.
Kessler, Auto Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135,
1177-78 (1957). (Footnotes omitted.)
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problem the courts face is adjusting the conflicting interests of the dealer,
manufacturer, and consuming public. If the term "coercion" is restricted to
the commission of criminal or tortious acts, then the situation will remain
essentially unchanged from that which existed under section 4 of the Clayton Act
prior to the adoption of the Day in Court Act. Neither the public 48 nor the
dealers will secure benefit from the act. On the other hand, if the elastic term
"coercion" is expanded to its widest possible sense, the automobile dealer fran-
chise system might be converted from one of contract integration to status
integration, by turning existing franchises into permanent relationships, to
the detriment of the public and manufacturer.488 Neither extreme is likely.
It is anticipated that courts will interpret "coercion" to include only the threat
of or commission of acts wrongful in themselves, plus acts not wrongful as
such, for example, threat of cancellation, yet which are part of an unlawful
scheme or plan-specifically, a plan of violation of the spirit of the antitrust
laws.
Given this interpretation of the act, not all dealers who desire legal redress
for cancellation will gain it. Indeed, many, if not most, of the cancelled dealer
antitrust suits would result, as before, in judgment for the defendent. 480
487. The public will not secure the benefits of increased competition (c.9., dual lines).
For the emergence of dual and multiple franchises, see Automotive News, Sept. 2, 1958,
p. 2, col. 1; id., Aug. 19, 1958, p. 58, col. 1; id., Aug. 26, 1958, p. 2, col. 1. The Justice De-
partinent has commented favorably on the practice. Address by Victor R. Hanson, [Former]
Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, to Meeting of NIADA,
Nov. 26, 1957. But will the practice survive the introduction of the Big Three's small cars?
For a discussion of the "threat" to franchised dealers by "supermarket" competition,
see 1 WmTNEY, ANTITRUST PoLIciEs 514-15 (1958).
488. The manufacturer will, in effect, be deprived of the flexbility of contract inte-
gration, see note 479 supra, and the public will not enjoy the increased competition between
manufacturers thus made possible.
489. Dealers will not, absent coercion, be protected against "arbitrary" refusals to re-
new. Therefore the manufacturer who waits out the expiration date of the franchise with-
out resorting to coercion can avoid the bite of the act, at least theoretically. This may occa-
sionally result in hardship to a terminated dealer. But the contrary position, taken in
Kessler, supra note 486, at 1183 (failure to renew must be in good faith), may lead to even
greater evils, as indicated in the text. Furthermore, even under the narrow interpretation
of the act taken here, the juridical risk placed on the manufacturer is formidable, particu-
larly since the line between the unlawful coercion and legitimate persuasion is very tenuous
indeed. That tension should not be further increased.
The one case to have been decided on the merits to date under the act has been a victory
for the manufacturer. Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F.
Supp. 378 (D.N.J. 1959). A cancelled dealer sought recovery for breach of contract, vio-
lation of the New York General Business Law and violation of the Day in Court Act. The
dealer had been operating under one year franchise agreements until 1958 when the defend-
ant refused to renew. The reasons given were insufficient sales, absenteeism, and lack of a
suitable place for display. After ruling out the first two causes of action, the court dealt
at length with the Day in Court Act. Finding that "the plain meaning of the Act indicates
that the restrictions which it imposes extend only to those dealings between parties wherein
coercion or intimidation or threats of the same are involved," id. at 332, it found that the
admitted facts did not indicate coercion, and it awarded summary judgment to the defend-
19591
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Hence, under this interpretation, -the dealer community may feel that the act
does not go far enough. Nevertheless, it is submitted that such a construction
will effectuate the purposes of the act in a manner most in accordance with
the intentions of Congress and the public interest. One can quarrel with the
proposition that the dealer should recover damages only if by so doing he
vindicates the public interest.40 0 But one should not quarrel with the propo-
sition that the dealer should not take damages if his suit will result in injury
to the public. Extending the scope of the term "coercion" beyond unlawful
acts and acts which will further an anticompetitive purpose may so hamper
the distribution of automobiles that the ultimate consumer will be injured,
and will be forced to foot the bill for preserving inefficient means of distribu-
tion. It is submitted that this is not a social cost which should be borne by
the car buyer.
Related legislation. A bill identical to the Auto Dealer Day in Court Act
has been proposed for gasoline distribution. 491 And the Senate Small Busi-
ness Committee has been considering extension of the Day in Court Act to
other industries which use the franchise system of retail distribution.402 Thus,
ants. Plaintiff had claimed that the act was violated in four ways: (1) Defendant with-
held automobiles ordered by plaintiff's son. The court held, however, that since the son
lacked authority under the contract to place orders the defendant was under no obligation
to supply the automobiles. (2) Defendant insisted that the 1957 agreement be signed in New
Jersey rather than in Staten Island where plaintiff's business was located. The court re-
garded this as a sound business practice. (3) The terms of the 1957 agreement relating to
defendant's obligations upon failure to renew were unfair. The court found, however, that
plaintiff signed the agreement voluntarily and was not coerced into so doing. (4) Defendant
failed to renew. The court found no coercion in the admitted facts and emphasized that a
manufacturer has a right to expect the dealer to maintain a suitable outlet for his products.
A number of other cancelled dealers have filed suits under the Act claiming one or
more of the following: insufficient deliveries; unfair and discriminatory distribution of
popular and unpopular models; insufficient advertising in the dealer's locality; larger dis-
counts given to competitors, and arbitrary cancellation. Among the cases which have been
filed are Jim Kelly, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., and McClaren Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.,
both in Michigan, Automotive News, Nov. 24, 1958, p. 2, col. 1; B. H. Dario Co. v. Gen-
eral Motors, in Rhode Island, Automotive News, March 2, 1959, p. 6, col. 2; Raleigh R.
Leach & Co. v. Ford Motor Co., in California, Automotive News, March 30, 1959, p. 8,
col. 1; Blenke Bros. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., and S. H. Arnolt, Inc. v. Renault,
both in Illinois, Automotive News, June 22, 1959, p. 45, col. 2.
490. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958),
reid, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
491. H.R. 425, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). This bill, like the automobile dealer act
after which it is patterned, restricts its coverage to written franchise contracts. While
automobile franchises are written, as a matter of business practice, franchises in other
industries are often informal and oral. See Hewitt, The Furor Over Dealer Franchises, 1
Bus. HORIZONS 80, 82 (1958).
492. S. Ra,. No. 1282, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1958). When exclusive dealing
is not anticompetitive, should "coerced" exclusivity be justified? The two senses
of "coercion" distinguished, note 478 supra, must be considered separately. The unlawful
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the Auto Dealer Day in Court Act may be the harbinger of extensive legis-
lative activity in the field of contract-integrated retail distribution. Because
of its potentiality for harm to the public and to industry, extension of the
Day in Court Act philosophy to other areas might better be postponed until
the actual effect of the act on the automobile industry becomes apparent 9
In this respect, future court decisions under the new act merit close attention.
Two measures closely related to the Auto Dealer Day in Court Act may
have a significant effect on the operation of the new law. The Automobile
Information Disclosure Act 494 ("Sticker Act"), and various bills to legalize
territorial security 495 appear to be directed at weakening section 4 of the Day
purpose aspect is irrelevant here, since we have stipulated no anticompetitive effect, and
the authors deny that any purpose other than restraining trade is unlawful in this context.
Hence, mere refusal to deal on nonexclusive terms ought not be considered "coercion" under
a Day in Court Act when they have no effect on entry. As for the other aspect
of coercion, the si et armis type of intimidatory behavior forbidden by the Day in Court
Act, it cannot be denied that such behavior is within the scope of Congress' regulatory
powers. But should Congress legislate in this area, rather than leave it to the states? Are
policy purposes served by such legislative interference with business activities? The authors
incline slightly more toward federal inaction than action in this area.
493. Particularly dubious is the basic countervailing power rationale of The Day in
Court Act. Countervailing power may work under the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952),
but it is essentially foreign to the philosophy of antitrust, which prefers to decrease power
at every point rather than to counterbalance it. That the consumer will benefit from the
rivalry between the countervailing powers is doubtful. See DDmUt & KAHN, FAR CoM-
PETiTION 238 (1954) ; Adams, Competition, Monopoly and Countervailing Power, 67 Q.J.
Ecow. 469, 475-77 (1953) ; Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Conditiors of
Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 Am. EcoN. REv. 15 (1954); Whitney,
Errors in the Concept of Countervailing Power, 26 J. Bus. 238 (1953). It is perhaps more
likely that the latter will join forces against the consumer; indeed, under a games theory
analysis, it is irrational to expect anything but a coalition. See McKisy, I.moucron To
THE THEORy OF GAMES ch. 15 (1952).
494. 72 Stat. 325, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1231-33 (1958).
495. The four bills presently pending are as follows:
S. 997, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), introduced by Senator Langer, R. N.D., allowing
a system of territory security enforced by penalties. Under this measure, a franchise con-
tract provision would be valid which required a dealer selling to a customer outside his
territory to make an "infringement payment" to the dealer whose territory was invaded.
This bill is not restricted to the automobile industry, but would extend to the distribution
and sale of all "complex mechanical equipment."
S. 2042, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), introduced by Senator Schoeppel, R. Kans., similar
to S. 997, but dealing exclusively with the automobile industry.
S. 2047, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), introduced by Senator Hruska, R. Neb., allowing
a system of territory security in the automobile industry enforced by bonus payments.
Under this measure, a franchise agreement provision would be valid which required "in-
centive payments" to be made by the manufacturer to the dealer each time he made a sale
to a customer from within his territory.
S. 2151, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) introduced by Senator Monroney, D. OkIa., similar
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in Court Act, which disclaims repeal or modification of the antitrust laws.
The Sticker Act, purportedly aimed at preventing dealers from misleading
customers as to the "list" price of cars and accessories, requires every new
car to bear a sticker listing suggested prices and listing the name and address
of the auto dealer to whom the car was originally consigned. Critics of the
act 496 have contended that its real purpose is suppression of "bootlegging"-
the practice of franchised dealers' selling overstocked cars to cut-rate, tin-
franchised auto dealers. 497 The latter assert that they will be deprived of
their source of supply because franchised dealers will fear manufacturer re-
taliation.498 Instances have already been reported where manufacturers took
to S. 2047, except that it refers to the bonus payment as an "additional discount, rebate
or allowance" rather than as an "incentive payment."
All four bills were referred to the Senate Subcommittee on Automobile Marketing Prac-
tices, and hearings commenced on June 22, 1959. Statements favorable to some form of
territory security were filed with the committee by representatives of General Motors, the
Department of Commerce, and the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA),
which had conducted a poll of its membership showing 59% of the 52% response favor-
ing some form of legislation permitting territory security. Hearings on, S. 997 et aL. Before
the Subcommittee on Automobile Marketing Practices of the Senate Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 55, 77, 99 (1959). Unfavorable state-
ments were filed by representatives of the National Independent Automobile Dealers Asso-
ciation (NIADA), the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, Studebaker-
Packard Motor Co., Chrysler Motor Co. and a group of North Carolina franchised dealers
who resigned from the NADA in protest over its position. Id. at 42, 123, 137, 171, 180, 189. The
Ford Motor Co. and American Motor Co. took a neutral position. Id. at 176, 180. Although
chances of passage are believed to be slight, the possibility has been noted that a compro-
mise bill might emerge from the hear.ings permitting manufacturers and dealers to agree
on territory security arrangements enforced by either bonus payments or penalties.
See Automotive News, June 1, 1959, p. 1, col. 3; id. June 15, 1959, p. 1, col. 1; id. June 22,
1959, p. 1, col. 5; id. June 29, 1959, p. 1, col. 4; id. July 6, 1959, p. 1, col. 2; id. Aug. 10,
1959, p. 1, col. 5.
496. The National Independent Automobile Dealers Association (NIADA), repre-
senting imported and used car dealers, has been critical of the act in so far as it requires
disclosure of the name and address of the dealer to whom the automobile was originally
sold. See id. Nov. 24, 1958, p. 1, cols. 2, 4; id. Feb. 2, 1959, p. 2, col. 1.
497. Former Antitrust Division Chief, Hansen, defines "bootlegging":
This is nothing more or less than the sale by a franchised dealer to another dealer
of new cars which he is unable or unwilling to sell at retail .... I can see no reason
why this form of competition is not entitled to its test in the market place ...
[P]roposed contractual provisions to be included in franchised dealer sales agree-
ments, to avoid antitrust attack, must not have either the purpose or effect of pre-
venting ... [this].
Speech to National Independent Automobile Dealers Ass'n, Nov. 26, 1957, p. 8. For a
description of the business operation of a successful "bootlegger," see Automotive News,
June 22, 1959, p. 1, col. 2.
498. See noie 496 supra. Since this act does not attempt to amend the antitrust laws,
it would appear that any manufacturer caught using information obtained from the man-
datory sticker in order to prevent dealers from selling to bootleggers would be in serious
antitrust difficulties. See note 500 infra and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the improved
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reprisals against bootlegging dealers who were traced by means of the stickers
the act requires. 49 9 Thus, this piece of legislation may function as a legislative
equivalent to antibootlegging clauses, which would probably be restraints on
alienation, unlawful under the rationale of Dr. Miles Mcdical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 00 and whose attempted enforcement by threat of nonre-
newal or cancellation would give rise to a dealer cause of action under the
Day in Court Act.
The territorial security bills propose to make it legal to insert in franchise
contracts prohibitions against the practice of "cross-selling," i.e., selling to
customers whose residence is in the territory allocated to another dealer.
Some bills allow penalty clauses 501 while others allow rebates or "incentive
payments.9 02 The Justice Department has long opposed manufacturer efforts
to include such restrictions in franchise contracts.50 3 Anti-cross-selling clauses
would seem to violate the section 1 Sherman Act per se rule against allocation
of territory.504 Thus, these two statutes appear to attempt to soften the
opportunity given for extra-legal policing of dealers is obvious. According to the National
Independent Automobile Dealers Association (NIADA), dealers have complained of
manufacturer pressure exerted on franchised dealers who sold new cars to independent
dealers. See Automotive News, Nov. 24, 1958, p. 1, col. 2.
499. The NIADA is presently conducting a poll to determine the impact of the Sticker
Act on the monopoly of 'ootlegged" cars. Id. May 11, 1959, p. 1, coL 5. Many franchised
dealers reportedly believe that the act has "practically wiped out bootlegging." Id. Feb.
9, 1959, p. 1, col. 2.
500. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
501. S. 997, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), introduced by Senator Langer, validates
franchise contracts which require "infringement payment" from the cross-selling dealer to
the dealer whose territory he invades. Significantly, the scope of the bill is not restricted
to the automotive industry; it attempts to prevent the cross-selling of all power-operated
machinery and appliances distributed under franchises. S. 2042, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959),
introduced by Senator Schoeppel, otherwise similar to S. 997, deals only with the auto-
mobile industry.
502. S. 2047, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959), introduced by Senator Hruska, validates
"incentive payments" to auto dealers on sales made within their territories. S. 2151, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1959), introduced by Senator Monroney, is similar to S. 2047, but uses
the term "discount, rebate or allowance" in place of "incentive payment."
503. Kessler, supra note 486, at 1158 n.147, 1161; see Letter From John R. Sheneman,
Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Senator Warren Magnuson, June 24, 1959, reprinted
in Hearings on S. 997 et al., supra note 495, at 189-90. Speech by Assistant Attorney
General Hansen, The Auto Dealer aid Free Enterprise, to NIADA, Nov. 26, 1957, pp. 7-8.
The view of the FTC is similar. See Letter From Robert T. Seacrest, Acting Chairman,
FTC, to Senator Warren Magnuson, June 15, 1959, reprinted in Hearings on S. 997 et al.,
supra note 495, at 187-88.
504. Compare Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.),
rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943) (vertical
allocation), uith Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S.'211 (1899) (horizontal allocation) ; Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Williams
Elec. Co-op., Inc., 263 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1959) (same), and Pennsylvania Water & Power
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vigor of the antitrust laws, in retail distribution, so that those who would
rather not compete may be relieved from the rigors of competition. The
Franchised Dealer Bill is particularly significant because its scope is not
restricted -to the automobile industry. It attempts to prevent the cross-selling
of all power-operated machinery and appliances distributed under franchises.
If such legislation were widely adopted, competition in the retail distribution
of merchandise affected might well suffer.
A Statutory Duty To Deal
A direct approach to the refusal to deal problem has been suggested by Dr.
Vernon Mund in a report prepared for the Senate Small Business Com-
mittee.50 5 Legislation is proposed "requiring producers of standard products
who hold themselves out as dealing with the public, and who control a sub-
stantial percentage of the output in their area of practical shipment, to sell
to all comers offering to meet the terms of sale." °00 This proposal is not
unlike a section of the original Clayton Bill which passed the House in 1914
but was deleted by the Senate Committee before passage of the act. The ex-
ised section imposed a duty upon owners and transporters of hydro-electric
energy, coal, oil, gas and other minerals to sell to all responsible persons. T
The Senate felt such a statute "would practically compel owners of the
products named to sell to anyone or else decline to do so at the peril of
incurring heavy penalties, [and] would project us into a field of legislation
at once untried, complicated, and dangerous." 08
The fears which led to elimination of the refusal to deal section might be
considered somewhat exaggerated, inasmuch as innkeepers, common carriers,
and public utilities are able to exist under such a regime without being
harassed by strike suits. Nevertheless the proposed legislation is quite drastic
and it may lead to undesirable and unexpected results.50 0 A blanket con-
demnation of refusals to deal, without limitation to those situations where there
is a monopoly 510 or where refusal to deal is used to accomplish an improper
Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec., Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 906 (1950) (same). See also Rifkind, Division of Territories, in How To COMPLY
WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 127 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954) ; ATr'Y GEN, NAT'L COMM.
ANTITRUST REP. 29 (1955).
505. SEN. Doc. No. 32, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
506. Id. at 92, 102. Dr. Mund also would like to have the franchise contract, like the
insurance contract, made by legislature and supervised and rewritten by FTC. Id. at 96,
103. A similar proposal may be found in the Ground Rules Bill, S. 3946, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1956). For a discussion of the Justice Department's criticism of the latter bill, see
Hearings on Automobile Marketing Practices Before a Subcolmnzittee of the Senate Con-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1489-98 (1956).
507. H.R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1914).
508. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
509. The FTC and Justice Department have expressed disapproval of this legislation.
See S. REP. No. 1282, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-63 (1958).
510. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 143 (1951) ; Eastman Kodak
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purpose-e.g., price fixing or coercion of exclusivity--covers too much ground.
It is perhaps difficult to imagine an innkeeper with a legitimate motive to
violate his duty to deal with "all comers offering to meet the terms of sale"
or with any "responsible person." But in the ordinary business context, one
can imagine many circumstances in which it is perfectly proper for a man to
refuse to deal with another without being called to an accounting before a
court or commission and being exposed to the attendant juridical risks. Thus,
other alternatives should be explored before resorting to so sweeping an
enactment. It is submitted that if any changes in the antitrust laws are to be
made, these changes should be limited to the most immediate problem-elimi-
nation of barriers to entry erected by exclusive dealing-whether exclusivity
is achieved by express agreement or by indirection."'
Amendments to the Clayton Act
Perhaps amendment of the Clayton Act can solve the problem. Section 3
could be amended to include offers and attempts to sell on exclusive dealing
conditions. This solution would not be satisfactory, however, because it
could be evaded by very careful behavior, just as coercion can be avoided
under the Auto Dealer Franchise Act by circumspection. Moreover, the same
proximate cause problem as presently exists under section 4 would survive
-the attempt or offer would not itself be the proximate cause of an injury.
A more effective solution would focus violation upon the refusal to deal 512
rather than the offer to deal on exclusive terms. Thus, Congress could
declare it "unlawful to refuse to deal with a person for the reason that he
deals or proposes to deal in the goods of a competitor of the prospective
seller where the effect of the practice may be to lessen competition sub-
stantially or tend to create a monopoly." Such a statutory change would
overcome the consummated sale and the proximate cause hurdles, but another
serious obstacle would still remain-the damages problem. The courts
should be free to award an injured plaintiff the value of the cancelled dealer-
ship. But would not expectation damages, if claimed, be considered too re-
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) ; Gamco, Inc. v. Providence
Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 877 (1952) ; United
States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, 63 F. Supp. 32 (C.D. Minn. 1945) ; cf. FTC v. Beech-
Nut Packaging Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1921) (resale price-fiXing). See generally Arr • GEN.
NAT'L Comm. ANrrausr REP. 132-37 (1955).
Territorial security is one of the chief targets in the suit against Volkswagen now being
litigated. See Complaint, United States v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., Civ. No. 1232-57,
D.NJ., Dec. 4, 1957, Tahoe REG. RsP. 45057, at 66334 (case 1368) (summary of complaint).
511. The only justification for a duty to deal is that refusal to deal may harm the
public. Therefore, there should be no duty to deal if competition will continue to flourish
because close substitute products are amply available to the consumer.
512. "Refusal to deal" is intended to include "cancellation" and "termination," under
the rule of Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
821 (1954).
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mote and speculative? The existing cases are divided as to whether "lost
profits" are recoverable in cancelled dealership actions. 18 This difficulty might
be remedied 'by adding to section 4 of the Clayton Act a provision that courts
include in damages -the value of reasonable expectation interests.5 14 Perhaps
the most economical procedure would be to amend section 4 as follows:
See. 4C. Any person injured because he refuses to accede to a proposed
agreement or understanding for exclusive dealing which would, if con-
summated, violate the antitrust laws, has a cause of action under § 4
of the Clayton Act. Injury may include damage to reasonable ex-
pectation interests.
This formulation attempts to overcome the unduly technical interpretation
of present section 4 of the Clayton Act. It seeks to bring private antitrust
law into harmony with public antitrust law. At the same time, established
business patterns and freedom of contract are restricted only to the extent
that they come in conflict with basic antitrust principles. The term "exclusive
dealing" is used in place of "sale," and no limitation as to "goods" is used, to
avoid the problems under present section 3 with respect to noncommodities
or purchases. The authors advance this proposed amendment to section 4
as the means most to be preferred for solution of the refusal to deal problem.
III. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND REGULATION OF PRICING
THE VULNERABILITY OF 'CONTRACT
In addition to the antitrust laws, the laws regulating pricing significantly
affect ownership and contract as vertical integration devices. The form of
integration adopted-contract or ownership-may vary considerably the im-
pact of such legislation on the integrated firms. For example, the principal
statute-section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act, which forbids price dis-
crimination 5 15-is applicable only to contractual relationships.
In part I, the economic advantages to seller and buyer under a contract
integration system were discussed. When each party keeps his savings to
himself, and does not attempt to share them with the other, there is no
Robinson-Patman problem. Should the seller, however, to make integration
worth the buyer's while, attempt to share his savings with the buyer in the
form of a price discount, there may be a violation of the act. 10
513. The cases are discussed in Kessler, supra note 486, at 1185-88.
514. For discussion of the appropriate measure of damages in these cases, see id. at
1187-89.
51S. Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), amending
Clayton Act § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). The text of this statute may be found in the APrEN-
DIX.
516. This might occur in a situation where integration offered far more benefit to the
seller than the buyer.
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The Robinson-Patnan Act
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act bans "price discrimination" with
respect to like commodities 517 by a seller between his buyers. The ban is not
imposed, however, when the price differential is cost-justified, reflects good
faith meeting of competition, reflects a change in "marketability" conditions,
or when there is no lessening of competition or injury to competitors.5 18 As
between vertical integration by contract and buying in the spot market these
qualifications seem to prefer contract integration. But the advantages turn out,
in large measure, to be nonexistent.
Defenses Under the Act
Cost Justification. Any defense based on cost justification is probably
doomed. The Report of the Attorney General's Committee, speaking of cost
justification in general, pointed out that "the cost defense has proved largely
illusory in practice."5 ,19 And in the language of the Supreme Court, "proof
517. There can be Robinson-Patman discrimination only when the seller sells to two
or more buyers. If the seller's entire output is sold to one buyer, no price differential can
exist Hence, the discussion which follows is directed only to the plural buyer situation.
Moreover, discriminatory purchasing is not within the scope of the Robinson-Patman Act;
like Clayton Act § 3, the Robinson-Patman Act is not directed against buying. 81 Coixo.
REc. 2340 (1937) (informal opinion of FTC). However, both the Sherman Act and § 5
of the FTC Act are applicable here. See ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. AN rrmusT Ran. 164
n.116, 201 n230 (1955) ; notes 276-77 supra. Thus, in MPAS, had respondent not obtained
output contracts but relied on contracts providing a higher payment conditioned on ex-
clusive dealing, it is doubtful that the outcome would have been different. To date there
is no case law on this point.
518. A defense based on lack of a substantial lessening of competition would probably
be unsuccessful, since the act is also applicable when competition with the buyer or seller
may be injured, destroyed or prevented. Thus, violation of the act is not dependent on a
showing of injury to competition; injury to competitors suffices. E. Edelman & Co. v. FTC,
239 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958) (individual competi-
tive situations rather than competition in general). Compare Atr'v GEN. NA-eL Com.
AxnTravus REP. 165 & n.120, 166 n.121 (1955). And injury to competitors follows almost
automatically from the existence of the differential. Rowe, Price Differentials and Product
Differentiation, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 18-21 (1956). The leading case on this point is Samuel
H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945). In that case the Second Circuit read
§ 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act to place the burden of proof of lack of injury on the
seller who sets two prices. See also FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) ; FTC
v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Note, 66 YALE I.J. 935 n2 (1957)
(collecting cases). The Attorney-General's Report takes a more sanguine but perhaps less
persuasive view of the case law. A7r'r GEn. NAr'L Cotm. A.rTITRUST REP. 161-63, 166
(1955) (dissent).
Note that both buyer and seller may be in violation of the act. Section 2(f) is directed
specifically at buyers. Moreover, there may be a § 1 Sherman Act or § 5 FTC Act vio-
lation. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948) ; Triangle Conduit & Cable Co.
v. FTC, 168 F2d 175, 180 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd per curiam by as; equally dh'dcd Court
sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949) ; see note 517 supra.
519. Arr'y GEN. NAfrL Comm. ANirrmusr Ran. 171 (1955) ; see Note, 68 YALE L.J.
808, 818 n.53 (1959).
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of a cost justification being what it is, too often no one can ascertain whether
a price is cost-justified." 520 These difficulties become even more formidable
when the cost defense is based on economies resulting from vertical integra-
tion by contract. 521 "Reliability of an adequate supply is not usually an ob-
jective fact or a calculable cost. '5 22 Even if existence of savings could be
established, the proper allocation of the joint costs involved for Robinson-
Patman Act purposes is extremely difficult.5 23 Finally, cost accounting is ex-
pensive. 524
Unlike Commodities. A defense might be based on a denial that the same
goods are sold to the nonintegrated buyer as are sold to the contract-integrated
buyer. Unless the goods sold at different prices to different buyers are of
like grade and quality, the statute is inapplicable. 25 This defense would point
to the economic realities of the term requirements contract situation: what
the contract-integrated buyer buys is not the same thing the spot market
buyer buys. The integrated buyer and seller may each acquire price hedges;
they secure stability of operations and shift or lessen other commercial risks.
The considerations exchanged are more complex than in the simple spot
sale. For -these reasons, it could be argued, the spot transaction and the
requirements contract transaction cannot reasonably be assimilated and be
considered to involve the same type of goods.
Nevertheless, however plausible the foregoing defense, and in the opinion
of the authors it is a meritorious one, it is unlikely that it will be success-
ful.526 The view may be taken that any cost justification situation also
involves a "like" commodity problem. Gasoline delivered to the dealer
is not the same commodity as gasoline picked up at the tank car, nor
520. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953).
521. See note 526 infra. But see Reid v. Harper & Bros., 235 F.2d 420 (2d Cir.), cecri.
denied, 352 U.S. 952 (1956).
522. Adelman, Integration and Antitruist Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27, 29 (1949).
523. HALE & HALE, MARXET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN Acr
227-29 (1958) ; see Adelman, supra note 522, at 30-31.
524. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L CoIIM. ANTITRUST REP. 172-74 (1955) ("only the most pros-
perous and patient business firm could afford pursuit of an often illusory defense") ; Aus-
tern, Tabula in Naufragio, in 1953 CCH ANTITRUST SYMPOSIUM 105, 115 (available only
to "the wealthy, the resourceful and the tireless") ; Fortas, AfOlrmative Legal Del cuses, in
How To CoMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 187, 196 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954). See
also Note, 68 YALE L.J. 808, 819 n.57 (1959) (collecting authorities).
525. Airr'Y GEN. NATL CofmH. ANTITRUST REP. 156 (1955).
526. This defense was raised in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936).
Goodyear sold Sears its "Allstate" tires requirements on a cost plus 6% basis, "Allstate"
being the private brand of Sears. This price was substantially lower than the price of
Goodyear brand tires to retailers. Goodyear unsuccessfully argued, inter alia, that the Sears
assured volume insured stability by leveling production (thereby securing to Goodyear re-
duced overhead) and eliminated raw material price fluctuation hazards and credit losses.
This, together with the absence of advertising expenses on ' Allstate" tires, allegedly made
the "Allstate" brand and Goodyear brand transactions two separate businesses in which
Goodyear was engaged. The FTC held that "the alleged hazards and other similar factors
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is nationally advertised brand aspirin the same commodity, marketwise,
as nonbrand aspirin. But neither court nor FTC is likely to hold that
a producer of these commodities may charge different prices for them, absent
cost justification of the price differential.r m  Hence it is probable that a
court will be impelled by similar reasoning to require that cost justification
actually be established in a contract integration case, rather than permit the
integration arrangement to escape the operation of the act completely via
the like quality requirement. And until section 2(a) is reinterpreted by tile
courts or revised by the legislature,rm such cost justification attempts will
prove practically hopeless a task. Furthermore, making substantially equiva-
lent contract integration and price discount arrangements available to all
customers will probably afford no defense to charges under the statute.52
Term Contract Prices
The preceding analysis has been directed to the situation where the seller
attempts to share with the buyer the benefits of the contract integration re-
lationship. Even in the absence of such attempts, some risk of Robinson-
... were too speculative, intangible and remote to justify, or to be reasonably related to,
the price discrimination' Id. at 286-87.
After lengthy litigation the order was vacated. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC,
101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939). The Court of Appeals appeared sympathetic to Goodyear's
claim of intangible benefits from the contract integration system. But the opinion does not
indicate that Goodyear need not cost justify its discounts; the reason for which the FTC
is reversed is the failure to weigh, sub nomine "quantity discount," the effect of the large
volume of sales to Sears on Goodyear's overhead. Id. at 62, 624-26. The Goodyear case had
been brought under Clayton Act § 2, which Congress amended in 1936 with the Robinson-
Patman Act in order to reach such discrimination more readily. A-rr" GEx. NAT'L CoMMs.
AlmRmusT REP. 159 (1955).
527. Id. at 157-59. A justifiable price differential might allow a reasonable return on
the investment in the advertising. The Report, at 159, suggests measuring this return by
the "spread" the public will pay for the branded article. See also Pure Oil Co., 3 TWz
REG. RE,. 1 27791. (FTC Feb. 20, 1959) ; Anheuser-Busch, Inc., TRADE REG. Rm. (1957-
1958 FTC Cas.) 1 26705 (1957), rev'd, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959).
528. See Arr'y GEN. NATL' Comm,. ANTITRUST REP. 174-76 (1955).
529. That requirements contract discounts are available to buyers who may not want
requirements contracts or for whom they are not feasible is Unlikely to excuse price dis-
crimination against such buyers. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1948)
(Robinson-Patman Act not evaded by providing discount arrangement theoretically open
to all but functionally available only to few). Moreover, in connection xith Clayton Act
§ 3, discussed in text at note 534 infra, the discount for exclusive dealing is the very "eil"
§ 3 is supposed to avert, making equal availability of the arrangements an aggravation
rather than palliation of the offense. See Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F2d 7-"
(8th Cir. 1940) ; United States v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 83 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ill. 1949) :
cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 239 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1956), aff'd sub noa. Federal
Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States,
96 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiuL by an equally di4ded Court Mb nome.
Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952). Compare Lipson v. Socony-Vacuum Corp.,
87 F.2d 265 (1st Cir.), cert. dimnissed per stipulation of counsel without consideration by
the Court, 301 U.S. 711 (1937).
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Patman Act violation remains. The price terms in a requirements contract
may provide for a fixed price over the term, a price formula based on
the spot market price, or a cost-plus-price formula.530 Each of these price
terms might be adjudged discriminatory, if it is used to give the buyer a non-
cost-justified advantage, so as to induce him to enter into the contract.6sl
Other Price Discrimination Laws
Two further pricing regulation statutes may raise problems for contract
vertical integration-section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act and section 3 of
the Clayton Act. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, a purely criminal
statute,532 prohibits (a) being a party to a sale which discriminates against
competitors of the buyer, when goods of like grade and quantity are involved,
(b) seller price discrimination aimed at destroying competition or eliminat-
ing a competitor, or (c) selling at an unreasonably low price to destroy
530. For a more elaborate catalogue of flexible price terms, see Horowitz, Robinson-
Patn an Act Aspects of Long-Term Contracts, 28 So. CAL. L. REV. 280, 281 (1953).
531. When a price rise is imminent, offering favored buyers the opportunity to make
futures purchases at current prices is a violation. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S.
726, 739-40 (1945) ; see Van Camp Sea Food Co., 46 F.T.C. 1087 (1949) (dismissed upon
discontinuance by respondent of acts complained against, inter alia, selling futures at prices
under current spot market prices to favored buyers). But when there is no attempt to favor
certain customers, and the opportunity to make futures purchases at the same price is open
to all, there is legislative history suggesting that no violation will occur. 1 TRADE Rmn. REv.
ff 3505.671; Hearings Before House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
10, at 24 (1935) :
There is a price discrimination at the time of delivery .... But the point is the
futures purchaser has committed himself at a different time, under different market
conditions; he has taken a different element of risk. There is nothing in the bill to
prevent freedom in buying and selling on a basis of the seasonal differential on
varieties .... The conditions affecting the two transactions would be the result of
market conditions which obviously would be different. But if a manufacturer said
to chain A, "I will give you a December future at $2 a case," and said to independ-
ent B at the same time, comparably, "You are going to have to pay $2.50 a case for
December futures," that would be a discrimination.
(Statement of Mr. Teegarden.) Nevertheless, the analogy between futures sales and a
term requirement contract is incomplete, and that the FTC and courts will refuse to believe
that risk of price fluctuations is an economic cost which must be paid for is quite possible.
Still another possible defense might be the changing market conditions proviso of § 2(a).
The defense might be that this proviso justifies the lower prices to the long-term buyers
or the raised prices to the spot buyers. See Horowitz, Robinson-Patman Act Aspects of
Long-Term Contracts, 28 So. CAL. L. REv. 280, 295 n.42 (1955). The validity of this de-
fense is most dubious. Ordinary market changes would hardly appear to be ejusdem generis
with the type of changes given in § 2(a) as examples within the proviso-imminent de-
terioration, seasonal obsolescence, distress sale by court order, and discontinuance of the
business. But see A-r'y GEN. NAT'L Com. ANTRmusT REP. 178-79 (1955).
532. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958); Arr'v GEaN. NAT'L
Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 199 (1955).
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competition or eliminate a competitor. This statute would not appear to
present serious difficulties to the contract integrator because the Justice De-
-artment has chosen not to enforce it.533 Moreover, its prohibitions are
probably inapplicable to the ordinary vertical integration by contract situa-
tion. The subsection (a) requirement of like quantity is unlikely to be satisfied
when an integration relationship is compared with a spot market buyer-seller
relationship. Furthermore, violation of subsections (b) and (c) requires that
the seller intend to destroy competition or eliminate a competitor, purposes
foreign to most vertical integration situations.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act includes a clause forbidding fixing a price
for goods or granting a discount or rebate on condition, agreement, or under-
standing that the buyer's requirements be bought from the seller, where there
may be substantial lessening of competition or tendency to create a monopoly.
Why Congress added this prohibition to its blanket condemnation of require-
ments contracts which may substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly is unclear.5 34 Perhaps what Congress intended w%,as to reach the
contract which does not bind the buyer to purchase his entire requirements
from the seller, but which offers him a lower price provided that he does.
That is, Congress was not attempting to pass an additional price discrimination
law, but was rather attempting to plug up a potential loophole in its exclusive
dealing law. This would account for the use of "discount" rather than "dis-
crimination" in the wording.535 It would seem, however, that under the
theory of the Richfield case,530 such a contract would constitute an under-
standing that the buyer not deal with competitors of the seller. In any case
it would appear that this clause of section 3 of the Clayton Act poses no
greater obstacle to vertical integration by contract than does the rest of
section 3. Finally, it is doubtful that the exculpatory provisions of Robinson-
Patman Act section 2-cost-justification, good-faith meeting of competition,
change in marketability-would be read into either section 3 by the courts.,"-
533. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., supra note 532, at 387-83 (dissenting
opinion); A'i"y GEN. NLx'L Coxm. ANTITRUST REP. 199 (1955). Moreover, there are
serious doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 200 (vagueness).
534. If the price regulation clause of § 3 is aimed merely at explicit requirement con-
tracts which specify a price for the goods sold or which grant a price concession, then it
adds nothing to the other clause of § 3. The price clause could have additional vertical in-
tegration implications if "substantially lessen competition" carries a different significance
in this context from its ordinary § 3 significance, but that courts will so interpret the law
is extremely doubtful in view of their assimilation, in the vertical integration context, of
§ 7 "substantially lessen competition" to § 3 "substantially lessen competition." See discus-
sion of du Pont case, supra at notes 297-307 for analysis of § 3-§ 7 coalescence.
535. Moreover, "discount" under § 3 is unlike "discrimination" under § 2(a) in that
no plurality of buyers would appear to be required. See note 517 upra.
536. See text at notes 166-71 supra.
537. See AT',y GEN. NAT'L Cocm. ANTausT REP. 199 (1955). But see id. at 200 &
n.229. In Horlicks Corp., 47 F.T.C. 169, 174-75 (1950), the Commission found a § 3 Clay-
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In summary, it appears that, with respect to pricing regulation, vertical
integration by contract is less advantageous than ownership integration. Price
discrimination laws pose hazards to even the bona fide contract integrator.
These hazards can be minimized, however, by the adoption of appropriate
price terms in the contract, for example, market price on delivery. In any
case, the requirements contract buyer would be well advised to settle for
the economic advantages of the integration relationship itself in the operation
of his business, rather than press for price concessions as well; by the same
token, the seller seeking to integrate buyers by contract should confine his
economic persuasion to pointing out the mutual benefits available to each
party in the operation of his own business.
OWNERSHIP INTEGRATION AS AN AVOIDANCE DEvicE
Ownership integration may prove to be of great value to the firm
deliberately seeking to evade the Robinson-Patman Act or price regulation.5A-
Because contract, whether in the spot market or under term agreements,
necessarily involves sales, it can be subject to this type of legislation. On the
other hand, whenever the comparative technological advantages of contract
as against ownership, or even of integration over nonintegration, are relatively
unimportant, and when the primary goal of the firm is maximization of its
revenues in the face of regulatory legislation, then contract is at a decided
disadvantage to vertical integration by ownership.
Discrimination
When a differentiated market exists, it is possible for a monopolist to maxi-
mize his profits by charging different prices in the different markets.8  For
ton Act violation, but found no § 2(a) violation because of cost justification. See also FTC
v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959) (no cost justification defense under § 2(e)).
538. Of course, whether such "evasion" is socially desirable does not depend only on
the respective social or economic merits of contract integration as contrasted with owner-
ship integration, but also on one's evaluation of the philosophy and merits of these laws.
This Article does not attempt to give such an evaluation. This section of this study seeks
to analyze the law as it is rather than prescribe what the law should be. For penetrating
analyses of the merits of the Robinson-Patman Act and its consistency with the overall
goals of the antitrust laws, see Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patinan Act,
6 STAN. L. Ray. 3 (1953) ("economic analysis only") ; Rowe, Price Discrimination, Corn-
petition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinsonv-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951);
Simon, The Fantasy of the Phrase "Injury to Competition," 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD.
258 (1950); ATr'y GEN. NAr'L Comm. AlnusT REP. 155-221 (1955). See also Rowe,
Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 34 n.141 (1956) (collecting authorities) ; Patman, For H.R. 11 and
S. 11, 11 VAND. L. R .399 (1958); Comment, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 253 (1959).
539. BOULDING, EcoNomic ANALYSIS 608, 611-12 (3d ed. 1.955) ; STILEE, Tnz TuEoRy
OF PRICE 214-18 (rev. ed. 1952) (differentiated markets are those separated from one an-
other by time, space, or distribution methods) ; see id. at 214.
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purposes of analysis, let us assume that a monopoly of aluminum production
exists. In order to compete with copper for transmission line cable, the price
of aluminum must be lower than its price when it competes with steel for
aircraft structural use. The reason for this is the comparative substitutibility
of the competitive materials in the former market and the lack of substituti-
bility in the latter; copper can readily be substituted for aluminum in cable,
but steel cannot readily replace aluminum in aircraft manufacture. Charging
lower prices to cable makers than to airplane makers would maximize the
aluminum company's revenue. Two great obstacles exist, however, to such
a maximization scheme: (1) arbitrage between markets, and (2) the Rob-
inson-Patman Act, which forbids price discrimination.
Arbitrage, the movement of low-priced aluminum from the cable market to
the higher price aircraft market, would defeat the profit maximization plans
of the aluminum company because aircraft users would, out of "a primitive
aversion to buying at a higher price when a lower price is aiflable," buy
their aluminum from cable fabricators willing to resell to them. 0 Moreover,
charging different prices to different users may subject the aluminum com-
pany to the penalties of the Robinson-Patman Act, because the discrimination
will injure the "competition" by copper as a cable material.?" Forward
540. Id. at 215-16; BouWiNG, op. cit. sgpra note 539, at 608, 613-14.
541. Probably the buyers in the market in which the higher price vas charged could
not complain under the act, since the existence of differentiated markets negatives any
possibility of competitive injury. See Hearings Before the House Comitnifee on the Judi-
ciary, 7.4th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10, at 209 (1935); PATmAzz, THE RoBINsoN-P-Mr,;
AcT 59 (1938); cf. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959); General
Foods Corp., TADE REG. RmE. (1953-1954 FTC Cas.) f[ 25069 (1954) (FTC dismissal of
complaint, geographically separated markets). However, a Robinson-Patman § 2(a) or
§ 3 complaint could be made regarding the injury to the other sellers who compete for the
business of the buyers receiving the discriminatory price. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC,
148 F2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945), opinion amended, 155 F2d 1016
(2d Cir. 1946) (same commodity, different prices to noncompeting buyers); cf. Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) (geographical discrimination, local price wrar
only); General Foods Corp., supra (dissent) (same); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v.
Tatnall Measuring Syss. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1, 25-31 (E.D. Pa. 1958), off'd per curiam, 263
F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1959) (functional field licensing). But see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC,
supra (not § 2) ; United States v. . I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 231
(D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (du Pont escaped censure for charging different
cellophane prices to different industries) ; cf. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938). The competing sellers probably need not be sellers of the
same commodity as defendant, since courts now recognize the phenonmenon of cross-elas-
ticity. See note 161 supra, Comment, 68 YALE UJ. 1627 & nn.24, 25 (1959). But see dt
Pont, text at notes 305-08 sutpra,
The "good faith meeting of competition!' defense of Robinson-Patman § 2(b) is prob-
ably unavailable in the hypothetical case in the text because there is a system of consistent
price difference between markets, instead of "sporadic" price cutting to combat "raids." See
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957) ; FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 725 (1948) ; FTC v. A. F Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). But see ATr'y Grux.
NAT'L Comms. ANTmITUST REP. 182 (1955). The good faith defense is also probably un-
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vertical integration through ownership eliminates both these obstacles. When
a cable plant vertically integrated by ownership is set tip, no unwanted
arbitrage can occur,r42 and no unlawful price discrimination is apparent. 48
available if there is an intent to destroy competition or eliminate a competitor (cf. Robin-
son-Patman § 3). The fact that copper is the historical transmission cable material and
aluminum the "interloper" would probably lead a court or the FTC to the conclusion that
aluminum is trying to eliminate copper as a competitor. Moreover, it is unlikely that there
can be good faith meeting of competition when one tries to capture a new market by dis-
criminatory pricing. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249-50 (1951); Standard
Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1959) ; see Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). But see Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104
F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd, 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
991 (1956); Levy, How To Meet Price Competition, in How To CoMPLY WITH TUSE
ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 103, 108 (CCH 1957). The Balian; case has been strongly criti-
cized by the FTC. Hearings To Amend Section 2 of the Clayton Act Before the Subeoin-
inittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 84th Cong., Zd Sess.
227-28 (1956). The FTC has even taken the position that there cannot be good faith meet-
ing of competition when "injury to competition" (i.e., injury to competitors) occurs. Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1951). The bills, inter alia, S. 11, S. 315, H.R.
11, H.R. 384, H.R. 848, H.R. 927, H.R. 2788, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., propose to reverse the
Supreme Court's reversal of the FTC on this point.
542. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 436-38 (2d Cir.
1945), from which the illustration in text is taken. The merger in United States v. Colum-
bia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), may reveal an analogous attempt at geographical price
discrimination by means of vertical integration: UIS. Steel (in Utah) wished to secure
-Consolidated (in Los Angeles) as a customer. Id. at 506. It probably was willing to meet
the steel price offered by Kaiser's California plant, even though the greater distance of U.S.
Steel from Consolidated would entail freight absorption. However, at that time it appeared
that uniform FOB mill pricing ("uniform mill net") was compulsory. See Corn Prods. Ref.
Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 736-39 (1945) ; FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721-26
(1948) ; Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd
per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S.
956 (1949). Vertical integration by ownership made it possible to gain the customer with-
out risk of prosecution for receiving a higher "mill-net" from sales made to buyers in
San Francisco or Seattle.
Such behavior is rational, to be sure, only in an industry where price substantially ex-
ceeds marginal cost, and is not to be expected in highly competitive industries. Absent an
ample profit margin on steel, the "discrimination" would be irrational. See generally Com-
ment, 65 YAiE L.J. 34, 76-79 (1955). Compare Arr'y Gai. NAT'L COMm. ANTIThUST RLt.
334-35 (1955). Moreover, the plan results in the extension of the first monopoly to a second
level. In the example used, since the open market price the aluminum company sets for in-
got is so high that aluminum cable makers could not compete with copper cable makers,
no outsiders will be able to enter the aluminum cable market. The second monopoly may
be unwanted, but it is unavoidable if the discrimination plan is to succeed.
543. On the company books the price "charged" the wholly owned cable maker is the
price charged the sheet rollers. See Bork, Vertical Integration and the Shernman Act: The
Legal History of An Economic Misconception, 22 U. Cni. L. RaV. 157, 197 (1954) ; Com-
ment, 19 U. Cxi. L. Ray. 583, 613-14 (1952). However, a "squeeze" might be alleged by
independent aluminum cable makers, i.e., it could be claimed that the price differential which
the aluminum company maintains between ingot and cable is too small to cover the cost of
fabricating cable. See Jarrett v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 131 F.2d 674, 676 (5th Cir.
[Vol. 69:1
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Price Controls
Price controls affecting some levels of production or distribution can be
evaded through vertical integration by ownership when the integrated enter-
prise includes levels which are not under price control. For example, con-
sider an industry where statute prevents raising prices of raw or semifinished
materials. If price in -the finished goods market is determined only by supply
and demand, then ownership of the fabrication level may make it possible to
secure some of the profit which would naturally be available in a scarcity
situation.54 Or, in a regulated industry where the retail profit margin is fixed,
control of an earlier stage of production may make it possible to inflate
the cost base-for bookkeeping purposes only, of course--on which the fixed
profit margin is -taken and thereby make it possible to enjoy the benefits of
the later stage monopoly at the earlier stage."r
1942) ; Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 72 F2d 236 (2d Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 589 (1934); United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 Fed. 964,
982-85, 1007-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) ; Hearings Before the Subconnifttee ont Study of Monop-
oly Power of the House Committee o; the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., see. 14, pt. 6, at
310-1.1, 331, 333, 334, 345, 615-16 (1950). See also cases discussed in text at notes 310-34
supra. The "squeeze" and recoupment are thoroughly discussed and discounted as fallacies
in HALE & HALE, MAaxr PowER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHnmm Acr 223-27
(1958) ; Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 921, 937-46 (1949) ; Bork, supro
at 164-65, 182-84, 198-200. These studies show that, in a rational business order, vertical
integration will not be adopted in order to carry out such practices. Of course, that
"squeeze" is an economic fallacy does not mean that it will not occur in an irrational con-
text. See Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, The Struggle Betwen Independ-
ents and Chains, 99 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1051, 1153-59 (1951). Query: Could A & P's practices
described by Fulda reflect, attempts, albeit unsuccessful, to create barriers to entry by use
of discrimination, i.e., imposing high costs on newcomers to discourage them from entering
the market? See text at notes 64-77 supra. See also Kahn, Discrimination as a Barrier to
Entry: The Spark Plug Litigation, June 1959 (unpublished study in Yale Law School
Library). And should it occur, could an antitrust violation be found under Sherman Act
§§ 1-2, FTC Act § 5, or Robinson-Patman Act § 3?
544. See Cole, General Discussion of Vertical Integration, in VRmic&L I. EGRATio-.
IN MARKETING 12-13 (Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Research, U. Ill., No. 74, 1952) (forward
integration in textile industry during price control period) ; ef. Lockhart & Sacks, The
Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 H.Av. L. REv. 913, 943 (1952). When, instead of statute,
it is the force of public opinion which prevents raising of prices, vertical integration may
also occur. See Hearings Before the Subcomnittee ons Study of Monopoly Power of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, pt. 4a, at 302-06, 318, 321,
324, 339, 356 (1950) (forward integration by steel companies to secure "gray market"
profit margins).
545. Mc n, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS 16-17 (1957); Sheahan, Integration
and Exclusion in the Telephone Equipmitent Industry, 70 Q.J. EcoN. 249, 251 (1956) ; Adl-
man, supra note 522, at 43-44; see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 224-25
(1947); Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 152-53 (1930); Cole, supra note
544. See also Adelman, supra note 522, at 51; Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 21-23 (1957) (analogous tie-in situation). Para-
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On an overall evaluation, the more favorable position of ownership inte-
gration under pricing laws does not dictate the rejection of contract inte-
gration. It is submitted that the considerations discussed in part I of this
Article are much more important in deciding whether to integrate by owner-
ship or contract.546 Scale of operation is particularly significant in this con-
nection.
It is hardly reasonable, for example, to suppose that concern over the
Robinson-Patman Act would be the predominant factor urging a department
store to purchase a textile mill. On the other hand, when the department
store considers purchase of a costume jewelery manufacturer, the Robinson-
Patman factor might exert greater influence. Moreover, the adoption of
ownership may merely push the problem to a different level: even the most
thoroughly integrated firm is not as self-sufficient as Robinson Crusoe; it
must do some buying. 47 Desire to escape the operation of the Robinson-Patman
doxically, price regulation may occasionally force a utility to divest itself of ownership-
integrated sources of supply. Thus, Federal Power Commission regulation of the price
that integrated pipelines could charge themselves for natural gas caused them to
switch to contract integration because the price level the FPC set was below the going
market rate. McKiE, op. cit. supra at 18.
By the same token, taxable profits at one level of production or distribution can be
avoided by siphoning them off at another, nontaxable level. See Price v. Standard Oil Co.,
55 N.Y.S.2d 890, 894-95 (Sup. Ct. 1945), settlement noted and judgment modified, 273
App. Div. 890, 77 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1948) (avoidance of Venezuelan Government oil royalties
based on net profits of drilling subsidiary of Standard) ; Magill, Allocatiotn of Income by
Corporate Contract, 44 HARv. L. Rav. 935 (1931) (avoidance of state income taxes by cor-
porations doing business in several states).
546. There is an outstanding exception to this conclusion: the case of ownership back-
ward integration into wholesaling by retailers. Discussion of this problem is ommitted from
this study because of its relative lack of importance in the general industrial context con-
sidered here and because of the able treatment it has received elsewhere in the legal litera-
ture. See Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patma); Act, 6 STAN. L. Rrv. 3
(1953) ; Adelman, Corporate Integration, in How To COMPLY WITH THE ANTiTRUST LAWs
290, 294-96 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954). See also Ar'ay GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANITRUST
REP. 188-89, 207-09 (1955).
Moreover, with regard to resale price maintenance, an area where the philosophies of
the Sherman Act and Fair Trade Laws conflict, tapered vertical integration (i.e., the use
of both contract and ownership integration) is at a disadvantage with purely contractual
arrangements. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956) (resale
price maintenance in tapered integration context, held price-fixing) ; see Note, 64 YALE L.J.
426 (1955).
547. On the other hand, for a rhionopolist, any resale price maintenance contracts
are illegal. Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 828 (1947). However, the Robinson-Patman Act problems encountered on the new
level toward which the hypothetical industrialist integrates by ownership might prove less
serious than those he formerly faced. Thus, Professor Adelman suggests that denial of
functional discounts to A & P gives A & P an incentive to integrate backward to the manu-
facturing (i.e., canning) level. Adelman, Corporate Integration, supra note 546, at 298.
Perhaps, A & P would be less likely to get into Robinson-Patman Act difficulties as a
canner (i.e., purchaser of cans) than as a canned goods purchaser, but this is questionable.
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Act in occasional situations may add impetus toward a merger decision, but
it is unlikely that ownership integration can or does serve as an escape hatch
from all the problems this act poses for contract vertical integration.
APPENDIX
Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § I (1958):
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal ....
Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958):
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punish-
ments, in the discretion of the court.
Clayton Anti-Trust Act § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District
of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price,
on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such
lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
Clayton Anti-Trust Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958):
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Clayton Anti-Trust Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1958):
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more corporations
engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
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effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the
voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create monopoly.
This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for invest-
ment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting
to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor shall anything contained
in this section prevent a corporation engaged in commerce from causing the formation
of subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate lawful business,
or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from owning and holding
all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such for-
mation is not to substantially lessen competition.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
45 (1958) :
(1) Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce are declared unlawful.
Robinson-Patman Act § 1 (a), (b), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (b) (1958)
(a) ... [I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of
the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered:
Provided, however, That the Federal Trade Commission may, after due investigation
and hearing to all interested parties, fix and establish quantity limits, and revise the
same as it finds necessary, as to particular commodities or classes of commodities, where
it finds that available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render differ-
entials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any
line of commerce; and the foregoing shall then not be construed to permit differentials
based on differences in quantities greater than those so fixed and established: And
provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in
selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers
in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade: And provided further, That noth-
ing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response to
changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned,
such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obso-
lescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith
in discontinuance of business in the good concerned.
(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of
rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the
person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination:
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the
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prima-fade case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services
or facilities to any purchaser was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.
Robinson-Patman Act § 3, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or contract to sell,
which discriminates to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser, in that, any
discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge is granted to the purchaser
over and above any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge available
at the time of such transaction to said competitors in respect of a sale of goods of like
grade, quality, and quantity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the United
States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States
for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of
the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for
the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
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